ULYSSES JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ulysses Johnson appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual battery, challenging the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, the exclusion of evidence regarding the victim's prior drug use, and the refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication. The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction.
The court affirmed on all three grounds: the jury's credibility determination regarding oral sexual battery was properly left to the jury; prior drug use testimony was inadmissible because it did not establish drug use at the time of the assault or testimony; and voluntary intoxication is not a valid defense to sexual battery, which is a general intent crime.
[1] A jury's determination of witness credibility will not be second-guessed on appeal.
[2] Evidence of a victim's prior drug use is inadmissible if it does not establish drug use at or about the time of the offense or testimony, or affect the victim's ability t…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Since the jury decides the credibility of the testimony, we will not second guess their decision.”
Establishes the appellate standard of review for jury credibility determinations in evaluating whether the oral sexual battery conviction was supported by evidence.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohnson approached the victim at a birthday party and requested a ride to John Miller's farm. After arriving at the isolated farm location, Johnson dr…
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HARRIS, Judge.
Ulysses Johnson appeals his judgment and sentence for two counts of sexual battery. He contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal on one count of sexual battery, in excluding testimony relating to the victim’s drug use, and in refusing to instruct the jury on his voluntary intoxication defense. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
DENIAL OF JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
The victim of this offense attended a birthday party at Ace’s Juke Joint and Bar. When the party disbanded at approximately 3:00 a.m., she was approached by Johnson who asked for a ride to “John Miller’s farm.” Although she did not know Johnson, she was familiar with John Miller’s farm. Since it was on her way home, she agreed to give him a ride. Once they arrived at the farm, Johnson asked to be let off at an isolated location. When the victim stopped, Johnson dragged her from the car and assaulted her. Later, after she was taken to the hospital, a vaginal examination was conducted. Johnson does not deny vaginal intercourse. He contends, however, that his conviction for oral sexual battery is not supported by the evidence. He relies on the fact that Dr. Blakely, the examining physician, only checked for vaginal intercourse because the victim denied that any oral sex had taken place. On cross-examination the doctor stated “my notes reflect that she said vaginal sex only.”
The victim testified, however, that when she was removed from the ear she was required to perform oral sex on Johnson. This issue then became a jury question and the jury found against Johnson. Since the jury decides the credibility of the testimony, we will not second guess their decision. See, e.g., Guzman v. State, 558 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) and cases cited therein.
PRIOR DRUG USE TESTIMONY
Johnson testified that the sex was voluntary after he and the victim had smoked cocaine. The victim testified that no drugs were involved that evening and her blood samples, taken as part of the rape investigation, showed no traces of drugs. Johnson proffered the testimony of a witness who would testify that he knew the victim and that during the period of time of the sexual battery, it was not uncommon for her to use cocaine. The court rejected this testimony.
This proffered testimony would not show:
1. That the victim used cocaine at or about the time of the sexual battery;
2. That the victim used cocaine at or about the time of her testimony; or
3. That her prior drug use would have affected her ability to observe, remember or recount.
Thus, the testimony was not admissible. Edwards v. State, 548 So. 2d 656 (Fla.1989); Richardson v. State, 561 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
While voluntary intoxication is a defense to a specific intent crime, sexual battery is a general intent crime. Buford v. State, 492 So. 2d 355 (Fla.1986). The court was correct in not instructing on voluntary intoxication.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH and COWART, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Wright v. State, 675 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…iary hearing or record attachments which refute his claim. Wright pleaded guilty to a number of felonies associated with two sexual batteries. He had been charged with the sexual batteries, crimes which require no specific intent, Johnson v. State, 565 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), as well as kidnapping and attempted first degree murder, which are specific intent crimes. Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285 (Fla.1993); Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820 (Fla.1989). In his motion he assails counsel for not pursui…
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Bratcher v. State, 743 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…of cocaine on the day of the incident and does not indicate that the defense witness’ mind was impaired because of drug use. Green v. State, 688 So. 2d 301, 305 (Fla.1996); Edwards v. State, 548 So. 2d 656, 658 (Fla.1989). See also Johnson v. State, 565 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Richardson v. State, 561 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Finally, Bratcher contends that the lower court habitualized him because of its belief that Bratcher had lied on the stand and the habitual offender sentence was the…
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Nova v. State, 874 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…of the testimony itself; or (c) it was expressly shown by other relevant evidence that the prior drug use affected the witnesses ability to observe, remember, and recount. See also Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 1053 (Fla.2000); Johnson v. State, 565 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Richardson v. State, 561 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Here, the testimony sought to be presented to the jury met none of the exceptions. As a final matter, Mr. Nova attacks his sentence as a prison releasee reoffender on cons…
Authorities Cited
- Derinda Edwards v. State, 548 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 1989)
- Buford v. State, 492 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1986)
- Richardson v. State, 561 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
- State v. Broderick Demerritte, 558 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)