EARNEST BELL, ETC., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1991-03-21
No. 90-1422
DIAMANTIS, J., concurs., DAUKSCH, J., concurs in part; dissents in part with opinion.
576 So. 2d 881 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Bell appeals his resentencing as a habitual offender, challenging the inclusion of a 1980 conviction in his presentence investigation report (P.S.I.) where adjudication had been withheld. The court held that when a defendant timely disputes a P.S.I. entry, the state bears the burden of proving the disputed fact, and the trial court erred in placing the burden on the defendant.


Holding

The trial court erred in requiring the defendant to disprove the P.S.I. entry. When a defendant makes a timely, specific objection to material in the P.S.I., the state bears the burden of proving the disputed fact with competent evidence.


Headnotes

[1] If a defendant disputes the truth of specific material in a presentence investigation report, the state bears the burden of presenting competent proof of the disputed mat…

[2] A defendant must timely object to hearsay in a presentence investigation report if they wish to exercise rights of confrontation and cross-examination.

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Key Quotes

“If a defendant disputes the truth of specific material in the P.S.I. the state must present competent proof of the disputed matter.”

Establishes the core legal principle that the burden of proving disputed P.S.I. entries rests with the state, not the defendant.

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Facts & Procedural History

Bell was resentenced as a habitual offender based on convictions listed in his P.S.I., including a 1980 felony conviction. At the resentencing hearing…

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Opinion of the Court
GRIFFIN, Judge.

GRIFFIN, Judge.

At appellant’s resentencing hearing, he asserted that a 1980 felony conviction shown on the P.S.I. was incorrect because adjudication had been withheld. Without this conviction, appellant could not be sentenced as an habitual offender. The trial court erred in ruling that the defendant had the burden of proving the P.S.I. entry showing a felony conviction in 1980 was incorrect. If a defendant disputes the truth of specific material in the P.S.I. the state must present competent proof of the disputed matter. Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1980). Appellant’s October 5, 1989 objection at the sentencing hearing was specific.

In reviewing what occurred at this hearing, however, we believe the admonition of our supreme court in Eutsey is important:

If the defendant disputes the truth of presentence report hearsay in respect to which he asserts rights of confrontation and cross-examination, and he wishes to exercise those rights, he must of course timely say so. It follows that the sentencing court must devise orderly procedures for identifying hearsay in the pre-sentence report which is disputed by the defendant, which the court intends to consider....

383 So. 2d at 225 (citations omitted). Here the record reflects that in the first sentencing hearing the defendant did not contest the 1980 conviction and there is no indication in the record that the defendant thereafter ever voiced any objection to the P.S.I. conviction record until the resentencing hearing.1 Just as the defendant should have a reasonable time to prepare for the hearing on habitual offender status, so must the state have a reasonable notice that a P.S.I. entry will be challenged so it may prepare its proof. Accordingly, we quash the sentence and remand for a resentencing hearing in which the state shall have the burden to prove appellant’s 1980 conviction. If the state can muster no more proof of the 1980 conviction than it produced at the prior hearing, appellant cannot be sentenced as an habitual offender based on the 1980 conviction.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

DIAMANTIS, J., concurs.

DAUKSCH, J., concurs in part; dissents in part with opinion.

. At the prior sentencing hearing the basis for finding defendant an habitual offender was the defendant’s two 1985 convictions, which the state proved with certified copies. We disagree that the defendant's concession at the first hearing that he ”ha[d] three prior felonies" constituted a waiver of any objection to hearsay proof of the 1980 conviction on resentencing.

Other
DAUKSCH, Judge,

DAUKSCH, Judge,

concurring in part; dissenting in part.

While I agree the sentence should be vacated and appellant should be resen-tenced, I cannot agree to give the state still another chance to do it correctly. I would remand for a strict guideline sentence, without another attempt to prove entitlement to enhancement.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Loos v. State, 585 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
    …e investigation report. Fleming v. State, 547 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Flanagan v. State, 536 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (a “bona fide objection” is some demonstration that the restitution amount in the PSI is improper). Cf. Bell v. State, 576 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). In the present case, the defendant’s negotiations did not rise to the level of a “bona fide objection” requiring further proof of valuation from the state. AFFIRMED. ‘ COWART and HARRIS, JJ., concur.…

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