DONALD PRUESSMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
DR. JOHN T. MACDONALD FOUNDATION D/B/A DOCTORS HOSPITAL, CITY OF CORAL GABLES, AND COMMUNITY HEALTH OF SOUTH DADE, INC., APPELLEES
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Pruessman appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit against Doctors Hospital and the City of Coral Gables arising from his removal from the hospital under Florida's Baker Act. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the hospital was not liable for requesting a Baker Act commitment and the city police had no discretion to refuse custody based on a facially valid Baker Act certificate.
The court held that (1) Doctors Hospital is not liable as a matter of law because Dr. Lewis was not alleged to be an agent of the hospital and the mere request for a proper Baker Act commitment does not constitute a cognizable cause of action, and (2) the City of Coral Gables is not liable as a matter of law because police officers have no discretion to refuse custody when presented with a facially valid Baker Act certificate.
[1] A hospital is not liable for the actions of a physician not alleged to be its agent, even if the hospital requested the physician's involvement in a Baker Act commitment.
[2] A hospital's request for a proper Baker Act commitment does not, in itself, constitute a cognizable cause of action.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the defendant Doctors Hospital is not liable as a matter of law, under any of the causes of action pled herein, for the act of contacting Dr. Lewis for the purpose of having the plaintiff Donald Pruessman removed from Doctors Hospital under the authority of the Baker Act when the plaintiff refused to leave the hospital after his treating physician had discharged him, because (a) Dr. Lewis is not alleged to be an agent of Doctors Hospital and therefore the latter is not legally responsible for any action thereafter taken by Dr. Lewis”
Establishes that absent an agency relationship, a hospital cannot be held liable for independent actions of physicians contacted to initiate a Baker Act commitment.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePruessman was a patient at Doctors Hospital. After his treating physician discharged him, Pruessman refused to leave the hospital. Doctors Hospital co…
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PER CURIAM.
The final order of dismissal is affirmed as to the defendant Dr. John T. MacDonald Foundation d/b/a Doctors Hospital and the defendant City of Coral Gables upon a holding that (1) the defendant Doctors Hospital is not liable as a matter of law, under any of the causes of action pled herein, for the act of contacting Dr. Lewis for the purpose of having the plaintiff Donald Pruessman removed from Doctors Hospital under the authority of the Baker Act when the plaintiff refused to leave the hospital after his treating physician had discharged him, because (a) Dr. Lewis is not alleged to be an agent of Doctors Hospital and therefore the latter is not legally responsible for any action thereafter taken by Dr. Lewis, and (b) the mere request by Doctors Hospital for a proper Baker Act commitment does not in itself constitute a cognizable cause of action; and (2) the City of Coral Gables is not liable as a matter of law, under any of the causes of action pled herein, for the act of its police officers in taking the plaintiff in custody from Doctors Hospital based on Dr. Lewis’ facially valid, executed certificate under Section 394.463(l)(b)(3), Florida Statutes (1981), and thereafter transporting the plaintiff to a mental health facility because the police had no discretion to refuse to do so under the above statute upon presentation of the facially valid certificate. Compare Sapp v. City of Tallahassee, 348 So. 2d 363, 366 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 985 (Fla.1977) with Everett v. Florida Inst. of Technology, 503 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 5th DCA), appeal dismissed, 511 So. 2d 998 (Fla.1987). See Trushin v. State, 475 So. 2d 1290, 1292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 486 So. 2d 598 (Fla.1986); § 394.463(1)(b), Fla.Stat. (1981); 1974 Op. Att’y Gen.Fla. 074-108 (April 9, 1974).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Sapp v. City OF Tallahassee, 348 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Everett v. Fla. Inst. OF Tech., 503 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Trushin v. State, 475 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)