JOHN D. SAVAGE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that a defendant's waiver of counsel during probation violation proceedings was insufficient without a thorough inquiry into the defendant's comprehension and capacity to make an intelligent choice.
Appellant challenged the trial court's acceptance of his waiver of counsel during probation violation proceedings. The trial court did not conduct a f…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Knowing And Voluntary Waiver cases and more on FLexlaw
WOLF, Judge.
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in accepting appellant’s waiver of counsel during proceedings on his violation of probation.1 It is undisputed that appellant is entitled to an attorney to represent him during a violation of probation. State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1985). The sole issue concerns the sufficiency of appellant’s waiver of counsel.
Appellee concedes that the trial court did not conduct a full-scale inquiry to determine the competency of the waiver. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The appellee argues, however, that the law is clear; even in the absence of a proper Faretta hearing, a sixth amendment violation will not occur in those rare cases where the record may support a knowing waiver of counsel. Strozier v. Newsome, 871 F. 2d 995, 997 (11th Cir.1989). The record in the instant case, however, neither supports a voluntary and knowledgable waiver, nor is there any indication of compliance with Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(2), which states
[a] defendant shall not be deemed to have waived the assistance of counsel until the entire process of offering counsel has been completed and a thorough inquiry into accused’s comprehension of that offer and his capacity to make that choice intelligently and understandingly has been made.
We, therefore, must reverse the order of revocation and remand for further proceedings.
ZEHMER and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . In light of our holding herein, it is unnecessary to address appellant’s other point on appeal.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1985)
- Strozier v. Lanson Newsome, 871 F.2d 995 (11th Cir. 1989)