BRANDEN BAILEY
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA

Fla. 5th DCA | 2026-04-10
No. 2025-1317
2026 FL 4109 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2026)

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Holding

Although the postconviction court's reasons for denying a Rule 3.800(a) motion challenging Apprendi-based sentencing claims were erroneous, affirmance is proper under the tipsy coachman doctrine when this court has already rejected the underlying claims on the merits.


Headnotes

[1] A Rule 3.800(a) motion is cognizable for challenging sentences on Apprendi grounds, notwithstanding that Apprendi claims relate to the sentencing process rather than the…

[2] Retroactivity analysis does not apply to a postconviction challenge based on Apprendi when the motion relies primarily on Apprendi rather than on a subsequently decided c…

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Facts & Procedural History

Branden Bailey appealed the denial of his Rule 3.800(a) motion arguing that his Prison Releasee Reoffender and Habitual Felony Offender sentences viol…

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Opinion of the Court

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA

BRANDEN BAILEY, Appellant,

v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

Case No. 5D2025-1317 LT Case No. 2016-CF-005817-A

3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. London Mahogany Kite, Judge.

Branden Bailey, Milton, pro se.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

April 10, 2026

EISNAUGLE, J.

Branden Bailey appeals the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion alleging that his Prison Releasee Reoffender and Habitual Felony Offender sentences violate Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). While the postconviction court's reasons for denying the motion were erroneous, we affirm based on the tipsy coachman doctrine.

In denying the motion, the postconviction court reasoned that (1) the alleged error relates to the sentencing process, not the sentence itself, and (2) Erlinger is not retroactive because it is not a “development of fundamental significance."

We have already considered and rejected both of these reasons for denying Bailey's motion in Brown v. State, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D1191a (Fla. 5th DCA May 30, 2025). First, while we still agree that rule 3.800(a) is an odd fit for an Apprendi claim, it is also still true that our supreme court's decision in Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90, 95 (Fla. 2014), makes such a claim cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion. “We are, of course, bound by Plott, as is the postconviction court.” Brown, 50 Fla. L. Weekly at D1191a.

Second, "the postconviction court's unelaborated statement that Erlinger is not retroactive misses the mark because, for one, [Bailey] did not rely on Erlinger alone. He relied on Apprendi and its progeny." Id. In fact, in this case, the motion relies almost exclusively on Apprendi—which was decided long before the convictions at issue.1 As a result, retroactivity is not relevant to our analysis. Id.

Although the postconviction court's reasons for denying Bailey's motion were in error, we affirm under the tipsy coachman doctrine. This court has already rejected these claims. See Denson v. State, 401 So. 3d 633, 634 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025); Simmons v. State, 332 So. 3d 1129, 1131–32 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022); Frumenti v. State, 885 So. 2d 924, 925 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Wright v. State, 780 So. 2d 216, 216 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).3

AFFIRMED.

WALLIS and LAMBERT, JJ., concur. Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.

Footnotes
1 We do not suggest that relying on Erlinger alone would foreclose Bailey's claim because we do not decide whether Erlinger announced a new rule or if it merely applied Apprendi. See Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980). Of course, we are aware of our supreme court's decision in Wainwright v. State, 411 So. 3d 392, 399 (Fla. 2025), but Wainwright did not hold that Erlinger announced a new rule. Instead, Wainwright concluded that “even if Erlinger constitutes a change of law, it does not apply retroactively." Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, unlike the appellant in Wainwright, Bailey does not argue that Erlinger created a new rule apart from the rule announced in Apprendi. In short, given the differing nature and procedural posture of the appellant's successive claim in Wainwright, that decision would not necessarily foreclose Bailey's argument in this case. Id. at 401 (“And even if Erlinger announced a new rule that might serve as a vehicle for Wainwright to overcome this procedural bar, Erlinger does not apply retroactively." (emphasis added)).
2 See Home Depot U.S.A. Co., Inc. v. Taylor, 676 So. 2d 479, 480 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“The trial judge made the right decision, albeit for the wrong reason . . . .”). 3 While our holding in Simmons is currently under review in the supreme court, it remains binding to date. Maye v. State, No. SC2023-1184, 2024 WL 1796831, at *1 (Fla. Apr. 25, 2024).

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