MICHAEL ANTONIO DAVIS
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Fla. 3d DCA | 2024-10-16
No. 2024-0382
2024 FL 12090 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2024)

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Synopsis

The Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District affirmed a lower court decision regarding a warrantless seizure and pat-down search. The court upheld the legality of the stop and frisk under Fourth Amendment principles requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed and dangerous.


Holding

The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the stop and frisk were justified where the officer had reasonable suspicion that the detainee had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, and reasonable suspicion that the person was armed and dangerous, based on the totality of the circumstances.


Headnotes

[1] A police officer may reasonably detain a citizen temporarily if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a…

[2] An investigatory stop requires a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity; mere suspicion is not enough to support a stop.

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Key Quotes

“The rationale for permitting brief, warrantless seizures is, after all, that it is impractical to demand strict compliance with the Fourth Amendment's ordinary probable-cause requirement in the face of ongoing or imminent criminal activity demanding 'swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat.'”

Establishes the foundational justification for warrantless seizures in emergency circumstances

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Facts & Procedural History

The opinion text does not specify the factual details of the case, as it is a per curiam affirmance that relies primarily on legal precedent without r…

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Opinion of the Court

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 12–13, (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The rationale for permitting brief, warrantless seizures is, after all, that it is impractical to demand strict compliance with the Fourth Amendment’s ordinary probable-cause requirement in the face of ongoing or imminent criminal activity demanding ‘swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat.’” (citation omitted)); Enich v. State, 838 So. 2d 1216, 1218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“A pat-down for weapons is justified when a police officer, in light of his experience, has a reasonable suspicion that the detainee is armed and dangerous.”); Hernandez v. State, 784 So. 2d 1124, 1126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330–31 (1990)) (explaining that the reasonableness of an officer’s belief that a suspect is armed and dangerous must be determined by the totality of the circumstances); Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993) (“[A] police officer may reasonably detain a citizen temporarily if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. § 901.151 Fla. Stat. (1991). In order not to violate a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights, an investigatory stop requires a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Mere suspicion is not enough to support a stop. Carter v. State, 454 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).”); see also Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792,

806 (Fla. 2002) (“[A] trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness, and the reviewing court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.”).


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