COLUMBUS FERRY SIPLIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant challenges his cocaine delivery conviction on appeal, raising issues regarding the discrepancy between the trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence and its written probation order regarding contact restrictions, and the imposition of court costs without notice. The court holds that while oral pronouncements prevail over written ones, the provisions do not conflict, but also strikes certain improperly imposed costs and remands for reconsideration of others.
The court holds that while oral pronouncements of sentence prevail when they conflict with written orders, the provisions here do not conflict and are reconciled to mean appellant cannot contact the victim or state's witnesses. However, the court affirms statutorily mandated costs of $220 that may be imposed without actual notice, but reverses and remands regarding other costs not authorized by statute and a court improvement fund fee that require proper notice and hearing.
[1] When a written probation order conflicts with the oral pronouncement of sentence, the oral pronouncement prevails.
[2] A written condition of probation that prohibits contact with "the victim or any witnesses" is not in conflict with an oral pronouncement prohibiting contact with "the vic…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“statutorily mandated costs may be imposed on an indigent defendant without actual notice and without a determination, at the time of imposition, of the defendant's ability to pay”
Establishes the rule allowing imposition of certain statutorily mandated costs without procedural protections
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Columbus Ferry Siplin was convicted of delivery of cocaine. At sentencing, the trial court orally imposed a condition that Siplin have no co…
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PATTERSON, Judge.
The appellant challenges his judgment and sentence for delivery of cocaine. He raises five points on appeal; however, we address only his arguments that the trial court’s written probation order differs from the court’s oral pronouncement of sentence and that court costs were imposed upon him without proper notice.
At sentencing, the trial court stated that the appellant was not to have any contact with “the victim involved in the burglary or any of the witnesses that testified against [the appellant] in the trial of this case.” The court’s written probation order, condition (9), provides that the appellant is to have “[n]o contact with the victim or any witnesses.”
The appellant argues that the court’s written condition of probation is broader than its oral pronouncement. He argues that when a written pronouncement of sentence conflicts with a written order, the oral pronouncement should prevail. While we agree that oral pronouncements should prevail, Zachary v. State, 559 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), we do not believe the provisions conflict. Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity we construe the written condition of probation to logically mean that the appellant is not to have any contact with the victim or the state’s witnesses.
The appellant also argues that the trial court erred in imposing $240 in court costs without notice or the opportunity to object. The final judgment reflects that $200 in costs were imposed pursuant to section 27.3455, Florida Statutes (1989), and $20 in costs were imposed pursuant to section 960.20, Florida Statutes (1989). We affirm the final judgment as to these costs since “statutorily mandated costs may be imposed on an indigent defendant without actual notice and without a determination, at the time of imposition, of the defendant’s ability to pay.” State v. Vamper, 579 So. 2d 730 (Fla.1991); State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla.1991).
We strike the costs imposed pursuant to two other statutes printed on the final judgment, section 943.25(4) and 943.-25(8), Florida Statutes (1989). These citations are apparently misprinted on the form, as these statutes do not authorize the imposition of costs. We also strike the $15 fee designated for the “Court Improvement Fund,” which is not a statutorily mandated cost. The state may seek to reimpose these costs after proper notice and the opportunity to be heard.
Reversed in part and remanded.
FRANK, A.C.J., and HALL, J., concur.
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Cited By (11 total)
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Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Brewer v. State, 531 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Wright v. State, 531 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Varela v. State, 550 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Zachary v. State, 559 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Siplin v. State, 584 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Alfonso v. State, 595 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Gawron v. State, 597 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Williams v. State, 601 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Reberv. State, 611 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Douglas v. State, 62…
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Gawron v. State, 597 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…HALL, Acting Chief Judge. We find merit only in Gawron’s argument that he was improperly ordered to pay $100 to the Hillsborough County Court Improvement Fund without being afforded adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. Siplin v. State, 584 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Accordingly, we strike the $100 without prejudice to the state to seek to reimpose this cost after giving Gawron proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. Gawron’s judgments and sentences are affirmed, but the $100 cost i…
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Alfonso v. State, 595 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…orally pronounced. However, special conditions 6, 11, 21, and 22 are either unauthorized or may be authorized only if orally imposed and must, therefore, be stricken. Various court costs were also imposed against appellant. As in Siplin v. State, 584 So. 2d 599 (Fla.2d DCA 1991), we strike costs imposed pursuant to two statutes printed on the final judgment, sections 943.25(4) and 943.25(8), Florida Statutes (1989), as these statutes are apparently misprinted and do not authorize imposition of costs. We al…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1991)
- State v. Vamper, 579 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1991)
- Haven Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kirian, 579 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1991)
- Zachary v. State, 559 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)