LAWSON MACK, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the firearm was unlawfully seized because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the appellant.
[1] A police officer's observation of a person stepping backward down stairs and entering a breezeway after making eye contact does not, in itself, establish reasonable suspi…
[2] An individual's evasive actions, without more, do not automatically indicate involvement in wrongdoing sufficient to justify a detention.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice responded to a report of a car break-in and observed the appellant walking away from the area. The appellant's reaction to the officers and ina…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant Lawson Mack was placed on probation (adjudication withheld) for carrying a concealed firearm. § 790.01(2), Fla. Stat. (1987). We find that the,firearm which serves as the basis for this charge was unlawfully seized, and reverse with directions to discharge the appellant.
Tampa police responded to a report of a black man (no further description) trying to break into cars parked at the Pak ⅛’ Save market. They drove past that location and saw nothing unusual. However, Mack, a 62-year-old black man, was observed walking up a flight of stairs at the adjacent Sundance Apartment complex. Having made eye contact with the officers, Mack “stepped backwards down the stairs” and entered a breezeway. The officers considered this reaction suspicious (one described Mack’s expression as “Qjust like you looked at your mother when she caught you doing something”). Mack was directed to stop and was subjected to “routine field interrogation questions.” He told the officers he was visiting a friend named James, but was unable to provide a last name or an apartment number. At this juncture Mack started to put his hands in his pocket. He was told not to do that, and the officers announced their intention to perform a pat-down search. Mack then admitted that he had a pistol in his coat pocket.
Under these facts the officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to justify their detention of Mack, which we deem more intrusive than a mere police-citizen encounter. At most the officers had been met with “evasive” actions, but such conduct does not ipso facto indicate involvement in wrongdoing. See, e.g., Bastien v. State, 522 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); McClain v. State, 408 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Brane v. Brane, 319 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Appellant’s admission, which obviated the need for an actual frisk, did not constitute a voluntary relinquishment of the weapon. See, e.g., Ingram v. State, 364 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
Reversed.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and LEHAN and HALL, JJ., concur.
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Cited By
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Sinclair v. State, 816 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…of burglaries on a particular street, and the officer thereafter saw the defendant’s car in the evening parked on the grounds of a business that was closed). To the same effect, see Moore v. State, 584 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Mack v. State, 557 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); and Jordan v. State, 544 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Moreover, the fact that defendant, after being approached by the officer, walked away from him at a pace faster than he had been initially seen walking does not justify his…
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Joseph v. State, 647 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…ficers would have proceeded to search him beyond a weapons pat down in any event, Appellant also suggests that his admission to the officers that he possessed contraband did not justify their retrieving the cocaine from his pants. See Mack v. State, 557 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). However, in Mack, there was no justification for a weapons search to begin with, the circumstances being more in the nature of a “roust.” Here, the officers’ conduct prior to Appellant’s admission was simply prudent. DELL, C.J.,…
Authorities Cited
- Ingram v. State, 364 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- McCLAIN v. State, 408 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Great Plains Ins. Co. v. Midgley, 522 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Brane v. Brane, 319 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)