CHRISTOPHER LYNN KOPPE

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Wagner v. State, 177 So. 3d 695, 697 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (recognizing that when a defendant enters an open plea, there is no plea agreement between the defendant and the State, and the trial court has the absolute discretion to determine the appropriate sentence); Jacoby v. State, 215 So. 3d 168, 171–72 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (recognizing that if a defendant is sentenced to a new prison sentence upon the revocation of the probationary term of a probationary split sentence, the defendant is not entitled to credit for the full amount of the original sentence if he obtained an early release due to gain time—he is entitled to credit for the time he actually served in prison); Brown v. State, 268 So. 3d 177, 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (“[F]orfeiture of gain time is a collateral consequence, and . . . neither the circuit court nor counsel was required to forewarn the defendant about that collateral consequence.” (citing Ortiz v. State, 227 So. 3d 682, 684 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017))); State v. Rodriguez, 990 So. 2d 600, 606–07 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“[T]here is no requirement that a defendant be given a specifically quantified amount of time that he is expected to serve in prison.”).

LAMBERT, C.J., MAKAR and BOATWRIGHT, JJ., concur.