DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, ETC.
v.
ORLANDO PEREIRA AND
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The appellate court reversed a portion of a lower court's attorney's fees award, specifically the contingency fee multiplier, because the homeowners failed to provide evidence of the relevant market factor. The court affirmed the rest of the award.
No, the lower court erred in awarding a contingency fee multiplier because the record lacked evidence of the relevant market factor, which is a mandatory consideration. The appellate court reversed this portion of the award.
[1] A contingency fee multiplier may not be awarded in the absence of evidence establishing that the relevant market requires such a multiplier to obtain competent counsel.
[2] The failure to present evidence on the relevant market factor mandates reversal of an award of a contingency fee multiplier.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The record is devoid of any evidence of the first factor, the relevant market factor. Awarding a contingency fee multiplier in the absence of testimony regarding the relevant market is error.”
Establishes the primary reason for reversing the contingency fee multiplier.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDeutsche Bank National Trust Company appealed a final award of attorney's fees granted to homeowners after a final judgment in their favor. The homeow…
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LEVINE, J.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company appeals a final award of attorney’s fees in favor of the appellee homeowners following final judgment in the homeowners’ favor, raising three issues. We reverse the portion of the order awarding the homeowners a contingency fee multiplier. On all other issues, we affirm without further comment.
The following factors are relevant when determining the applicability of a fee multiplier:
(1) whether the relevant market requires a contingency fee multiplier to obtain competent counsel; (2) whether the attorney was able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment in any way; and (3) whether any of the factors set forth in Rowe are applicable, especially, the amount involved, the results obtained, and the type of fee arrangement between the attorney and his client.
Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 834 (Fla. 1990).
The record is devoid of any evidence of the first factor, the relevant market factor. Awarding a contingency fee multiplier in the absence of testimony regarding the relevant market is error. See USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Prime Care Chiropractic Ctrs., P.A., 93 So. 3d 345, 347 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (“If there is no evidence that the relevant market required a contingency fee multiplier to obtain competent counsel, then a multiplier should not be awarded.”); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cedolia, 571 So. 2d 1386, 1387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (reversing the award of a fee multiplier, in part where “[n]othing in the record supports the statement that the relevant market required a contingency fee multiplier to obtain counsel”); Sumner Grp., Inc. v. M.C. Distributec, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (affirming the denial of a requested fee multiplier where “Sumner Group did not establish that the market for collection cases requires a contingency risk multiplier to obtain competent counsel” and “evidence that a multiplier is required in relevant market to attract competent counsel is mandatory”). “[W]here reversal is the result not of trial court error, but a party’s failure to meet its evidentiary burden, a remand to allow for a ‘second bite of the apple’ is generally not permitted.” Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Candelaria, 339 So. 3d 463, 471 n.9 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022).
Thus, we reverse and strike the portion of the order applying a multiplier to the homeowners’ fee award. See Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deshpande, 314 So. 3d 416, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (reversing application of fee multiplier where the record is devoid of evidence of the relevant market factor).
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
CONNER and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990)
- USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Prime Care Chiropractic Ctrs., P.A., 93 So. 3d 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)
- Sumner Grp., Inc. v. M.C. Distributec, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
- Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Raghunath Deshpande (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cedolia, 571 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Roniel Candelaria and Amelia Padura, 339 So. 3d 463 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)