CALVIN RHODES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Rhodes appealed the imposition of statutory costs as part of his sentence for escape, arguing that his prior indigency adjudication required the trial court to provide notice and a hearing before imposing costs. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the imposition of costs but certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court regarding whether Bull v. State permits imposition of fixed statutory costs on indigent defendants without special notice or hearing.
The court affirmed the imposition of costs, holding that under Bull v. State and recent federal precedent, statutorily-mandated fixed costs may be imposed on convicted indigent defendants without prior notice and a separate hearing. However, the court certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court regarding whether Bull expressly overrules the prior Jenkins standard.
[1] Statutorily-mandated, fixed costs may be imposed upon a convicted indigent defendant without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard separate from the sentencing hear…
[2] Due process is not offended by the imposition of costs upon a convicted indigent defendant until the government seeks to enforce collection.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In Bull, the Supreme Court held that a convicted indigent defendant need not be given notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of a lien to recover attorney fees and costs under Section 27.-56, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(d)(1).”
Establishes the Bull standard permitting imposition of costs without prior notice or hearing
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCalvin Rhodes was convicted of escape and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. As part of the judgment and sentence, the trial court imposed statutory…
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PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on appeal from the imposition of costs as part of a judgment and sentence for escape. Appellant cites Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947, 950 (Fla.1984), and Hughes v. State, 497 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), approved, Mays v. State, 519 So. 2d 618, 620 (Fla.1988), arguing that because he had previously been adjudicated indigent, the trial court erred in imposing statutory costs upon him without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. Appellee argues that the trial court’s imposition of statutorily-mandated, fixed costs without prior notice and hearing is permissible under the holding in Bull v. State, 548 So. 2d 1103, 1104, 1105 (Fla.1989), and is consistent with recent federal decisions.
In Bull, the Supreme Court held that a convicted indigent defendant need not be given notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of a lien to recover attorney fees and costs under Section 27.-56, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(d)(1). Because only the amount of the lien is at issue, the defendant need only be given an opportunity to challenge the amount of the lien.
Recent federal decisions have held that due process presents no impediment to the imposition of costs upon a convicted indigent defendant until the government seeks to enforce collection of them. In United States v. Pagan, 785 F. 2d 378, 381 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017, 107 S.Ct. 667, 93 L.Ed.2d 719 (1986), the court held:
[T]he imposition of assessments on an indigent, per se, does not offend the Constitution. Constitutional principles will be implicated here only if the government seeks to enforce collection of the assessments “ ‘at a time when [Pagan is] unable, through no fault of his own, to comply.’ ”
Accord, United States v. Rivera-Velez, 839 F. 2d 8 (1st Cir.1988); United States v. Cooper, 870 F. 2d 586 (11th Cir.1989).
Accordingly, we affirm the imposition of costs. However, we recognize that the Supreme Court has not expressly receded from its earlier holding in Jenkins, supra, and therefore certify the following question to the Supreme Court:
WHETHER BULL V. STATE, 548 S0.2D 1103 (FLA.1989), STANDS FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT STATUTORILY-MANDATED AND FIXED COSTS MAY BE IMPOSED ON CONVICTED INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS WITHOUT AFFORDING THEM SPECIAL NOTICE OR A HEARING SEPARATE FROM THE SENTENCING HEARING.
BOOTH, SMITH and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- Mays v. State, 519 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1988)
- Bull v. State, 548 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1989)
- Gill v. United States, 479 U.S. 1017 (U.S. 1986)
- Smith v. United States, 479 U.S. 1017 (U.S. 1986)
- United States v. Pagan, 785 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1986)
- United States v. Cooper, 870 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1989)
- United States v. José Rivera-Velez, 839 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1988)
- Hoffman v. Kye S. Hoffman, 497 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)