GARRETT EMIL WRIGHT, A/K/A DERRICK TALBERT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Garrett Emil Wright was convicted of armed robbery by a jury in Florida state court. On appeal, Wright challenged the trial court's admission of hearsay testimony from an investigating officer regarding statements made by witness Willie Burnett. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding that Wright had opened the door to the hearsay evidence through his own cross-examination strategy.
The trial court properly admitted the hearsay testimony because the defendant opened the door to its admission through his own cross-examination strategy. Although general Confrontation Clause principles prohibit introducing incriminating statements without affording the accused an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, the defendant's counsel injected Burnett's name and the basis of his statement into the trial, thereby waiving the hearsay objection.
[1] Testimony is admissible on redirect examination which tends to qualify, explain, or limit testimony given on cross-examination.
[2] A defendant may open the door to the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay testimony through cross-examination that elicits partial or misleading information.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We agree, as does the state, that it is improper to introduce statements that incriminate an accused without affording him an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.”
Establishes the general Confrontation Clause principle that applies to hearsay evidence incriminating a defendant
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWright was charged with armed robbery of a convenience store in Pinellas County, Florida. The state presented two witnesses: the victim and the invest…
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SCHOONOVER, Chief Judge.
The appellant, Garrett Emil Wright, a/k/a Derrick Talbert, challenges the judgment and sentence imposed upon him after he was found guilty by a jury of the crime of armed robbery. We affirm.
The appellant raises four points on appeal. Although we reject all of the appellant’s contentions, one of his points requires discussion. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the investigating officer to testify with respect to a statement of a witness who did not testify.
The appellant was charged with the armed robbery of a convenience store in Pinel- las County, Florida. The state presented two witnesses at the appellant’s trial, the victim and the investigating officer. The officer testified that she talked to the victim and that the victim had identified the appellant from a photopak that she had put together. On cross-examination, the officer was asked if fingerprints taken from the scene were compared with others, including those of one Willie Burnett. She was also asked if she had spoken with any witnesses whose statements ultimately led to the appellant’s arrest. She responded in the affirmative and testified that she had talked to Willie Burnett. Further cross-examination established that Willie Burnett was the only witness that gave information leading to the appellant’s arrest and that the photo-pak was created based upon this information. The appellant’s attorney concluded his cross-examination of the officer by having her testify that Willie Burnett was at that time in jail in Pinellas County.
On redirect examination, the officer, over the objection of the appellant, was allowed to testify to the contents of her conversation with Willie Burnett. The officer testified that Willie Burnett told her that he drove the appellant to the store, waited for him to rob the store, and had received about $15 for his part in the robbery.
We agree, as does the state, that it is improper to introduce statements that incriminate an accused without affording him an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. It is immaterial whether the situation arises because the statements are introduced through the testimony of a third party, as in this case, or because the person who made the statement, e.g., an accomplice or codefendant, takes the stand and refuses to answer questions concerning the statements. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); Hall v. State, 381 So. 2d 683 (Fla.1978). In this case, however, the appellant through his actions and cross-examination, opened the door for the testimony, and it was, therefore, properly admitted.
During his opening statement, the appellant informed the jury that they were going to hear that the officer talked to certain witnesses before the appellant was arrested and asked them to listen carefully to what those witnesses told her. The witness’s name was subsequently injected into the trial by the appellant’s counsel through questions concerning fingerprints and then through questions concerning the basis for the appellant’s arrest.
As a general rule, testimony is admissible on redirect examination which tends to qualify, explain, or limit testimony given on cross-examination. Tompkins v. State, 502 So. 2d 415 (Fla.1986). Since the appellant’s questions established that, Willie Burnett’s statement was the basis for the appellant’s arrest, the door was opened for the state’s questions which clarified the testimony elicited by the appellant. Hinton v. State, 347 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). See also Walton v. State, 481 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1985); Adamson v. State, 569 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
Furthermore, the appellant’s statements and questions could easily have led the jury to infer that the statement which was the basis of the arrest was not sufficient to arrest the appellant. The' state was, accordingly, properly allowed to ask the nature of the statement to rebut this inference. Tompkins.
We, accordingly, affirm the judgment and sentence imposed upon the appellant.
DANAHY and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
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Wyon Dale Childers v. State, 936 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)…Tompkins v. State, 502 So. 2d 415 (Fla.1986) (holding that defense counsel opened the door to the State’s redirect questions establishing that the murder victim had begged her mother to stay out of relationship with the defendant); Wright v. State, 582 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (holding that defense counsel on cross examination opened the door to allow the State on redirect examination to introduce statements of accomplice inculpating defendant). Cf. Pacheco v. State, 698 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 199…
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Pacheco v. State, 698 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…o rely on the doctrine of completeness as justification for admitting the information from Neilson’s statement. Under that doctrine, redirect testimony is admissible to qualify, limit or explain testimony given on cross-examination. Wright v. State, 582 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). For example, if the defendant asks a witness questions designed to bring forth favorable portions of a eode-fendant’s statement, the prosecutor properly may inquire about the remainder of the code-fendant’s confession, inclu…
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Cartwright v. State, 885 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…rial court’s ruling. The “opening the door” concept is based on considerations of fairness, and as a general rule, testimony is admissible on redirect which tends to “qualify, explain, or limit testimony given on cross-examination.” Wright v. State, 582 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). However, while admission of the collateral crimes evidence may not have been [*1014] error standing alone, the prejudice results ing from this evidence was compounded by the state’s closing argument, which highlighted this…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (U.S. 1968)
- Tompkins v. State, 502 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1986)
- Walton v. State, 481 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1985)
- Hall v. State, 381 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1979)
- Hinton v. State, 347 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Adamson v. State, 569 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)