LUIS MONTERO, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEPT. OF INSURANCE, DIV. OF RISK MANAGEMENT, APPELLEES
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Luis Montero appealed an order compelling him to undergo psychiatric evaluation and treatment by an employer-selected physician. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that an employer cannot compel an injured worker to see a particular physician without a judicial finding that such treatment is in the employee's best interest.
An order compelling an injured employee to be treated by an employer-selected physician is only lawful if based on a judicial finding that such treatment is in the claimant's best interest. The judge erred by granting the motion to compel without making such a finding, as it is unlawful for an employer to coerce an injured employee in the selection of a physician.
[1] An employer must select another physician to treat an injured employee if the employee objects to the initially furnished medical attendance, unless a judge of compensati…
[2] A judge of compensation claims errs as a matter of law by compelling an injured employee to undergo treatment by an employer-selected physician without finding that such…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If an injured employee objects to the medical attendance furnished by the employer, it is the employer's duty to select another physician to treat the employee unless a judge of compensation claims determines that a change in medical attendance is not in the employee's best interest.”
States the applicable statutory standard governing employer selection of physicians for injured workers.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMontero suffered compensable physical and psychiatric injuries in September 1984 and had not yet reached maximum medical improvement psychiatrically. …
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JOANOS, Judge.
Luis Montero has appealed from an order of the judge of compensation claims granting a motion to compel evaluation and treatment by a physician chosen by the employer. We reverse and remand for reconsideration of the motion in light of the correct legal standard.
Montero suffered compensable physical and psychiatric injuries in September 1984, and has not yet reached maximum medical improvement psychiatrically. See Department of Transportation v. Montero, 568 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). In September 1989, the employer authorized evaluation and treatment by Dr. Raven-Stigler, a clinical psychologist. Montero objected, and proposed an alternative psychiatrist, Dr. Jiminez. The employer declined to authorize another doctor, and filed the instant motion to compel Montero to see Raven-Stigler. The judge granted the motion, finding that Montero was obligated to undergo treatment by the employer’s chosen physician until unsatisfactory treatment was actually rendered.
If an injured employee objects to the medical attendance furnished by the employer, it is the employer’s duty to select another physician to treat the employee unless a judge of compensation claims determines that a change in medical attendance is not in the employee’s best interest. § 440.13(3), Pla.Stat. (1983). In the instant case, the employer tendered evaluation and treatment by Dr. Raven-Stigler, to whom Montero objected. Rather than exercising the option to offer alternative physicians, the employer determined to seek an order from the judge compelling Montero to be treated by Raven-Stigler. Under the foregoing statutory provision, such an order must be based on a finding that such treatment is in the claimant’s best interest. However, although the judge herein granted the motion, he made no finding that treatment with Raven-Sti-gler would be in Montero’s best interest. This was erroneous as a matter of law, in that it is unlawful for any employer to coerce a sick or injured employee in the selection of a physician. § 440.13(3), Fla. Stat. (1983).
Because the judge failed to apply the correct legal standard in granting the employer’s motion to compel, we reverse and remand for reconsideration of the motion in light of the correct legal standard. Additional evidence may be received should it be necessary to the proper determination of the issue.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
WENTWORTH and ALLEN, JJ., concur.
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Smith v. Gen. Parcel Serv., Inc., 699 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…titioner who provides skilled services. See, e.g., Redwing Owner Operators v. Cardenas, 648 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (affirming order requiring payment of psychologist’s bill and authorizing continuing care); Montero v. Department of Transp., 570 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (E/C authorized clinical psychologist to provide treatment); Nurse Finders, Inc. v. Harris, 561 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (upholding award authorizing a psychologist). Moreover, because Dr. Imfeld recommended that Dr. Rosen…
Authorities Cited
- Dep't OF Transp. v. Montero, 568 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)