YVONNE HADEED REYNOLDS
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES
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Reynolds petitioned for a writ of certiorari challenging a driver's license suspension order from the DHSMV, arguing she was denied due process when the Florida Highway Patrol refused to accept a subpoena for Officer Stuhr based on an informal time restriction. The court granted the petition because the agency failed to comply with the statutory requirement that the agency head formally determine acceptable service hours.
The court granted the writ of certiorari because there was no evidence that the agency head or highest ranking official ever formally determined the days of the week and hours that service may be made at the place of employment, which would have justified the refusal of the subpoena.
[1] Due process in quasi-judicial administrative proceedings requires notice of hearing and an opportunity to be heard, including the right to present evidence and cross-exam…
[2] The refusal to accept service of a witness subpoena upon a law enforcement officer is wrongful if the stated grounds for refusal do not comply with applicable administrat…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In quasi-judicial proceedings, due process is met if the parties involved are provided with notice of hearing and an opportunity to be heard, including an opportunity to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and be informed of all facts upon which the commission acts.”
Establishes the due process standard applicable to DHSMV proceedings
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceReynolds sought to subpoena Officer Stuhr for a driver's license suspension hearing. On May 6, 2009, a process server attempted substituted service of…
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Appellate Division (Civil) Case No.: 502009CA020777XXXXMB Division: 'AY'
Appeal from the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles
Ira Karmelin, Esq., 3951 Haverhill Road North, Suite 203, West Palm Beach, FL 33417-8112
Heather Rose Cramer, Esq., DHSMV-Legal Office, PO Box 540609, Lake Worth, FL 33454-0609
PER CURIAM.
Yvonne Hadeed Reynolds filed this petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of a final order suspending her driver's license entered by the State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Driver's Licenses, Bureau of Administrative Reviews ("DHSMV"). Reynolds argued that she was denied due process of law. In quasi-judicial proceedings, due process is met if the parties involved are provided with notice of hearing and an opportunity to be heard, including an opportunity to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and be informed of all facts upon which the commission acts. Jennings v. Dade County, 589 So. 2d 1337, 1340 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Reynolds requested a subpoena of Officer Stuhr and the process server attempted to effectuate substituted service of process on the Florida Highway Patrol's court liaison on May 6, 2009. The liaison refused to accept the subpoena because the process server arrived at the office after 1:00 Reynolds argues that none of the reasons for refusal listed in Florida Administrative Code Rule 15A-6.012(3) existed so the refusal was wrongful. That rule provides that service of a witness subpoena upon a law enforcement officer may be made as provided in section 48.031(1), Fla. Stat., or by delivery to a designated supervisory or administrative employee at the witness's place of employment if the highest ranking official at the place of employment has designated the employee to accept. The employee may reject service if the witness is no longer employed at that place of employment; the witness is not scheduled to work prior to the day the witness is scheduled to appear; or the appearance date is less than seven days from the date of service. Id. The agency head or highest ranking official may determine the days of the week and the hours that service may be made at the place of employment. Id. Here, the return of service indicates that service was attempted at 4:00 PM on May 6, 2009 and contains the following notation:
Service refused per liaison, Dorothy Ingram. Subpoena had to be delivered before 1:00 PM on May 6, 2009 or they would not be able to accept.
The process server testified that the liaison had informed him that the officer was working that day but that the subpoena had to have been delivered before 1:00 PM. The agency head or highest ranking official may determine the days of the week and the hours that service may be made at the place of employment. FAC 15A-6.012(3). The petition is GRANTED because there is no evidence in the record that the agency head or highest ranking official ever actually determined the days of the week and the hours that service may be made at the place of employment, which would justify a refusal of the subpoena. As a result of the granting of the writ, this cause is REMANDED and the subpoena shall be re-served consistent with this opinion. The Court finds that the other issue raised in this petition lacks merit.
KEYSER, BURTON, COLIN, JJ., concur.