MADELYN NAVARRO,
v.
OSDANY A. VELOZ,
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The appellate court reversed a trial court's denial of attorney's fees, finding that the opposing party had sufficient notice of the claim, thus waiving any objection to the lack of formal pleading.
The court held that the trial court erred in denying attorney's fees. The opposing party's lack of objection to the clearly asserted claim for fees, despite the absence of formal pleading, meant they waived any objection.
[1] A claim for attorney's fees must be properly pled to notify the opposing party and prevent unfair surprise.
[2] A party waives any objection to a failure to properly plead attorney's fees when the opposing party raises no objection to a clearly asserted claim for fees.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“As the record establishes the applicability of the well-entrenched “exception to the Stockman doctrine which applies when the opposing party raises no objection to a clearly asserted claim to fees,” we reverse for the imposition of attorney’s fees in favor of Navarro.”
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMadelyn Navarro sought attorney's fees in her dissolution action. The trial court denied her request, citing a failure to properly plead the claim as …
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MILLER, J.
Appellant, Madelyn Navarro, challenges the postdecretal final order and subsequent denial of rehearing rendered in her dissolution action below, divesting her of entitlement to attorney’s fees.
The trial court denied Navarro an award of attorney’s fees on the ground that her claim had not been properly pled as required by Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1991).
As the record establishes the applicability of the well-entrenched “exception to the Stockman doctrine which applies when the opposing party raises no objection to a clearly asserted claim to fees,” we reverse for the imposition of attorney’s fees in favor of Navarro.1 Crespo, 98 So. 3d 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (citations omitted); see also Caufield v. Cantele, 837 So. 2d 371, 377 (Fla. 2002) (“[T]he fundamental concern of the pleading requirement [for an attorney’s fees claim] is notice.”); Stockman, 573 So. 2d at 837 (“[P]leading requirements serve to notify the opposing party of the claims alleged and prevent unfair surprise.”); BankUnited, N.A. v.1 As the hearing on temporary fees was convened, but not concluded prior to the entry of the final hearing, with objection lodged solely as to the amount, here, the distinction between temporary and permanent fees is eroded. See, e.g., Cobo v. Sierralta, 13 So. 3d 493, 500-01 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (“In this case, [wife] was entitled to a temporary fee award to permit her to litigate all of the issues raised below . . .
Accordingly, the final judgment on review is reversed and remanded . . . and consideration [shall be] given to an additional fee award for [wife’s] representation in the prior trial.”) (emphasis added); see also Nichols v. Nichols, 519 So. 2d 620, 622 (Fla. 1988) (“Where one spouse effectively is unable to pay for legal counsel and the other suffers no similar disability, the very purposes of Florida’s dissolution statute are jeopardized and the trial court risks inequity. This conclusion is no less true because the request is for temporary fees.”); Fisher v. Bond, 906 So. 2d 1248, 1249 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“The net effect of the [failure] to schedule a hearing is to deny a needy spouse any . . . fees.”).
Ajabshir, 207 So. 3d 354, 356 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (“[A]lthough the defendants did not plead entitlement to attorney’s fees in their . . . answers, the defendants provided notice to [plaintiff] early on in the litigation that they were requesting attorney’s fees . . . and thus [plaintiff] waived any objection to the defendants’ failure to plead entitlement [to fees].”).
Reversed and remanded.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1991)
- Caufield v. Gino Cantele, 837 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2002)
- Cobo v. Sierralta, 13 So. 3d 493 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)
- Fernandez v. Crespo, 98 So. 3d 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)
- Bankunited, N.A. v. Soheila Ajabshir and Mehdi Ajabshir, 207 So. 3d 354 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)