IN THE INTEREST OF F.M., JR., A CHILD
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WIGGINTON, Judge.
We affirm the order of the trial court terminating the parents’ rights to F.M., Jr. After carefully studying the record and authority cited, and after receiving the benefit of argument by counsel on behalf of the parties, we are unable to say that “no one could reasonably find the evidence to be clear and convincing.” In the Interest of D.J.S. and J.S.G., 563 So. 2d 655, 662 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
However, we must reverse that portion of the final order allowing the mother to retain visitation rights. Apparently, the court’s attention was never directed to section 39.47(2), Florida Statutes (1989), which denies the natural parents any knowledge, at any time after the order terminating parental rights is entered, “of the whereabouts of the child or of the identity or location of any person having the custody of or having adopted the child.” Accordingly, we strike that portion of the order making allowance for such visitation.
SMITH and KAHN, JJ., concur.
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Mitchell v. State, 678 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…ndant could not be habitualized for possession of cocaine). Additionally, a defendant cannot be habitualized for a misdemeanor. Pace v. State, 662 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Cribbs v. State, 599 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); DuBose v. State, 585 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Therefore, it is reversible error to habitualize Mitchell’s sentence in Count V for possession of drug paraphernalia, a first-degree misdemeanor pursuant to section 893.147(1), Florida Statutes. We strike these two habitual felo…
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Cribbs v. State, 599 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…al offender classification cannot be based on non-sequential convictions was rejected in State v. Barnes, 595 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1992). However, Cribbs is correct that habitual offender status does not apply to misdemeanors (Count III), DuBose v. State, 585 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), and that the maximum habitual offender sentence for a third-degree felony (Count II) is 10 years. Section 775.084(4)(a)3., Fla.Stat. (1989). Cribbs’ stipulations do not bar these arguments, in that a defendant cannot concede to…
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Teasley v. State, 610 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…84-4947. The two other cases also contain sentencing errors which require trial court action. In count four of case number 90-5483, which was a misdemeanor charge, the court erred in designating Teasley as a habitual offender. See DuBose v. State, 585 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (habitual offender status cannot be invoked for a misdemeanor). This case must be remanded for the trial court to correct the written sentencing order by deleting the habitual offender designation for count four. In case number…
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- IN the Interest OF D.J.S. and J.S.G. v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 563 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)