LITTLE CAESAR'S PIZZA AND HARTFORD INSURANCE, APPELLANTS,
v.
WILLIAM BRUCE INGERSOLL, APPELLEE
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Little Caesar's Pizza and its workers' compensation carrier appealed a judge's award of benefits for injuries an employee sustained in an automobile accident while returning from physician-approved swimming therapy for an industrial injury. The appellate court affirmed, holding that injuries sustained while reasonably pursuing prescribed medical treatment remain within the chain of industrial causation, and that a subsequently enacted statute limiting such coverage does not apply retroactively to injuries predating the statute.
The court held that the claimant's injuries from the automobile accident are compensable because they were sustained while reasonably pursuing prescribed medical treatment and therefore remain within the chain of industrial causation. The court also held that a statute enacted after the industrial injury occurred does not apply retroactively to determine the compensability of claims arising from that injury.
[1] Injuries sustained in a subsequent intervening accident are compensable if they are the direct and natural consequence of the original injury and occur while traveling to…
[2] The substantive rights of parties in workers' compensation cases are determined by the law in effect at the time of the claimant's injury.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“since the claimant injured herself while reasonably pursuing prescribed medical treatment, her subsequent injuries remained within the chain of industrial causation”
Establishes the foundational principle from King that injuries during prescribed therapy remain compensable
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee sustained a compensable industrial injury on June 21, 1987, and was treated by an orthopedic surgeon authorized by appellants. The surgeon ad…
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ALLEN, Judge.
Appellants, employer/carrier, appeal a workers’ compensation order awarding benefits to appellee claimant. We find that the injuries which the appellee sustained in an automobile accident after returning from swimming, which was physician-approved therapy for his industrial injury, were properly determined by the judge of compensation claims to be compensable. We therefore affirm the order on appeal.
Appellee sustained a compensable industrial injury on June 21, 1987. Appellants authorized treatment by an orthopedic surgeon. The orthopedic surgeon advised claimant to increase his activities to improve his stamina and told him that swimming would be an acceptable exercise for his recovery process, so claimant began swimming at a park called Matheson Hammock.
On June 1, 1988, while returning from Matheson Hammock where he had been swimming, claimant was involved in an automobile accident. Appellants did not authorize treatment for the automobile accident, and this is the accident for which compensability was disputed below.
In Dep't of Transp. v. King, 554 So. 2d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), review denied, 563 So. 2d 631 (Fla.1990), a claimant was struck by an automobile while walking as prescribed therapy for an industrial injury. We held that since the claimant injured herself while reasonably pursuing prescribed medical treatment, her subsequent injuries remained within the chain of industrial causation. We find that the judge’s reliance on King was appropriate in this case since claimant was returning from swimming at the time of his automobile accident. See also All American Wheel World, Inc. v. Gustafson, 499 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
The recently enacted Ch. 90-201, § 14, Laws of Fla. reads as follows:
Subsequent Intervening Accidents. — Injuries caused by a subsequent intervening accident arising from an outside agency which are the direct and natural consequence of the original injury are not compensable unless suffered while traveling to or from a health care provider for the purpose of receiving remedial treatment for the compensable injury.
Appellants argue that this statute supersedes King, and that it should control this case. We reject appellants’ argument because the substantive rights of the parties in workers’ compensation cases are determined by the law in effect at the time of a claimant’s injury. City of Clermont v. Rumph, 450 So. 2d 573, 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), review denied, 458 So. 2d 271 (Fla.1984). Here, the industrial accident occurred well before the effective date of the new statute, so we need not determine whether the statute would have affected the compensability of appellee’s claims growing out of the automobile accident.
The order appealed is affirmed.
WENTWORTH and JOANOS, JJ., concur.
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Special Disability Tr. Fund v. Meyer USA, 721 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…r under review. In 1993, undergoing a chiropractic manipulation attributable to injury at work, Mr. Smith sustained further injury, which gave rise to an additional twenty percent permanent impairment rating. See Little Caesar’s Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); D.O.T. v. King, 554 So. 2d 1192, 1192-93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (characterizing as established the proposition “that injuries sustained in the pursuit of medical treatment may be compensable when the treatment relates to a compensa…
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Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys. & United Self Insured Servs. v. Hurst, 763 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation case, we affirm the portion of the order of the judge of compensation claims determining that injuries arising out of claimant’s fall were compensable. See Little Caesar’s Pizza v. Ingersoll, 572 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (when a claimant is injured while reasonably pursuing prescribed medical treatment for injuries received in an industrial accident such subsequent injuries remain within the chain of industrial causation). We also affirm that por…
Authorities Cited
- City OF Clermont & Aetna Ins. Co. v. Rumph, 450 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- ALL Am. Wheel World v. Gustafson, 499 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- D.O.T. v. King, 554 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)