MR. FRANTZEN

v.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES

this court has jurisdiction. §322.31, Fla. Stat. Mr. Frantzen contends that the Department’s decision to suspend his driving privileges was not supported by competent, substantial evidence of a lawful arrest because there is video evidence that Mr. Frantzen argues directly conflicts with the arresting officer’s testimony presented at the license suspension hearing. After reviewing the petition, response, reply, appendix, relevant statutes, and case law, the court finds that the hearing officer’s decision was supported by competent, substantial evidence because video evidence is not hopelessly in conflict with the officer’s testimony.

On February 4, 2024, Mr. Frantzen was arrested for DUI by Tampa Police Officer Frueh. Mr. Frantzen was taken to central breath testing (CBT).

Prior to being taken into the building, while still seated in the police vehicle, Officer Frueh read a scripted implied consent warning to Mr. Frantzen. Specifically, Officer Frueh informed Mr. Frantzen that if he submitted to a breath test and his blood alcohol level was above the legal limit his license would be suspended for six months and that if he refused to submit to a breath test his license would be suspended for twelve months.¹ Mr. Frantzen and Officer Frueh had a subsequent verbal exchange during which Mr. Frantzen asked “so I’m either going to be suspended for 6 months or 1 year?” Officer Frueh did not respond to Mr. Frantzen’s question. The verbal exchange was recorded by Officer Frueh’s dashboard video camera.

The recording was presented at Mr. Frantzen’s formal

Mr. Frantzen asserts that the hearing officer lacked competent substantial evidence to support a finding of willful refusal because the video evidence presented demonstrates his confusion and misunderstanding regarding the consequences of submitting or refusing to submit to a breath test. This assertion is based upon two principles of law: oral testimony and written reports that are directly contradicted by objective video evidence are not competent, substantial evidence, and; the confusion doctrine renders an implied consent warning insufficient when an arrestee is mislead and confused regarding their rights and communicates this confusion to the arresting officer. Wiggins v. Dep't of Safety & Motor Vehicles, 209 So. 3d 1165 (Fla. 2017); Kurecka v. State, 67 So. 3d 1052, 1057 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citing Dep't of Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Marshall, 848 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)).

First, while Mr. Frantzen correctly states that Wiggins creates an exception to the rule regarding circuit courts’ ability to review evidence in the context of certiorari review of license revocation hearings, that exception is narrow. Wiggins v. Dep't of Safety & Motor Vehicles, 209 So. 3d at 1173. The Wiggins decision specifically states: Evidence that is confirmed untruthful or nonexistent is not competent, substantial evidence . . . It follows that a competent, substantial evidence analysis demands an honest look at the evidence available. Otherwise, we are asking judges to simply parrot the findings of the hearing officer, thus reducing the task of a constitutional judge to providing a predetermined stamp of approval. To hold that a judge on first-tier certiorari review must accept testimony that, as here, is clearly contradicted and totally refuted by objective video evidence, would be an injustice to Florida drivers. Id. (emphasis added).

Mr. Frantzen argues that the video evidence shows the arresting officer explaining the consequences of submitting to a breath test and getting a result above the legal limit, and Mr. Frantzen’s confusion as demonstrated by follow-up questions related to the breath test. In Wiggins the arresting officer testified that he saw the wheels of the driver’s car cross over the lane division lines but the video evidence clearly showed that the wheels stayed within the lines. In this case, the arresting officer testified that he informed Mr. Frantzen of the consequences of having a breath alcohol level above the legal limit and the video shows the officer doing exactly that. Whether Mr. Frantzen 09/29/2025 04:09:36

Second, § 322.2615(7)(b) authorizes the hearing officer to determine “[w]hether the person whose license was suspended was told that if he or she refused to submit to such test his or her privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended for a period of 1 year or, in the case of a second or subsequent refusal, for a period of 18 months.” The hearing officer was not tasked with determining whether Mr. Frantzen was informed of the consequences of submitting to a breath test and having a blood alcohol level below the legal limit. In this case, the hearing officer did not err in finding that Mr. Frantzen was informed of the consequences of refusing to submit to a breath test.

Third, there is no clearly established principle of law that extends the confusion doctrine to civil license revocation hearings in Florida. In this case, however, the court need not determine whether the confusion doctrine can be applied in the context of civil license revocation hearings because law enforcement was only required to inform Mr. Frantzen of the consequences of refusing to submit to a breath test and there is no competent, substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Mr. Frantzen was confused about the consequences of refusal. It is therefore ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is DENIED.

ORDERED in Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida, on September 29, 2025.

_____________________________________ PAUL L. HUEY, Circuit Court Judge

Electronic copies provided through JAWS. 24-CA-005316 9/29/2025 4:09:35 Page 3