ARNETT C. GREENE AND FRANCIS T. GREENE, APPELLANTS,
v.
CHARLES R. BOYETTE, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Arnett and Francis Greene appealed a summary judgment awarding overdue mortgage payments plus interest and attorney's fees to Charles Boyette, the seller-financer of their apartment complex. The court affirmed the judgment on the merits but reversed the interest rate calculation, holding that the rate should be limited to the contract rate of 10.125% rather than the statutory default rate of 12%.
The court held that a suit for one installment payment does not preclude suit for later installments on a divisible contract, so the Greenes' defenses fail on this ground. However, the court reversed the interest rate award, holding that under Florida Statutes § 55.03(1), when a judgment is rendered on a written contract specifying a lower interest rate, that contract rate (10.125%) applies rather than the statutory default rate (12%).
[1] A suit for one installment payment under a divisible contract does not preclude a subsequent suit for later installment payments.
[2] A judgment on a written contract or obligation providing for a specific interest rate must bear interest at that rate, not the statutory default rate.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it is axiomatic that a suit for one installment payment does not preclude suit for a later installment on a divisible contract”
Establishes that the Greenes' res judicata argument fails; successive installment suits are permissible under Florida law
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBoyette sold an apartment complex to the Greenes on May 25, 1988, personally financing 96% of the $240,000 purchase price at 10.125% interest with mon…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Divisible Contract cases and more on FLexlaw
SHIVERS, Judge.
This appeal is from a summary final judgment awarding past due installment payments plus interest and attorney’s fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Charles Boyette sold an apartment complex in Jacksonville to Arnett and Francis Greene on May 25, 1988. The Greenes executed and delivered a mortgage and note to Boyette, who personally financed ninety six percent of the purchase price. The principal amount of the note is $240,-000. The interest rate is ten and one eighth percent. The monthly payments are $2,202.07 for fifteen years.
On February 16, 1990, Boyette sued the Greenes to recover overdue payments from September 1988 through January 1990. On August 3, 1990, the trial court granted summary judgment for Boyette and awarded him $16,125.40, including interest and attorney’s fees. The Greenes paid the judgment.
On October 15, 1990, Boyette sued the Greenes to recover overdue payments from February 1990 through September 1990. On January 11, 1991, the trial court granted summary judgment for Boyette and awarded him $22,325.84, including interest and attorney’s fees. The trial court ruled the total amount “shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date hereof until paid....”
The Greenes first argue that the doctrines of merger, estoppel by judgment, and res judicata should prevent Boyette from becoming unjustly enriched by suing twice to recover overdue payments. We reject this argument because “it is axiomatic that a suit for one installment payment does not preclude suit for a later installment on a divisible contract....” Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, Inc., 150 So. 2d 468, 472 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963).
The Greenes next argue — and Boy-ette concedes — that the trial court erred by awarding interest at a rate greater than ten and one eighth percent. Section 55.-03(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides:
A judgment or decree entered on or after October 1, 1981, shall bear interest at the rate of 12 percent a year unless the judgment or decree is rendered on a written contract or obligation providing interest at a lesser rate, in which case the judgment or decree bears interest at the rate specified in such written contract or obligation.
Accordingly, we reverse the award of interest to the extent its rate exceeds ten and one eighth percent. The summary final judgment is otherwise affirmed.
AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.
WOLF, J., and WENTWORTH, S.J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2004)…predicated upon subsequent and different defaults present a separate and distinct issue. See Olympia Mortgage Corp., 774 So. 2d at 866 (“We disagree that the election to accelerate placed future installments at issue.”); see also Greene v. Boyette, 587 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that a mortgagee can successfully recover twice on one mortgage for multiple periods of default because the payments were different “installments”). For example, a mortgagor may prevail in a foreclosure action by de…
-
U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Bartram, 140 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)…ent defaults present a separate and distinct issue. See Olympia Mortgage Corp [v. Pugh], 774 So. 2d [863] at 866 [ (Fla. 4th DCA 200) ] (“We disagree that the election to accelerate placed future installments at issue.”); see also Greene v. Boyette, 587 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that a mortgagee can successfully recover twice on one mortgage for multiple periods of default because the payments were different “installments”). For example, a mortgagor may prevail in a foreclosure action by de…
-
Christiana Tr. for Arlp Tr. 4 v. Eliezer Taveras and Valeria Taveras, 186 So. 3d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)…nt defaults present a separate and distinct issue. See Olympia Mortgage Corp. [v. Pugh, 774 So. 2d 863, 866 (Fla. 4th DCA [*52] 2000) ] (“We disagree that the election to accelerate placed future installments at issue.”); see also Greene v. Boyette, 587 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding' that a mortgagee can successfully recover twice on one mortgage for multiple periods of default because the payments were different “installments”). For example, a mortgagor may prevail in a foreclosure action by d…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, Inc., 150 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)