JESUS R. GONZALEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
ESTRELLA GONZALEZ, APPELLEE
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In this divorce appeal, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's distribution of marital assets and award of permanent alimony to the wife, but reversed the award granting the wife exclusive possession of the marital home beyond the youngest child's age of majority. The court held that child support obligations, and incidents thereof, terminate when the child reaches the age of majority.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in distributing marital assets or awarding permanent alimony, and those decisions are affirmed. However, the trial court erred in awarding exclusive possession of the marital home beyond the child's age of majority, as the husband's support obligation terminates upon the child reaching majority, and the award of exclusive possession is an incident of child support.
[1] A trial court has discretion in the equitable distribution of marital assets and in awarding permanent periodic alimony.
[2] An award of exclusive possession of the marital home to a spouse is generally considered an incident of child support.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the award of exclusive possession is an incident of child support”
Establishes the legal characterization of the home possession award despite the trial court's framing it as support for both the minor child and wife
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJesus R. Gonzalez and Estrella Gonzalez were married. The trial court entered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage on May 16, 1989, at which ti…
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BASKIN, Judge.
The husband appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in its distribution of the marital assets, its award of permanent periodic alimony to the wife, and its award of exclusive possession of the marital home beyond the youngest child’s age of majority. We affirm the final judgment in all respects other than the award of exclusive possession of the marital home. The equitable distribution of the marital assets and the award of permanent alimony were within the discretion of the trial judge, and we find no evidence that the trial judge abused that discretion. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980).
The trial judge awarded exclusive possession of the marital home to the wife “so long as the minor child resides in the home while attending high school, college or post-graduate education but in no event beyond August 1, 1996.” 1 Despite the trial court’s characterization of this award as support for the minor child and the wife, it is clear that the award of exclusive possession is an incident of child support. Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla.1980); Farrington v. Farrington, 390 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review dismissed, 399 So. 2d 1142 (Fla.1981).
Although the wife is entitled to exclusive possession of the marital home until the minor child reaches the age of majority, Farrington; Dolch v. Dolch, 368 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); see also Markham v. Markham, 485 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), we are unable to sustain the award of exclusive possession of the marital home beyond that time; the husband’s obligation for support terminates upon the child’s attainment of majority. Farrington; Hirst v. Hirst, 452 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Thomas v. Thomas, 427 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
We, therefore, reverse the provisions of the final judgment relating to exclusive possession of the marital home be yond the age of the youngest child’s majority.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded for entry of final judgment in accordance with this opinion.
. At the time of the entry of final judgment, May 16, 1989, the minor child was fourteen years old.
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Polley v. Polley, 588 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…his present consulting position. . The trial court properly awarded the wife exclusive possession of the marital home until the minor child reaches eighteen years of age. Sanchez v. Sanchez, 577 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 563 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). . In addition, the wife obtained a personal loan to finance replacement of the marital home roof. The final judgment does not disclose whether the trial court considered this liability in fashioning the equitable distribution sc…
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Kirkland v. Kirkland, 568 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…erminates when the son reaches age eighteen. There was no showing of special circumstances that warranted [*496] extending use of the marital home beyond the son’s attainment of the age of eighteen while he attends college. See Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 563 So. 2d 813, 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (abuse of discretion to award wife exclusive possession of the home “ ‘so long as the minor child resides in the home while attending high school, college or post-graduate education but in no event beyond August 1, 1996’ ”);…
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Peacon v. Peacon, 578 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…ild reached the age of majority. The award of sole possession was obviously an incident of child support for a specified period of time until the youngest child reached majority. See Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla.1980); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 563 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Farrington v. Farrington, 390 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), rev. dismissed, 399 So. 2d 1142 (Fla.1981). Now that the youngest child has reached majority, the former husband’s obligation to support that child has terminated, and…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980)
- Farrington v. Prince Farrington, 390 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Markham v. Markham, 485 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Knobby J. Thomas v. Thomas, 427 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Booth v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 452 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Hirst v. Hirst, 452 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Carraway v. Carraway, 368 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Dolch v. Dolch, 368 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)