DARIUS TOUSSAINT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Darius Toussaint appealed his adult sentencing, arguing that because he was 17 years old when he committed the offenses, the trial court was required by Florida Statute § 39.111(7)(d) to make specific findings explaining why juvenile sanctions were inappropriate before imposing adult sentences. The court vacated his sentences and remanded for resentencing with proper compliance with the juvenile sentencing statute.
The trial court was required to comply with § 39.111(7)(d) before imposing adult sentences on the defendant because he was 17 at the time of the offense. The defendant's age at the time of the offense, not at trial or sentencing, determines whether the statute applies. A juvenile's negotiated plea does not automatically waive the statutory requirements unless there is a manifest waiver in the plea agreement or on the record showing the defendant knowingly and intentionally relinquished those rights.
[1] A trial court must determine the suitability or non-suitability for adult sanctions before any other determination of disposition for a defendant who committed offenses a…
[2] Failure to follow statutory criteria for determining suitability for adult sanctions constitutes reversible error.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it is the age of the defendant at the time of the commission of the offense which is determinative of whether the provisions of section 39.111 apply, not the defendant's age at the time of trial or sentencing”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that a defendant's age at the time of the offense, not at sentencing, determines whether juvenile sentencing protections apply.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceToussaint was charged with several criminal offenses that occurred between May 8-11, 1990, when he was 17 years old (born September 2, 1972). He negot…
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COWART, Judge.
The defendant was charged with several criminal offenses, negotiated a sentencing plea agreement and the trial court imposed sentences in keeping with the plea agreement.
On appeal the defendant directs attention to the fact that the record (an arrest/notice to appear form) indicates the defendant was born September 2, 1972 and that the charges to which he pled guilty occurred between May 8-11, 1990, or before his 18th birthday, and argues, for the first time on appeal, that the trial court, before imposing adult sanctions on the defendant, was required by section 39.-lll(7)(d), Florida Statutes, to provide specific findings and reasons why juvenile sanctions were inappropriate and why the defendant should be sentenced as an adult. See Youngblood v. State, 560 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
Section 39.111(7), Florida Statutes (1989)1 applies to juveniles who are tried upon a direct information as well as to those transferred from the juvenile division. Austin v. State, 400 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), rev. denied, 408 So. 2d 1095 (1981). Further, it is the age of the defendant at the time of the commission of the offense which is determinative of whether the provisions of section 39.111 apply, not the defendant’s age at the time of trial or sentencing. Barkley v. State, 522 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Rathbone v. State, 448 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
Given the evidence in the record that the defendant was 17 years of age at the time he committed the offenses, the provisions of section 39.111(7)(c), (d) would apply to this case. The defendant did not raise this matter in the trial court but noncompliance with the provisions of section 39.111(7) has been held to constitute fundamental error which may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.1984).
Further, a juvenile’s negotiated plea of guilty does not automatically act as a waiver of the requirements of section 39.111(7).
Lang v. State, 566 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
In Lang, this court held that, “A juvenile can waive his rights under section 39.111 but such a waiver must be manifest either in the plea agreement or on the record.” 566 So. 2d at 1354. In this case, there is nothing in the record indicating the defendant was aware of and knowingly and intentionally waived his rights under section 39.111(7).
The defendant’s sentences are vacated and the cause remanded for the trial court to make a factual determination of whether or not the offenses for which the defendant was sentenced occurred before his eighteenth birthday, and if so, for the court to comply with section 39.111(7)(d), Florida Statutes (1989) and, in any event, to resentence the defendant.2 SENTENCE VACATED; CAUSE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . The Legislature overhauled Chapter 39 in 1990 and this included repeal of section 39.111, effective October 1, 1990. See Chapter 90-208, section 17, Laws of Florida. The provisions found in section 39.111(7) can now be found in section 39.059(7).
. The defendant, relying on guidelines departure cases, argues that where the trial court fails to initially give valid reasons for rejecting juvenile sanctions and for imposing adult penalties, on remand the defendant must be sentenced as a juvenile. See Pope v. State, 561 So. 2d 554 (Fla.1990).
In this case the trial court was apparently unaware of the applicability of section 39.111(7), therefore, this case is more like those guideline departure cases holding that a trial court may, following reversal and remand for resentencing, still depart where the court was unaware in • the initial sentencing that it had imposed a departure sentence. See State v. Betancourt, 552 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1989); Green v. State, 581 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Henderson v. State, 577 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), rev. denied, 589 So. 2d 291 (1991); Merritt v. State, 567 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
In any event this is a negotiated plea case, and if the trial court properly determines, under section 39.111(7), Florida Statutes, that juvenile sanctions are inappropriate and states why the defendant should be sentenced as an adult, OR the defendant with specific knowledge of his rights under section 39.111(7), Florida Statutes (1989) voluntarily and intentionally relinquishes and waives those rights, the same negotiated sentence imposed in this case can again be imposed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Ishan Sanders v. State, 638 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…980). Although the defendant was an adult at the time of sentencing, he was seventeen years old and thus a juvenile at the time of the offense; accordingly, Section 39.059(7), Florida Statutes (1991), was applicable to this ease. Toussaint v. State, 592 So. 2d 770, 771 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Barkley v. State, 522 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Rathbone v. State, 448 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The final judgments of conviction under review are affirmed. The sentences under review are, however, reversed, and…
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Evans v. State, 594 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…trial court’s required findings under Chapter 39, Florida Statutes. I believe a negotiated plea should require the juvenile’s waiver of the required trial court findings under Chapter 39. As stated by the Fifth District Court in Toussaint v. State, 592 So. 2d 770, 771 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992): [A] juvenile’s negotiated plea of guilty does not automatically act as a waiver of the requirements of section 39.111(7). Lang v. State, 566 So. 2d 1354 (Fla.5th DCA 1990). In Lang, this court held that, “A juvenile can w…
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Thompson v. State, 638 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…decision to sentence the appellant as an adult, as is required by section 39.059(7). See Croskey v. State, 601 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The statute applies even though the appellant reached adulthood before the trial. See Toussaint v. State, 592 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Therefore, we reverse and remand for resentencing. Reversed and remanded. RYDER, A.C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.…
Authorities Cited (12 total)
- Pope v. State, 561 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1990)
- State v. Learnhart Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1984)
- State v. Betancourt, 552 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1989)
- Lang v. State, 566 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
- Henderson v. State, 577 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Val Lee Rathbone v. State, 448 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Merritt v. State, 567 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Barkley v. State, 522 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Austin v. State, 400 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Youngblood v. State, 560 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)