MARIA SIDLOSCA,
v.
OLYMPUS INSURANCE COMPANY,
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The appellate court reversed a trial court's award of attorney's fees and costs to an insurer. The court held that a motion for sanctions filed after a voluntary dismissal is invalid because the trial court loses jurisdiction to consider such motions once a case is voluntarily dismissed.
No, a trial court does not have continuing jurisdiction to consider a motion for sanctions if that motion is filed after the voluntary dismissal of the underlying case. Such a motion is only valid if filed before the voluntary dismissal.
[1] A trial court has continuing jurisdiction to consider a motion for sanctions under section 57.105 only if the motion was filed before a voluntary dismissal.
[2] A voluntary dismissal removes a court's power to enter orders, equivalent to a deprivation of jurisdiction, preventing the court from imposing sanctions sua sponte after…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to consider a [section] 57.105 motion for sanctions only where the motion for sanctions was filed with the court before a voluntary dismissal”
Establishes the core legal principle governing the timing of sanctions motions relative to voluntary dismissals.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMaria Sidlosca voluntarily dismissed her first-party property insurance dispute against Olympus Insurance Company. Following the dismissal, the insure…
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MILLER, J.
Appellant, Maria Sidlosca, appeals from a final judgment awarding attorney’s fees and costs to her insurer, Olympus Insurance Company, rendered following a voluntary dismissal of the underlying first-party property insurance dispute.1 Because entitlement to fees was premised upon a motion for sanctions filed after the voluntary dismissal, and it is well-established that “a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to consider a [section] 57.105 motion for sanctions only where the motion for sanctions was filed with the court before a voluntary dismissal,” we are constrained to reverse and remand. Pomeranz & Landsman Corp. v. Miami Marlins Baseball Club, L.P., 143 So. 3d 1182, 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); see § 57.105(4), Fla. Stat. (2019); see also Pino v. Bank of N.Y, 121 So. 3d 23, 43 (Fla. 2013) (“Sanctions pursuant to section 57.105 were unavailable because [plaintiff] dismissed the case within [the safe harbor period].”); Lago v. Kame By Design, LLC, 120 So. 3d 73, 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (“[B]ecause appellee’s second motion for section 57.105 sanctions did not comply with the twenty-one-day ‘safe harbor’ provision of section 57.105(4), the trial court erred in granting that motion.”).2
Reversed and remanded.3
an order, equivalent in all respects to a deprivation of “jurisdiction,”’” a trial court does not have the “inherent authority to sua sponte impose sanctions after the entry of the voluntary dismissal.” Almazan v. Estate of Aguilera-Valdez, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D1230, D1230 (Fla. 4th DCA May 8, 2019) (quoting Randle-E. Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. 1978)). 3 Upon remand, in considering the enforceability of the proposal for settlement, see section 768.79, Florida Statutes; Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, the lower tribunal shall conduct all proceedings in accordance with relevant procedural due process requirements. See, e.g., 1445 Wash. Ltd. P’Ship v. Lemontang, 19 So. 3d 1079, 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (reversing a final default judgment awarding attorney’s fees where appellant was not afforded “reasonable notice [and] an opportunity to be heard before the trial court awarded [the] fees”); see also Brewer v. Solovsky, 945 So. 2d 610, 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“An award of attorney’s fees requires competent and substantial evidence.”) (citation omitted).
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- Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station Wqba, 731 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1999)
- Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1978)
- Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2002)
- Bitterman v. Anette Bitterman, 714 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1998)
- Pino v. The Bank OF NEW York, 121 So. 3d 23 (Fla. 2013)
- Zaida Lago, Julio Lago, Juan Carlos Lago & Alberto N. Moris, P.A. v. Kame BY Design, LLC, 120 So. 3d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
- Brewer v. Solovsky, 945 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
- Pomeranz & Landsman Corp. v. Miami Marlins Baseball Club, L.P., 143 So. 3d 1182 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)