ASHANDA FINEGAN AND MARCIA HUFF
v.
US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
This case involves an appeal by Ashanda Finegan and Marcia Huff from a trial court's denial of their motions to vacate a final judgment in a foreclosure lawsuit. The appellate court dismissed the appeal as to Huff for lack of standing and affirmed the denial as to Finegan, finding her arguments impermissible under the relevant rule and lacking a sufficient record for review.
The appeal is dismissed as to Marcia Huff because she was not a party in the trial court and therefore lacks standing to appeal. The trial court's order denying the motion to vacate is affirmed as to Ashanda Finegan because her arguments regarding the bank's standing are not cognizable under Rule 1.540(b), and the appellate court cannot review other claims without a transcript of the hearing.
[1] A non-party to trial court proceedings lacks standing to appeal the judgment and must be dismissed from the appeal.
[2] A claim that a plaintiff lacks standing to bring an action cannot be raised in a motion to vacate a final judgment under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), as that…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We dismiss the appeal as to Ms. Huff. She cannot challenge the order on appeal because she was not a party in the trial court.”
Establishes the reason for dismissing the appeal for one of the appellants.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAshanda Finegan and Marcia Huff appealed a trial court's order denying their motions to vacate a final judgment in a foreclosure case. Huff was not a …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Florida Rule Of Civil Procedure 1.530 Motion For Rehearing cases and more on FLexlaw
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as trustee on behalf of the Holders of the Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-7 Home Equity Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-7; UNKNOWN SPOUSE OF ASHANDA FINEGAN; CARROLLWOOD VILLAGE PHASE III HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.; HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA; and UNKNOWN PERSON(S) IN POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, Appellees. No. 2D22-1122 May 3, 2023 Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Melissa M. Polo, Judge. Ashanda Finegan and Marcia Huff, pro se. Benjamin B. Brown, Joseph T. Kohn, and Gabriela N. Timis, of Quarles & Brady LLP, Naples, for Appellee U.S. Bank National Association. No appearance for remaining Appellees. LaROSE, Judge. Ashanda Finegan and her mother, Marcia Huff, appeal the trial court's nonfinal order denying the "Motions to Vacate Final Judgment," filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) in a foreclosure lawsuit between Ms. Finegan and U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee on behalf of the holders of the Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-7 Home Equity Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-7. We dismiss the appeal as to Ms. Huff. She cannot challenge the order on appeal because she was not a party in the trial court. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(g)(1) (defining "Appellant" as a "party"); Mkt. Tampa Invs., LLC v. Stobaugh, 177 So. 3d 31, 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("[B]ecause the trial court did not permit Market Tampa to intervene or to be substituted as a party, . . . Market Tampa was not a party to the foreclosure proceedings and does not have standing to appeal the merits of the final judgment of foreclosure." (footnote omitted)); Yankeetown Mgmt., LLC v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 164 So. 3d 744, 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("We dismiss the appeal because the appellant, Yankeetown Management LLC, lacks standing to challenge the final judgment of foreclosure in this case. Yankeetown did not seek to intervene before the final judgment was rendered; therefore, it is a legal stranger to the action."); Turkell-White v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 273 So. 3d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (dismissing the appeal as to Turkell-White where "[t]he record below and on appeal clearly showed that neither Barbara A. Turkell-White nor her estate were named parties in the suit below").
As to Ms. Finegan, a trial court is restricted in vacating a final judgment under [rule] 1.540 to the narrow grounds stated therein, and is not empowered to revisit a final judgment on the merits so as to correct errors of law as the trial court may do on a motion for rehearing under [Florida Rule of Civil Procedure] 1.530. Balmoral Condo. Ass'n v. Grimaldi, 107 So. 3d 1149, 1153 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting Herskowitz v. Herskowitz, 513 So. 2d 1318, 1319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)).
Thus, Ms. Finegan's claim that U.S. Bank lacked standing to seek foreclosure is not permitted under rule 1.540. See id.; see also Phadael v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 83 So. 3d 893, 895 (Fla. 4th DCA
2012) ("Even where a judgment is entered in favor of a plaintiff that lacks standing, the judgment is merely voidable, not void. A judgment that is merely voidable cannot be set aside under rule 1.540(b)(4)." (citation omitted)).
We cannot adequately review the remainder of Ms. Finegan's claims on appeal absent a transcript of the hearing in the trial court. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) ("Without a record of the trial proceedings, the appellate court can not properly resolve the underlying factual issues so as to conclude that the trial court's judgment is not supported by the evidence or by an alternative theory."); John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co. v. Lorelys Elec. Corp., 69 So. 3d 1099, 1101 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) ("Where no transcript of the hearing on the motion to set aside exists, there is a presumption that the trial court correctly ruled on the motion below." (citing Larjim Mgmt. Corp. v. Cap. Bank, 554 So. 2d 587, 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989))).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order as to Ms. Finegan.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part. BLACK and LUCAS, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Pitcher v. Schneider (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
- Phadael v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Americas, 83 So. 3d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)
- The Balmoral Condo. Ass'n v. Grimaldi, 107 So. 3d 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)
- Herskowitz v. Herskowitz, 513 So. 2d 1318 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Mkt. Tampa Invs., LLC v. Goldia Marie Stobaugh, 177 So. 3d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)
- Larjim Mgmt. Corp. & Lawrence Gordon v. Cap. Bank, 554 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co. v. Lorelys Elec. Corp., 69 So. 3d 1099 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)
- Yankeetown Mgmt., LLC v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 164 So. 3d 744 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)
- Darst v. Yaron David, 59 So. 3d 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)