ADDIE C. RICHARDSON, A FREE DEALER, APPELLANT,
v.
W. A. MYERS, M. D., R. T. JOUGHIN, SHERIFF OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEES

Fla. | 1932-07-08
Terrell and Davis, J. J., concur. ■, Buford, C.J., and Ellis and Brown, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
106 Fla. 136 Florida Supreme Court (1932) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 143 So. 157
Cited by 14 cases

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Synopsis

This case concerns whether a "lien" provision in a lease agreement constitutes a chattel mortgage enforceable in equity, even when the lessee claims homestead exemption on the property. The court held that such a provision creates a valid chattel mortgage and does not preclude equitable enforcement, even if statutory rent collection proceedings were initiated.


Holding

Yes, the lien provision in the lease agreement constitutes a chattel mortgage enforceable in equity. The statutory distress proceeding for rent does not preclude the equitable foreclosure of this chattel mortgage, and the lien is valid between the parties even with the lessee's claimed exemption.


Key Quotes

“It is hereby further agreed that the said lessor shall have a lien fob the payment of the rent aforesaid upon all the goods, chattels, fixtures and equipment of the said lessees which are or may be put on said demised premises and such lien may be enforced upon the non-payment of any of the rent aforesaid by the taking and sale of such property in the same manner as in the case of chattel mortgage or default thereof.”

This quote establishes the lease provision at the heart of the dispute, which the court interprets as a chattel mortgage.

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Facts & Procedural History

A married woman, operating as a "free dealer," leased premises and included a lease provision granting her a lien on the lessee's goods, chattels, fix…

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Opinion of the Court
Whitfield, P. J.

Whitfield, P. J.

In 1930 a married woman free dealer leased described premises with stated equipment and fixtures for a term of years, the lease being executed by both parties under seal and attested by two subscribing witnesses, and containing a provision that

“It is hereby further agreed that the said lessor shall have a lien fob the payment of the rent aforesaid upon all the goods, chattels, fixtures and equipment of the said lessees which are or may be put on said demised premises and such lien may be enforced upon the non-payment of any of the rent aforesaid by the taking and sale of such property in the same manner as in the case of chattel mortgage or default thereof.”

The lessor.brought suit alleging default in payment of $800.00 rent, and that complainant

“filed an affidavit and caused to be issued a distress for said sum of $800.00 upoh. certain personal property in said premises described upon the sheet hereto' attached marked exhibit ‘B’.”

That thereafter the lessee

“'did file a schedule and application for exemption; claiming the said property as exempt from seizure and sale, by reason of the fact that he was the head of a family residing in the State of Florida; that the property described on said sheet was and constituted his chattel ‘homestead exemption, and the Sheriff of Hillsborotigh County, Florida, thereupon delivered said property to the said lessee.”

That thereupon lessor borbade the lessee to remove the property

*138“from the place now stored, but the said lessee has refused to recognize the lien of your oratrix stipulated and agreed in said lease, and is removing, or attempting to remove said property, and your oratrix believes that the said lessee, unless restrained and enjoined * * * will move said property beyohd the jurisdiction of the Court. ’ ’

It is prayed that the lien of the lessor be enforced with appropriate injunctions, etc. A temporary injunction was granted. Later the bill of complaint was dismissed upon a motion filed December 1, 1931, as authorized by Section 33, Chapter 15658, 1931 Chancery Act; Section 4902 (14) Cumulative Supplement, 1932, to Compiled General Laws, 1927. The lessor appealed.

The appellant lessor in effect contends that the above quoted provisions in the lease contract gives her a chattel mortgage which she may enforce in equity against chattels of the lessee upon the leased premises; while the appellee lessee contends that the quoted provision in the lease contains no waiver of lien exemptions and is nothing more than the lien for rent given by statute to the lessor; and as the lessor had proceeded at law to enforce the statutory lien for rent, and the lessee’s exemption had been claimed in such proceedings, the lessor cannot now claim a right to enforce in equity a supposed chattel mortgage predicated upon the quoted provision of the lease so as to defeat the lessee’s already asserted exemption.

