JAMES C. HARTLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
ANTHONY ANDRIULI, D/B/A TONY BELMONT, AND SUSAN ANDRIULI, APPELLEES
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Hartley appeals a trial court order that set aside a dismissal and entered judgment against him based on a settlement agreement. The appellate court holds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal because the motion was filed more than one year after entry of the dismissal judgment, violating Florida Rule 1.540(b).
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal because the Andriulis failed to file their motion for relief within one year of the entry of the dismissal judgment, as required by Rule 1.540(b). The one-year time limit is jurisdictional and cannot be exceeded.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to set aside a final judgment of dismissal more than one year after its entry, absent grounds specified in rule 1.540(b) of the Florida R…
[2] A settlement agreement stipulating that the trial court will have continuing jurisdiction over a matter must be ratified or confirmed by the court to be effective.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the cause”
Statement of the court's holding regarding the trial court's lack of authority to set aside the dismissal judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn February 1988, the Andriulis sued Hartley for breach of a real estate contract. On March 8, 1988, the parties settled, with Hartley agreeing to pay…
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HALL, Judge.
The appellant, James C. Hartley, challenges a trial court order setting aside a final judgment of dismissal one year and ten months after its entry. Hartley contends that pursuant to rule 1.540(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the cause. We agree.
In February 1988, the appellees, Anthony and Susan Andriuli, filed suit against Hart-ley, seeking money damages for breach, or in the alternative, specific performance of a contract for the sale of certain real property.
On March 8, 1988, just prior to trial, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, Hart-ley agreed to pay to the Andriulis the sum of $27,500 in monthly installments of $250. The agreement also provided that should Hartley fail to cure any default within ten days of receiving notice thereof, the Andri-ulis would be entitled to “the entry of instanter of judgment.” It was further agreed that upon satisfaction of Hartley’s obligation, the case would be dismissed with prejudice. The parties thus stipulated that the trial court would have continuing jurisdiction in the matter. For some reason, a copy of the signed settlement agreement was never entered into the court file. Consequently, the agreement was never ratified or otherwise confirmed by the trial court as was required to confer continuing jurisdiction upon the court. In fact, the court file reflected absolutely no activity in the case beyond March 2, 1988.
On March 6, 1989, a notice of intent to dismiss for failure to prosecute for more than one year was served on all parties by the clerk of court. Upon receiving no response from either the Andriulis or Hart-ley, the trial court dismissed the action on May 2, 1989.
Approximately one year and ten months later, the Andriulis filed a motion to set aside the trial court’s order of dismissal, alleging Hartley had defaulted on his obligation. The Andriulis thus provided the court with a copy of the settlement agreement and requested that the court enter judgment in their favor for the outstanding balance of the obligation. Finding the An-driulis were entitled to judgment under the agreement, the trial court thereafter set aside its previous order of dismissal and entered final judgment for the Andriulis. The Andriulis do not dispute they received proper notice of the trial court’s intent to dismiss their action. It is also undisputed that, having received notice, the Andriulis did nothing to avoid the actual dismissal of the case. They further failed to file for relief from the judgment of dismissal within one year of its entry pursuant to rule 1.540(b); thus, the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant their motion to set aside the judgment. See Garvin v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 528 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
Based on the foregoing, we therefore reverse the final judgment entered in favor of the Andriulis pursuant to the settlement agreement and remand the cause with directions consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
SCHOONOVER, C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.
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Bank ONE v. Arleen Batronie and Gene Batronie, 884 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…0(b). Because the Homeowners’ motion was untimely filed, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the underlying foreclosure action permitting it to entertain a motion seeking to set aside the final judgment of foreclosure. See Hartley v. Andriuli 595 So. 2d 311, 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Once beyond the reach of rule 1.540(b), the final judgment of foreclosure “passed into the unassailable realm of finality.” See Holm v. Demetree, 681 So. 2d 868, 869 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). The lack of jurisdiction of the tria…
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In re Guardianship of Theresa Marie Schiavo v. Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…er. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) (stating that “[t]he motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than 1 year after the judgment, decree, order, or proceeding was entered or taken”); Hartley v. Andriuli, 595 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Wescott v. Wescott, 444 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. George Constr. Corp. 153 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). The Schindlers’ motion was filed more than one year after the entry of the final order in the…
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Wright v. Scott, 658 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…ore, the trial court was without jurisdiction to amend the final judgment by adding Wright, because more than one year had passed since entry of the last amended final judgment. Kippy Corp. v. Colburn, 177 So. 2d 193 (Fla.1965); Hartley v. Andriuli, 595 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); St. Cloud Utilities v. Moore, 410 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Avant v. Waites, 295 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). Even though Wright failed to raise this error below, it is fundamental error which can be raised for the first…
Authorities Cited
- Turner v. Turner, 528 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Garvin v. S.C. Ins. Co., 528 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)