DENETRY LAMPKIN
v.
SEAN BRIDGNANAN
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Appellant Lampkin, the prevailing party in a dismissed landlord-tenant eviction action, appealed the trial court's denial of attorney's fees and costs. The Ninth Judicial Circuit Court reversed, holding that the prevailing party in a residential eviction action is statutorily entitled to costs and attorney's fees as a matter of law with no judicial discretion.
The prevailing party in a residential landlord-tenant eviction action is statutorily entitled to recover reasonable court costs, including attorney's fees, from the nonprevailing party. The trial court has no discretion and is mandated to award such fees and costs under Florida Statute §83.48 and Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.420(d).
[1] The prevailing party in a residential landlord-tenant eviction action is entitled to an award of costs, including attorney's fees.
[2] When a statute makes attorney's fees part of recoverable costs, a court has no discretion and is mandated to award them to the prevailing party in a dismissed action.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In any civil action brought to enforce the provisions of the rental agreement or this part, the party in whose favor a judgment or decree has been rendered may recover reasonable court costs, including attorney's fees, from the nonprevailing party.”
Florida Statute §83.48 establishing the statutory basis for mandatory award of attorney's fees in eviction actions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellee Bridgnanan filed an eviction action against Lampkin on April 13, 2007, for nonpayment of rent. Lampkin filed a motion to dismiss, and the tri…
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Before POWELL, MCDONALD, WHITEHEAD, J.J.
PER CURIAM.
REVISED FINAL ORDER REVERSING TRIAL COURT (Revised only as to title above)
Appellant Denetry Lampkin timely appealed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for fees and costs entered on June 21, 2007, in favor of Appellee Sean Bridgnanan. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(1)(A). We dispense with oral argument pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.320.
Bridgnanan filed a tenant eviction action against Lampkin on April 13, 2007, for nonpayment of rent. In response, Lampkin filed a motion to dismiss and the trial court entered a final order granting dismissal on May 3, 2007, based on Bridgnanan’s acceptance of rent. On June 21, 2007, the trial court entered an order denying Lampkin’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs. This appeal followed.
Lampkin was the prevailing party below and the dismissal order in his favor was a final order.1 The prevailing party in a residential landlord-tenant eviction action is entitled to an award of costs. See §83.48, Fla. Stat. (2007); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(d)2. Section 83.48, Florida Statutes, states that “[i]n any civil action brought to enforce the provisions of the rental agreement or this part, the party in whose favor a judgment or decree has been rendered may recover reasonable court costs, including attorney’s fees, from the nonprevailing party.”3 See Xanadu of Cocoa Beach, Inc. v. Lenz, 504 So. 2d 518, 520 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). Where, as here, a statute makes attorney’s fees part of recoverable costs, the court has no discretion and is mandated to award them under rule 1.420(d), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, to the prevailing party in a dismissed action. See Muniz v. Samero, 534 So. 2d 848, 849 n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
Accordingly, this Court concludes that the trial court erred in denying Lampkin’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs in the case below.
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the order appealed from is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the trial court with directions to schedule a hearing on both motions with notice to the parties. It is further ORDERED AND of _______February________________, 2010, nunc pro tunc to January 8, 2010.
________/S/_________________________
ROM W. POWELL Senior Judge
_______/S/__________________________ ________/S/_________________________ ROGER J. MCDONALD
REGINALD WHITEHEAD Circuit Judge
Circuit Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing order was furnished via U.S. mail on this 23 day of February , 2010, to the following: Dennis A. Chen, Esquire, 2719 Maguire Road, Ocoee, Florida 34761 and Justin R. Clark, Esquire, 1928 Boothe Circle, Suite B, Longwood, Florida 32750.
/S/
Judicial Assistant
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- Wilson v. Rose Printing Co., Inc., 624 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1993)
- Xanadu OF Cocoa Beach, Inc. v. Lenz, 504 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Muniz v. Samero, 534 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)