It is clear that the lien provision of the lease contract is and was intended to be a chattel mortgage to secure the payment of the rent in addition to the statutory lien for rent; and the distress proceeding for rent under the statute is. not inconsistent with and does not preclude a foreclosure in equity of the chattel mortgage, the lien given by the lease contract being sufficient without a waiver of exemptions. See Roper et al. v. Hackney et al, 15 Fla. 323, 330. Under the statute of 1853 the mortgage is a mere lien, L. *139& N. R. R. Co. v. Wang, 61 Fla. 299, 55 So. 73; Section 5725 Compiled General Laws, 1927. The description of the property covered by the lien is sufficient as between the parties.

“as against third persons a mortgage must point out its subject matter so that the third person may identify the property covered by the aid of such inquiries as the instrument itself suggests; but between the parties it is only necessary to identify the chattels so that the mortgagee may say with a reasonable degree of certainty what property is subject to his lien; and parol evidence is admissible to' more clearly identify it.” Davis et al. v. Horne, 54 Fla. 563, 45 So. 476.

See also 11 C. J. 456. The description in the Patterson-Taylor ease included “all the com and cotton that I may make the present year. ’ ’ The description of the mortgaged property in this case is “all the goods, chattels and fixtures and equipment of the said lessee which are or may be put on said demised premises.” The bill of complaint refers to personal property of the lessee “in southwest two rooms, Sulphur Springs Arcade Building” the leased premises being “the southwest two (2) rooms in the new Sulphur Springs Arcade Building.”

In Carter’s Administrators v. Carter et al., 20 Fla. 558, there was no mortgage or contract lien and the note merely agreed that all the debtor’s real and personal estate and effects should be subject to' levy and sale in execution, waiving and relinquishing all benefit of any law exempting such estate and effects from such levy and sale. The court held such waiver and agreement covering all of the debtor’s property to be inoperative as against the policy of the exemption laws of the State. Here a- contract lien was given on designated classes of property of the lessee, that may be identified as those “which are oí may be put on said demised premises. ’ ’ As between the parties such description is sufficient since the chattels referred to may with reasonable certainty be ascertained by the description given, the *140term of the lease being stated and the premises on which such chattels of the lessees “are or may be put” being specifically described.

Reversed.

Terrell and Davis, J. J., concur. ■

Buford, C.J., and Ellis and Brown, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment.


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Citator

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  • Lawson v. State, 125 Fla. 335 (Fla. 1936)
    …were stolen property, or knowledge of such facts on the receiver’s part as would put a man of ordinary intelligence and caution on inquiry as to their stolen character. Hart v. State, 92 Fla. 809, 110 Sou. Rep. 253; Williams v. State, 106 Fla. 225, 143 Sou. Rep. 157; Minor v. State, 55 Fla. 90, 45 Sou. Rep. 818. But in any case, if there be reasonable doubt as to the required guilty knowledge on the receiver’s part, or reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant had knowledge of subsidiary facts of such natur…
  • McQUEEN v. State, 304 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
    …permit, perhaps impel, the jury to have concluded that McQueen either knew, or should have known, that the calculator had in fact been stolen — an indispensable element of the crime with which he was charged. E. g., Williams v. State, 106 Fla. 225, 143 So. 157 (1932); Lampley v. State, Fla.App.1968, 214 So. 2d 515; Mayer v. State, Fla.App.1970, 231 So. 2d 540. Thus, there is no difficulty in concluding that all the evidence, including the confession, see Holland v. State, 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 298 (1897), a…
  • Johnson v. State, 127 Fla. 100 (Fla. 1937)
    …18; Franklin v. State, 66 Fla. 213, 63 So. 418; Worster v. State, 82 Fla. 463, 90 So. 188; Knowles v. State, 86 Fla. 270, 97 So. 716; Winton v. State, 87 Fla. 104, 99 So. 249; Hart v. State, 92 Fla. 809, 110 So. 253; Williams v. State, 106 Fla. 225, 143 So. 157. Roscoe Osteen and Earl Hickman, State witnesses, testified that they went to the defendant’s filling station about eight o’clock on the morning of March 6, 1936; that defendant told them that he wanted them to get him some fruit, five boxes of ora…

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