UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA/STATE OF FLORIDA AND CRAWFORD & COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
MARVENE GLEAVES, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1991-09-23
No. 90-2201
BOOTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
586 So. 2d 458 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded a workers' compensation judge's order awarding temporary partial disability benefits, finding the order violated statutory limits and lacked sufficient specificity for meaningful appellate review. The court also struck portions addressing a third-party tort-feasor lien that was outside the judge's jurisdiction and remanded issues regarding travel expense awards and the effect of sick leave benefits.


Holding

The court reversed the award of temporary partial disability benefits as facially exceeding statutory limits and insufficiently detailed for appellate review. The court struck the portions addressing the third-party tort-feasor lien as outside the judge's subject matter jurisdiction. The court reversed the travel expense award as insufficiently detailed and remanded for clarification regarding the effect of sick leave benefits on temporary partial disability awards.


Headnotes

[1] An order awarding temporary partial disability benefits must be sufficiently specific regarding the amount awarded to allow for meaningful appellate review.

[2] A judge of compensation claims lacks subject matter jurisdiction to resolve disputes over third-party tort-feasor liens, which are vested in the appropriate circuit court…

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Key Quotes

“the order on appeal is facially incorrect in its award of temporary partial disability benefits for a period in excess of five years, in contravention of section 440.15(4)(e), Florida Statutes”

Establishes that the award violated statutory limits on temporary partial disability benefits

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Facts & Procedural History

Marvene Gleaves received a workers' compensation award from a judge of compensation claims. The order awarded temporary partial disability benefits fo…

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Opinion of the Court
WIGGINTON, Judge.

WIGGINTON, Judge.

Appellants, employer/carrier, appeal the judge of compensation claims’ order awarding benefits to appellee. We reverse and remand.

As appellants correctly assert, the order on appeal is facially incorrect in its award of temporary partial disability benefits for a period in excess of five years, in contravention of section 440.15(4)(e), Florida Statutes. Although the record does contain some evidence of appellee’s temporary partial disability, including hearsay testimony to which appellants did not object, the order is so nonspecific as to the amount of temporary partial disability awarded that meaningful review of that award by this court is impossible. See Trujillo v. Southern Wine and Spirits, 525 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Therefore, we reverse the award of temporary partial disability benefits and remand for entry of an adequately specific order on this issue.

The JCC also erred in assuming jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ dispute over a third-party tortfeasor lien when section 440.39(3)(b), Florida Statutes, specifically provides that subject matter jurisdiction of that dispute rests in the appropriate circuit court. Therefore, we strike the portions of the order on appeal which address that question.

Further, the JCC’s award to appel-lee of expenses incurred in traveling for authorized treatment again is so insufficiently detailed that this court cannot be intelligently apprised as to the rationale of the JCC in making such an award and as to the exact amount of the award made. Therefore, we reverse the portions of the order addressing the award of travel expenses and remand to the JCC for entry of a sufficiently detailed order in this regard. See Mills v. Walden-Sparkman, Inc., 493 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

Finally, upon reversal and remand, we direct the JCC to again address the question of the effect of appellee’s receipt of sick leave benefits during her period of temporary partial disability, especially in light of the decisions in Brown v. S.S. Kresge Company, Inc., 305 So. 2d 191 (Fla.1975) and Belle v. General Electric Company, 409 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In making his determinations on this issue, the JCC is further directed to provide sufficient detail in his order to apprise the reviewing court of his rationale.

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BOOTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • IMC Agrico MP v. Faulk, 783 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
    …rtfeasor] and there is no appeal provided for to the Deputy Commissioner or to the Full Commission”); Murray v. Harborside Hosp., 634 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (construing § 440.39(3)(b), Fla. Stat.); University of Cent. Fla. v. Cleaves, 586 So. 2d 458, 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (same). Affirmed. VAN NORTWICK and LEWIS, JJ., concur.…
  • Murray v. Harborside Hosp., Inc., 634 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
    …the judge also referred to an employer/carrier lien on the proceeds of the claimant’s settlement of a third-party action. The circuit court is the jurisdictional forum for any disputes regarding such a lien. University of Central Florida v. Gleaves, 586 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); § 440.39(3)(b), Fla.Stat. We therefore strike the language in the order addressing the employer/carrier lien. The appealed order is reversed' insofar as it denies attendant care reimbursement prior to the date of the claim. Th…

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