POLK STREET HOTEL, INC.
v.
CITY OF STUART

19th Cir. Ct. App. Div. | 2024-08-28
No. 25-AP-2
1 FLCA 7814 Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Appellate Division (2024)

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Synopsis

Polk Street Hotel sought certiorari review of the City of Stuart's denial of its rezoning application. The court granted the petition, finding the City failed to state specific reasons for denial as required by the Land Development Code and that no competent substantial evidence supported the decision.


Holding

The City departed from the essential requirements of law by failing to state specific reasons for denial as required by Code section 11.01.09(J)(6)(a-c), and the resolution was not supported by competent substantial evidence. The petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the City's resolution is quashed.


Headnotes

[1] An administrative agency must state specific reasons for denying an application when required by its governing code.

[2] A resolution denying an application is improper if it fails to provide specific reasons referencing the governing code's requirements.

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Key Quotes

“the City shall deny the application, and 'the specific reasons for such determination with reference to the requirements of this Code shall be stated in the resolution'”

Establishes the mandatory statutory requirement that denials must include specific reasons referencing Code requirements, which the City failed to do.

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Facts & Procedural History

Polk Street Hotel owned a 0.33-acre parcel zoned Urban Waterfront (UW) and two adjacent parcels zoned Urban Highway (UH). The applicant sought to rezo…

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Opinion of the Court

EWEN, J.

This case is before the circuit court on a petition for writ of certiorari filed by Polk Street Hotel, Inc. (“Petitioner”), seeking review of a resolution by the City of Stuart's City Commission (“City”) denying Petitioner's application to rezone a 0.33-acre parcel of land. Because the City departed from the essential requirements of law by failing to state the reasons for denial of the application in the resolution and there is no competent substantial evidence to support the City's decision, this court grants the petition for writ of certiorari and quashes the City's resolution. BACKGROUND

The Petitioner sought to rezone a 0.33-acre parcel of land near Frazier Creek from the Urban Waterfront (“UW") zoning designation to Urban Highway ("UH") zoning designation. It purchased the subject parcel and joined the parcel in a unity of title with two adjacent lots also owned by Petitioner. The subject parcel is zoned UW, and the other two portions of the property are zoned UH.

The UH and UW zoning designations both allow for many of the same uses, including Petitioner's proposed use: a four-story, 94-room, all-suite hotel. However, the UH and UW designations conflict with respect to the placement of parking areas (either in front or back of the proposed structure, respectively), as well as a requirement of a waterfront view for the UW designation. The subject parcel does not have a waterfront view, and it is not located on the water despite the UW zoning.

On August 28, 2024, the Petitioner applied to the City for a zoning map amendment to rezone the subject parcel from UW to UH to unite the entire property under one zoning designation. The Local Planning Agency and the Community Redevelopment Agency both unanimously approved the application and submitted reports recommending approval to the City. At the two public hearings, there was no testimony by community members against approving the rezoning. However, the City voted 3-2 to deny the Petitioner's application.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review applied by a circuit court to an administrative decision is whether procedural due process was afforded, whether the essential requirements of the law were observed, and whether the findings and judgment were supported by competent substantial evidence. Wiggins v. Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 209 So. 3d 1165, 1170 (Fla. 2017) (citing Nader v. Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 87 So. 3d 712, 723 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995)); Broward County v. G.B.V. Intern., Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838, 843 (Fla. 2001) (quoting City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1982)).

ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF LAW

The City departed from the essential requirements of law by ignoring the Land Development Code (“the Code”) section 11.01.09(J)(6)(a-c), which requires that the City make a determination that a rezoning application is one of three things: 1) “in compliance”-- in which case, the Commission shall approve the application; 2) “in compliance subject to stated conditions"-- in which case, the applicant may submit an amended rezoning application with required revisions within 45 days; or 3) “not in compliance”-- in which case, the City shall deny the application, and “the specific reasons for such determination with reference to the requirements of this Code shall be stated in the resolution” (emphasis added). Here, the City's resolution merely states that it denies the Petitioner's application. It does not state any reasons, much less the required specific reasons for such determination with reference to the requirements of the Code, which was improper. COMPETENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

In DeGroot v. Sheffield, the Court defined competent substantial evidence:

Substantial evidence has been described as such evidence as will establish a substantial basis of fact from which the fact at issue can be reasonably inferred. We have stated it to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In employing the adjective 'competent' to modify the word 'substantial,' we are aware of the familiar rule that in administrative proceedings the formalities in the introduction of testimony common to the courts of justice are not strictly employed. We are of the view, however, that the evidence relied upon to sustain the ultimate finding should be sufficiently relevant and material that a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to support the conclusion reached. To this extent the 'substantial' evidence should also be 'competent.'

In its response, the City is unable to direct this court to the competent substantial evidence to support its decision. The court has also thoroughly reviewed the record and transcript and cannot independently find competent substantial evidence to support the City's decision. Although specific commissioners did express concerns at the hearing about utilities, traffic, surrounding neighborhood, and the need to preserve waterfront views, no factbased evidence was presented at the quasi-judicial hearing to support those concerns. Notably, no residents came forward to speak against approving the application. City of Apopka v. Orange Cnty., 299 So. 2d 657, 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (“The board should base their determination upon facts which they find to have been established, instead of upon the wishes of persons who appear for or against the granting of the application."). Thus, the City's resolution is not supported by competent substantial evidence.

NEXT STEPS

A writ of certiorari has a limited purpose; the role of the reviewing court is to halt the miscarriage of justice, nothing more. See Broward County v. G.B.V. Intern., Ltd., 787 So. 2d at 844. Upon deciding if the administrative authority's judgment has met the standard of review, the appellate court may either quash the writ of certiorari or quash the order reviewed. Id. When the order is quashed, it leaves the controversy pending before the administrative authority as if no order has been entered, and the parties stand upon the pleadings and proof as it existed when the order was made with the rights of all parties to proceed under the law in the same manner and to the same extent which they might have proceeded had the order reviewed not been entered. Id. “The appellate court has no power in exercising its jurisdiction in certiorari to enter a judgment on the merits of the controversy under consideration nor to direct the respondent to enter any particular order or judgment." Id.

CONCLUSION

The City departed from the essential requirements of law by failing to adhere to the Code. Further, its resolution is not supported by competent substantial evidence. Therefore, this court grants the petition for writ of certiorari and remands the cause to the City for another hearing on the application for rezoning, at which time the City shall comply with Code section 11.01.09(J)(6).

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, and the City's resolution is quashed.

Copies of above decision were furnished to the attorneys/parties of record on the same date the decision was filed.

Footnotes
95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957); Becker v. Merrill, 20 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1945); Laney v. Board of Public Instruction, 15 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1943); Jenkins v. Curry, 18 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1944); United States Casualty Company v. Maryland Casualty Company, 55 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1951); Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126.

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