SHINTA MCCRAY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant's adult sentence for cocaine delivery was reversed because the trial judge failed to ensure she knowingly and intelligently waived her right to juvenile sanctions before imposing an adult sentence.
A juvenile defendant's waiver of the right to be sentenced as a juvenile must be knowing and intelligent, requiring the trial judge to affirmatively establish the defendant's understanding of sentencing alternatives and consequences.
[1] A juvenile defendant's waiver of the right to be sentenced as a juvenile must be knowing and intelligent, requiring the trial judge to affirmatively establish the defenda…
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Discussing the requirement for a valid waiver of juvenile sentencing rights under State v. Rhoden
Shinta McCray, age sixteen, was convicted by jury of delivering cocaine and sentenced to two years probation as an adult.…
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HALL, Acting Chief Judge.
The appellant challenges the two-year term of probation upon which she was placed pursuant to her conviction by a jury of delivering cocaine. She was sixteen years of age at the time of the offense. She contends the trial judge committed reversible error by merely stating she was not suitable for juvenile sanctions and failing to provide specific written reasons for imposing an adult sanction upon her. We agree.
We reject the state’s contention that the appellant waived her right to be sentenced as a juvenile under section 39.-111(6)(d), Florida Statutes (1987). Although a juvenile may waive her rights to be sentenced as a juvenile, that waiver must be knowing and intelligent. State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.1984). At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel requested both that the appellant be placed on probation and that she be sentenced as an adult and placed on community control. The judge did not ask the appellant whether she understood the sentencing alternatives and whether she was waiving her right to be sentenced as a juvenile and, if she was, whether she understood the consequences of that waiver. Thus, the appellant did not knowingly and intelligently waive her rights under section 39.111(6)(d).
Accordingly, we vacate the appellant’s sentence and remand for resentencing pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 39.111(6).
THREADGILL and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Norris v. State, 659 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…fendant himself can make a knowing and intelligent waiver of this right after being made aware of it and after the trial court makes the requisite written findings. Harris v. State, 633 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). See also McCray v. State, 588 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (trial court did not ask appellant whether she understood sentencing alternatives and whether she was waiving her right to be sentenced as a juvenile and, if so, whether she understood consequences of waiver). Courts have also emp…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Learnhart Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1984)