MICHAEL JOSEPH WRIGHT

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

WHITE, J.

Michael Joseph Wright (“Wright”) appeals the judgment and sentence rendered after he entered a plea and expressly reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion for discharge and argues that the trial court improperly scheduled his trial outside the 10-day recapture time period.¹ R. 1 This case was transferred from the Fifth District Court of Appeal to this Court on January¹, 2023.

App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A), 9.140(b)(1)(A), (F), 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i). Pursuant to the “tipsy coachman” doctrine, 2 we affirm. Background On January 29, 2022, Wright was arrested for several offenses. The State charged him by Information with only two: driving while license suspended (subsequent offender) and resisting officer without violence. On May³, 2022, Wright filed a Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial Time. The trial court held a hearing on that notice on Thursday, May 5, 2022, agreed with Wright that the 90-day speedy trial time period had expired, and set his trial for Tuesday, May 17, 2022. The trial court overruled Wright’s objection that Saturday and Sunday should be included in the “count” of the 10-day recapture time period. Wright filed a motion for discharge on May 13, 2022, contending that the trial court improperly set his trial more than 10 days after the hearing. That motion was heard on May 17, 2022, prior to the commencement of trial. The trial court stood

2 “According to the ‘longstanding principle of appellate law’ known as the ‘tipsy coachman’ doctrine, an appellate court should affirm a trial court that ‘reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons’ if there is ‘support for the alternative theory or principle of law in the record before the trial court.’ Therefore, ‘if a trial court reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons, it will be upheld if there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record.’” Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 97 So. 3d 204, 212 (Fla. 2012) (citations omitted).

by the prior ruling³ and denied the motion for discharge. After the trial court confirmed that he could preserve his right to appeal the denial of that motion, Wright accepted the State’s offer and pled no contest to the charges. The trial court accepted his plea and entered judgment and sentence accordingly. Wright timely appealed. Analysis The parties agree that Wright properly filed his Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial Time after the expiration of the 90-day speedy trial time period. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(a), (p)(2). It is also undisputed that the trial court timely held a hearing on that notice. See id. (p)(3). The disputed issue is whether the trial court set Wright’s trial outside of the recapture time period. At a hearing on a notice of expiration of speedy trial time: unless the court finds that one of the reasons set forth in subdivision (j) exists, shall order that the defendant be brought to trial within 10 days. A defendant not brought to trial within the 10-day period through no fault of the defendant, on motion of the defendant or the court, shall be forever discharged from the crime.

Id. The computation of all time periods contained in Rule 3.191 is governed by Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.514. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.040.

In pertinent part, Rule 2.514 provides:

(a) Computing Time. The following rules apply in computing time periods specified in any rule of procedure, local rule, court order, or statute that does not specify a method of computing time.

(1) Period Stated in Days or a Longer Unit. When the period is stated in days or a longer unit of time:

(A) begin counting from the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday;

(B) count every day, including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; and (C) include the last day of the period, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, or falls within any period of time extended through an order of the chief justice under Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.205(a)(2)(B)(iv), the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday and does not fall within any period of time extended through an order of the chief justice.

“When the period stated in days is less than 7 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.” Id. (a)(3) (emphasis added).

Applying those rules in this case, counting for the recapture time period begins on Friday, May 6, 2022, because that date was not a holiday. See id. (a)(1)(A). For a 10-day time period, every subsequent day is counted, including Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. See id. (a)(1)(B), (a)(3). Therefore, a 10-day recapture time period would run through the end of Monday, May 16, 2022 (not a holiday), because May 15, 2022, was a Sunday. See id. (a)(1)(C). If Wright had not pled no contest

and preserved his right to appeal, his trial would have begun on May 17, 2022. Accordingly, if 10 days was the applicable recapture time period, then we must reverse the denial of Wright’s motion for discharge. It wasn’t, so we don’t. The chief justice may extend any time period contained in the speedy trial rule. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(i)(5). Prior to Wright’s arrest, the chief justice issued In re COVID-19 Health and Safety Protocols and Emergency Operational Measures for Florida Appellate and Trial Courts, Florida Administrative Order No. AOSC21-17, Amendment³ (Jan. 8, 2022). That order states: “The 10-day time period in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(p)(3) is increased to 30 days.” Id. at 25. Therefore, at the hearing on May 5, 2022,4 the trial court was required to set Wright’s trial no later than Monday, June 6, 2022. See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.514(a)(1). Because the trial was set prior to that date, the trial court properly denied Wright’s motion for discharge. Conclusion The trial court reached the right result, albeit for the wrong reason. Therefore, under the “tipsy coachman” doctrine, we affirm. AFFIRMED.

TRAVER, C.J., and STARGEL, J., concur. 4 The 30-day recapture period remains in effect. See In re COVID-19 Administrative Orders, Florida Administrative Order No. AOSC23-25, at 2-3 (April 27, 2023).

Michael Joseph Wright, Orlando, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Whitney Brown Hartless, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.