WILLIAM G. GLYNN, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY AND BONINA INSURANCE, INC., JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court reversed a judgment for an insurance company in a dispute over uninsured motorist coverage, holding that an independent insurance agent acting under a written agency agreement with the company can be the company's agent for purposes of obtaining rejection of uninsured motorist coverage, thereby binding the company by the agent's acts or omissions.
An independent insurance agent licensed with the state to write for an insurance company, even though also licensed to represent other companies, is the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of obtaining rejection of uninsured motorist coverage. The company may be bound by the acts or failure to act of such an agent in this regard.
[1] An insurance agent acting under a written agency agreement for an insurance company, using company-supplied forms, and required to account to the company is the company's…
[2] An insurance agent licensed with the state to write for a company is the company's agent for the purpose of obtaining a rejection of uninsured motorist coverage, even if…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is clear from findings and statements in the judgment that the company would not have prevailed but for the trial court's conclusion that the insurance agent must, as a matter of law, be considered the agent of the insured for all purposes.”
Establishes the trial court's erroneous legal conclusion that forms the basis for reversal.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGlynn was not advised of his uninsured motorist coverage options, and an employee of the insurance agency apparently signed his name to company forms.…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Agency Agreement cases and more on FLexlaw
STONE, Judge.
We reverse a final judgment for the defendant-insurer in an action to determine the insured's rights to expanded uninsured motorist coverage. It is clear from findings and statements in the judgment that the company would not have prevailed but for the trial court’s conclusion that the insurance agent must, as a matter of law, be considered the agent of the insured for all purposes.
Glynn was not advised of his uninsured motorist options and an employee of the agency apparently signed his name to the company forms. The agent was not simply a “broker,” but was acting under a written agency agreement for the company and was apparently a “licensed” agent (although the specific proof of this fact does not appear in our record). The agent also represented three or four other companies. The agency’s contract authorized it to bind the company until any subsequent rejection, and the agent used company supplied forms. The agent was required to account to the company every fifteen days.
In Quirk v. Anthony, 563 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), the court, in resolving a similar issue, noted the significant difference between acting as an insurance “broker” and an insurance “agent.” The court in Quirk concluded that an agent licensed with the state to write for a company, even though also a licensed agent for other companies, is the company’s agent for the purpose of obtaining a rejection of uninsured motorist coverage. See also Rodriguez v. American United Ins. Co., 570 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
While recognizing that the trial court did not have the benefit of these recent opinions, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that an independent insurance agent may not be the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of obtaining a rejection of uninsured motorist coverage, while at the same time acting as the agent of the insured for other purposes. Therefore, the company may be bound by the acts or failure to act of the agent in this regard.
We have considered Gazie v. Illinois Employers Ins. of Wausau, 534 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 545 So. 2d 1367 (Fla.1989) and Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Koven, 402 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), and find nothing in Koven or the majority opinion in Gazie to be inconsistent with this opinion. Therefore, the final judgment is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
WARNER and POLEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 2001)…es, the answer to the first and second issue may depend on resolution by the trier of fact of whether the agent was acting as either the agent for the insurer or the insured — or acting in both capacities. See, e.g., Glynn v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 578 So. 2d 36, 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Thus, the operative facts in the two causes of action may be intertwined. In fact, the case before us is one where the insured could have elected to plead in the alternative regarding whether Bruner was his agent or the insu…
-
Warren v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 662 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…f Dairyland had issued a liability policy and its agent had improperly explained uninsured motorist coverage to plaintiffs, Dairyland could be liable for uninsured motorist coverage equal to the liability limits. See Glynn v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 578 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Russell, 527 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Alternatively, Dairyland could be vicariously liable for the negligent misrepresentations if the insurance agency were acting as agent for Dairyland at the ti…
-
Sommers v. Smith & Berman, P.A., 637 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…lawyer or title company might wear “two hats,” in selling the title insurance and closing the sale, does not make the title insurance company liable for the mishandling of the real estate closing. See also, Glynn v. New Hampshire Insurance Company, 578 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (an agent can be the agent of the insurance company for one purpose and the agent of the insured for other purposes). Florida has a statute which authorizes a title insurer to undertake more responsibility in a closing besides i…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Koven, 402 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Quirk v. Anthony, 563 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Gustav Thorarinsson v. Robert F. Wilson, Inc., 563 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Rodriguez v. Am. United Ins. Co., 570 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Gazie v. Ill. Emp'rs Ins. OF Wausau, 534 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)