ROBERT BELLAMY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Robert Bellamy appealed his sexual battery conviction on the grounds that allowing the victim to remain in the courtroom during trial pursuant to Florida's victim rights constitutional amendment violated his due process rights. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, holding that the victim's presence did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights because the jury was unaware of the victim's formal status and there was no evidence the presence prejudiced the defense.
The court held that the victim's presence in the courtroom did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. A 'victim' can be designated as such under the constitutional amendment even when the defendant contests the characterization by claiming consent. The victim's courtroom presence does not destroy the presumption of innocence or relieve the state of its burden of proof when the jury is unaware of the victim designation and there is no evidence the presence prejudiced the defendant.
[1] A crime victim's constitutional right to be present at trial may be exercised unless their presence interferes with the constitutional rights of the accused.
[2] The term "victim" in the context of a victim's rights amendment should be construed to effectuate the amendment's purpose and avoid absurd results.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Article I, section 16(b) entitles a crime victim to be present at trial unless such presence would interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused.”
Establishes the basic statutory right at issue and its constitutional limitation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBellamy was convicted of sexual battery. At trial, the victim was permitted to remain in the courtroom pursuant to Article I, section 16(b) of the Flo…
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SMITH, Judge.
Appellant appeals his conviction for sexual battery. We affirm and write only to address appellant’s contention that his constitutional rights to due process were violated when the trial court permitted the victim to be present in the courtroom during the trial pursuant to the 1988 “rights of victims” amendment to the Florida Constitution, Article I, section 16(b).
Article I, section 16(b) entitles a crime victim to be present at trial unless such presence would interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused. Appellant contends that because his defense was consensual sex, that his accuser could not be classified as a victim for purposes of the amendment until the jury decided whether to believe her version of the event or his. By permitting her presence in the courtroom, appellant contends, the trial court destroyed his presumption of innocence and relieved the state of the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
To give the construction to “victim” urged by appellant would undermine the purpose of the victim’s rights constitutional amendment. A constitutional provision is to be construed in such a manner as to make it meaningful, and a construction which will lead to an absurd result should not be adopted when another construction will accomplish the manifest intent and purpose of the people. Plante v. Smath-ers, 372 So. 2d 933, 936 (Fla.1979).
There was nothing in the manner or circumstances under which the provision in question was invoked which violated appellant’s rights. The jury was not made aware that his accuser was declared a “victim” and could remain in the courtroom. We find no substance to appellant’s contention that his presumption of innocence was destroyed by her presence. The state did not attempt to call her as a rebuttal witness, and there is no contention that her presence altered or affected the presentation of the state’s case, or that of the defense, in any way. No argument is made that the victim displayed any emotion or otherwise drew attention to herself while sitting in the courtroom, and we find no basis upon which it could be said that her presence could have prejudiced the jury against appellant. In short, appellant has not sustained his constitutional challenge.
AFFIRMED.
ERVIN and ALLEN, JJ., concur.
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Booker v. State, 773 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 2000)…99 So. 2d 978, 985-86 (Fla.1992) (defendant arguing that trial court erred in excusing victim’s stepmother from rule of sequestration solely because she was a relative of the victim); Sired v. State, 587 So. 2d 450, 454 (Fla.1991); Bellamy v. State, 594 So. 2d 337, 338 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (defendant claiming due process violation because trial court allowed victim to be present in courtroom during trial); cf. Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392, 395 (Fla.1996) (defendant claiming he was prejudiced by the fact tha…
Authorities Cited
- Plante v. Smathers, 372 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1979)