STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
AVRAHAM GIL, DAVID STONE, AND DAVID SINGER, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1991-01-02
No. 90-910
Before JORGENSON, GERSTEN and GODERICH, JJ.
573 So. 2d 90 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

State Farm appeals a trial court's award of attorney's fees to two attorneys representing an insured in a personal injury protection (PIP) insurance dispute. The appellate court affirmed that the attorneys were entitled to fees under Florida law but reversed and remanded because the trial court failed to make specific findings required by Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe regarding the calculation of reasonable fees.


Holding

The court held that both Stone and Singer were entitled to attorney's fees under section 627.428, Florida Statutes, because State Farm denied payment of medical benefits before suit was filed and the insured ultimately prevailed. However, the trial court erred by failing to make specific findings as to hourly rate, hours expended, and adjustment factors as required by Rowe.


Headnotes

[1] An insured who prevails in an action against a PIP insurer for denied medical benefits is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees.

[2] An attorney is entitled to fees for services rendered in a PIP action against an insurer, even if the specific medical bill for which payment is awarded was submitted aft…

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Key Quotes

“Florida law provides that when a PIP insurer denies payment of medical benefits arising out of a use or operation of a motor vehicle, and the insured prevails in an action against the insurer for such benefits, the insured is entitled to recover his reasonable attorney's fees.”

Establishes the statutory basis for attorney's fees entitlement in PIP disputes under sections 627.428 and 627.736.

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Facts & Procedural History

In July 1988, Avraham Gil was injured in an automobile accident. State Farm, his PIP insurer, initially paid his medical bills but denied further paym…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), appeals a final order awarding appellees, Av-raham Gil, David Stone, and David Singer, attorneys’ fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

In July, 1988, Avraham Gil (Gil) had an automobile accident where he sustained personal injuries. Initially, State Farm, Gil’s personal injury protection (PIP) insurer, paid Gil’s medical bills arising from the accident. In November, 1988, State Farm informed Gil that it would not pay any further medical bills, because Gil’s ailments were not from the accident.

Shortly thereafter, Gil retained attorney David Stone (Stone) to institute a PIP suit against State Farm. Stone subsequently had the cause set for trial. In May 1989, Stone withdrew from representing Gil, and the Law Offices of David Singer, P.A. (Singer) undertook representation of Gil.

At trial, the jury awarded Gil $1,375 in damages. This award was the exact amount of a medical bill submitted by a physician who had conducted a medical examination of Gil. This medical bill had been provided to State Farm after Stone had withdrawn from representing Gil.

Post-trial, Stone and Singer each moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 627.-428, Florida Statutes (1989). State Farm opposed both motions. After a hearing, the trial court awarded Stone, attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,000, and Singer, attorney’s fees in the amount of $18,000.

State Farm first contends that Stone was not entitled to any attorney’s fees because the jury awarded payment for medical treatment, which was billed to State Farm after Stone had withdrawn from representing Gil. State Farm has no authority for this contention.

State Farm’s reliance on Obando v. Fortune Insurance Company, 563 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), is misplaced. In Obando, 563 So. 2d at 117, there were no unpaid medical bills pending, and the insurer had merely requested “follow-up information and any additional medical bills.” Here, State Farm denied further payment of Gil’s medical bills before Stone filed suit on behalf of Gil.

Florida law provides that when a PIP insurer denies payment of medical benefits arising out of a use or operation of a motor vehicle, and the insured prevails in an action against the insurer for such benefits, the insured is entitled to recover his reasonable attorney’s fees. §§ 627.428, 627.-736, Fla.Stat. (1989). We therefore find State Farm’s contention that Stone is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees, devoid of merit.

State Farm next asserts that the trial court erred in failing to set forth specific findings supporting the award of attorney’s fees as required in Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985). On this point, we agree. Rowe mandates that a trial court, in determining the proper amount of attorney’s fees, set forth specific findings as to hourly rate, the number of hours reasonably expended, and the appropriateness of reduction or enhancement factors. Abdalla v. Southwind, Inc., 561 So. 2d 468 (Pla. 2d DCA 1990); Frechter v. Frechter, 548 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Manuel v. Manuel, 498 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

It is undisputed that in this case, the trial court failed to make the requisite findings. On remand we direct the trial court to conduct a new evidentiary hearing on this matter because the record contains insufficient evidence to support the award of attorneys’ fees.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Stone and Singer are entitled to attorneys’ fees, but reverse and remand for a new evidentiary hearing to redetermine the amount of attorneys’ fees and to set forth its specific findings in accordance with Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Peachtree Cas. Ins. Co. v. Walden, 759 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
    …htree’s notice gave rise to a cause of action for breach of contract with respect to the claims that accrued by the time of the litigation, see id.; Cruz v. Union General Ins., 586 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gil, 573 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). We do not agree with Peach-tree that this result renders the 30-day provision of the statute meaningless. Insurers have 30 days to provide the benefits unless they themselves announce that they will pay no benefits in any event.…
  • Home Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 648 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
    …See Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Ouanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla.1990); Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985); Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501 (Fla.1982); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gil, 573 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Harrison v. Grubb, 567 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Jones v. Associates Fin. Inc., 565 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Accordingly, that award must be reversed so that the trial court can further consider the question of attorne…
  • …ed on the litigation and the reasonable hourly rate. We remand for the sole purpose of making these findings. Rodriguez v. Campbell, 720 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review denied, 731 So. 2d 650 (Fla.1999); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gil, 573 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). .The remaining points that the appellant has raised on appeal lack merit. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.…

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