LIVINGSTON PERRY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Livingston Perry was convicted of cocaine sales and obstructing a police officer. On appeal, Perry challenged the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges against black jurors and the sufficiency of evidence for the obstruction conviction. The appellate court affirmed both the denial of the jury challenge and the obstruction conviction.
The court affirmed the trial court's determination that the prosecutor's peremptory challenges were not racially motivated and found merit in the obstruction conviction. Flight from police, coupled with apparent knowledge that one is the target of a lawful arrest, constitutes obstruction of a police officer's execution of legal duty.
[1] A prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges against minority jurors does not automatically constitute an abuse of discretion; the trial court's determination of whet…
[2] To sustain a conviction for obstructing a police officer without violence, the state must prove the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty and the de…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to sustain a conviction under section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1989), the state must prove that (1) the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty, and (2) the action by the defendant constituted obstruction or resistance of the lawful duty.”
Establishes the two-part test required for obstruction of a police officer conviction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn November 9, 1989, an undercover detective purchased crack cocaine from Johnny Griggs at an intersection in Jacksonville. Perry then approached the …
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WOLF, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of sale of cocaine and obstructing a police officer without violence. Appellant raises two issues: (1) Whether the trial court erred in not striking the venire panel where the prosecutor exercised two preemptory challenges against black jurors, and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of obstructing a police officer without violence. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that the prosecution’s challenges were not racially motivated, and affirm as to that issue without further discussion. See Files v. State, 586 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). We also find no merit in appellant’s other assertion.
On November 9, 1989, Detective Thurne, dressed in plain clothes, was portrayed to be a passenger in a taxicab driven by a fellow undercover detective. Detective Thurne was accompanied by a white female, and they proceeded to the intersection of Day and Fitzgerald Streets in Jacksonville. The detective observed a black male identified as Johnny Griggs standing on the edge of the street. Griggs yelled something, the taxi stopped, and Detective Thurne purchased $20 of what appeared to be crack cocaine. Detective Thurne testified that another individual climbed over the fence and approached the vehicle saying, “Don’t buy his, buy mine.” This individual was identified as the appellant, Livingston Perry. Perry placed a baggie into the detective’s hand containing four or five pieces of crack cocaine. The detective did not give money to Perry because he had already given a take-down signal to the surveilling undercover officers.
Detective Richardson, one of the uniformed police officers who participated in the buy-bust operation, testified that he first observed the appellant standing near the taxi and yelled, “Police!” Appellant looked directly at the officer and ran and jumped over a fence. Appellant was arrested several minutes later. In order to sustain a conviction under section 843.02, Florida Statutes (1989), the state must prove that (1) the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty, and (2) the action by the defendant constituted obstruction or resistance of the lawful duty. The facts in this case leave no doubt that Officer Richardson was engaged in a lawful duty. He was responding to a take-down call by undercover agents to whom the appellant had attempted to sell cocaine. He was attempting to arrest appellant.
Several cases have held that flight, standing alone, will not support a charge of obstructing a police officer in the lawful execution of a legal duty. See Nelson v. State, 543 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1989); F.E.C. v. State, 559 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1990). In F.E.C. v. State, the court noted that flight may be grounds for an obstruction charge if the individual flees knowing of the officer’s intent to detain him, and if the officer is justified in making the stop. That court reasoned that the flight then frustrates the officer’s right to make the stop and any inquiries. We find that under the facts of this case, the flight, coupled with the apparent knowledge of the appellant that he was the target of a lawful arrest by the police, constituted an obstruction of the officer’s execution of a legal duty.
We therefore affirm.
WIGGINTON and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
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Slydell v. State, 792 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…A 1992) (juvenile’s flight when ordered by officers to stop was not sufficient to support finding of guilt as to resisting arrest without violence, where officers had no basis for detaining juvenile at time they ordered him to stop); Perry v. State, 593 So. 2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (“Several cases have held that flight, standing alone, will not support a charge of obstructing a police officer in the lawful execution of a legal duty.”); Nelson v. State, 543 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (“Flight, stan…
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S.G.K. v. State, 657 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…. To support a conviction under section 843.02, the state must show: (1) the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty; and (2) the action by the defendant constituted obstruction or resistance of that lawful duty. Perry v. State, 593 So. 2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “[T]he crime of resisting an officer without violence did not take place if either [the officer] lacked an articulable well founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify the attempt to detain [the defendant] or if [the…
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Harris v. State, 647 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…ot remember what he had been starting to say to Michael Harris when Michael and Dion Harris fled. He did answer “no” to the question whether he had ever told them to stop, adding that he just ran after them when they took off. Unlike Perry v. State, 593 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), Michael Harris had no reason to be [*209] lieve he had done something illegal for which the police would be arresting him. The State argues that Michael should still have known the police wanted to question the passenger. Yet ev…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Nelson v. State, 543 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- F.E.C. v. State, 559 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Files v. State, 586 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)