PAUL A. GAMBA, APPELLANT,
v.
MARY JOANN GAMBA A/K/A JOANN GAMBA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1991-10-09
Nos. 90-2362, 90-3190
GLICKSTEIN, C.J., and ANSTEAD and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
587 So. 2d 1162 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

In a dissolution of marriage appeal, the husband challenged an order denying his petition for modification, an award of attorney's fees to his former wife, and a contempt finding. The court affirmed most orders but reversed the attorney's fees award, requiring an evidentiary hearing with proper findings under the Rowe factors.


Holding

The court affirmed the orders denying modification and the contempt finding, but reversed the attorney's fees award and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The trial court must apply the Rowe factors (hourly rate, hours expended, and appropriate adjustments) and set forth specific findings supporting the fee award.


Headnotes

[1] An order denying a petition for modification of a final judgment of dissolution is affirmed when the trial court's decision is not erroneous.

[2] An order denying a motion for rehearing of an order denying a petition for modification of a final judgment of dissolution is affirmed when the original order was not err…

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Key Quotes

“[1]n computing an attorney fee, the trial judge should (1) determine the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation; (2) determine the reasonable hourly rate for this type of litigation; (3) multiply the result of (1) and (2); and, when appropriate, (4) adjust the fee on the basis of the contingent nature of the litigation or the failure to prevail on a claim or claims.”

Establishes the required Rowe factors for computing reasonable attorney's fees

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Facts & Procedural History

The husband appealed from multiple orders in a dissolution of marriage case, including denial of his modification petition and a contempt finding. The…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The husband appeals: (1) an order denying his petition for modification of final judgment of dissolution; (2) an order denying his motion for rehearing of the same; (3) an order awarding his former wife attorney’s fees; and (4) an order holding him in contempt. We affirm all of the orders except the award of attorney’s fees, which we reverse and remand with direction for an evidentiary hearing.

In Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1151 (Fla.1985), the Florida Supreme Court held:

n computing an attorney fee, the trial judge should (1) determine the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation; (2) determine the reasonable hourly rate for this type of litigation; (3) multiply the result of (1) and (2); and, when appropriate, (4) adjust the fee on the basis of the contingent nature of the litigation or the failure to prevail on a claim or claims. Application of Disciplinary Rule 2-106 criteria in this manner will provide judges with objective guidance in the awarding of reasonable attorney fees and allow parties an opportunity for meaningful appellate review.

Rowe requires the trial court not only to determine the proper amount of attorney’s fees by considering the hourly rate, the number of hours reasonably expended on the case, and the appropriateness of the reduction or enhancement figures but also requires that the trial court set forth specific findings as to these factors. Id. at 1151. Rowe is fully applicable to attorney’s fee determinations undertaken in the course of dissolution procedures. Tucker v. Tucker, 513 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); see also Frechter v. Frechter, 548 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

The only evidence contained within the record of the amount of attorney’s fees expended by the wife is an itemized billing statement of fees and costs attached to the wife’s motion for attorney’s fees. Even if this statement were sufficient to demonstrate the reasonable number of hours expended and a reasonable hourly rate, the award of attorney’s fees would still have to be reversed for a new evidentiary hearing due to the trial court’s failure to set forth specific findings. Lanham v. Lanham, 528 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Frechter. GLICKSTEIN, C.J., and ANSTEAD and HERSEY, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Ragar v. Diona Bruno Ragar, 600 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
    …o make appropriate findings in accordance with Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985) was error. Castranova v. Auth, 590 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 5th DCA1991); Prom v. Prom, 589 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1st DCA1991); Gamba v. Gamba, 587 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 4th DCA1991). Although the stipulation obviated the need to prove the amount of fees incurred, husband expressly reserved the issue of reasonableness. For that reason, the order awarding attorney’s fees does require reversal, remand for an app…

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