KHALIL LINDSEY

v.

BOB GUALTIERI, SHERIFF OF PINELLAS COUNTY

PER CURIAM. Khalil Lindsey filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention after the revocation of his pretrial release. We granted relief in a previous order that directed the first appearance judge to vacate the revocation, thereby reinstating the previous bond.

We now write to explain our decision. Lindsey was charged by felony information in case number 22-04569-CF and was released on a $14,000 bond. Circuit Judge Chris Helinger was assigned to preside over the trial in that case. Lindsey was arrested after failing to appear for a pretrial hearing but was again released, this time on a $28,039 bond. While out on this bond, Lindsey was arrested for new offenses in case number 23-04356-CF. During Lindsey's first appearance in the new case, a different judge sua sponte revoked Lindsey's bond in the prior pending case over his objection that she was not authorized to do so under Benoit v. Hoffman, 359 So. 3d 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (citing Little v. Gualtieri, 353 So. 3d 675 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)).

Based on her assessment that our analysis in Benoit was deficient because it turned on the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure rather than on the bail statutes—particularly section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2023)—the first appearance judge concluded that she was not obligated to follow that decision. The first appearance judge was wrong. See Wood v. Fraser, 677 So. 2d 15, 18–19 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) ("[U]ntil such time as the supreme court overrules [an opinion of this court], or we recede from it en banc, or the Florida legislature clearly expresses its disapproval of [the opinion] by a subsequent statutory enactment, trial courts in this district are firmly bound by its holding." (footnote omitted)).1 1 Moreover, to the extent the first appearance judge appeared to reflexively deem statutes that she considered pertinent superior to the rules that this court applied and interpreted in Benoit, we remind her that although substantive law is the purview of the legislature, article V, section 2(a), of the Florida Constitution grants the Florida Supreme Court the exclusive authority to adopt rules of judicial practice and procedure. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. ("The supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts . . . ."); see also art. II, § 3 ("No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein."); State v. Raymond, 906 So. 2d 1045, 1048 (Fla. 2005) ("It is a well-established principle that a statute which purports to create or modify a procedural rule of court is constitutionally infirm."); Kalway v. State, 730 So. 2d 861, 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) ("If the procedural

During the first appearance of Lindsey's codefendant later on that same calendar, the first appearance judge stated that she was authorized to revoke the codefendant's bond because she had "authority from every judge in this courthouse minus [a judge not relevant here] . . . to revoke bond in all cases where somebody picks up a new" charge. Although Respondent urges this claim of authority as an alternate basis for denying Lindsey's petition, without any specifics concerning the nature of this authority on the limited portions of the record before us, we are not persuaded that it provided a basis for the first appearance judge to revoke bond in a prior pending case over which a different judge has been assigned to preside. See State v. Norris, 768 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 2000).

Petition granted. VILLANTI, ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, and SMITH, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. elements of [a] statute were found to intrude impermissibly upon the procedural practice of the courts, the legislative provisions would have to give way to the court rules and procedures.").