SOUTHLAND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
JENNIFER ABELOVE, ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES
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Southland Life Insurance Company sought to intervene in its insured's tort action against third-party defendants who allegedly caused the insured's injuries. The trial court denied intervention but granted Southland monitoring rights and notice of settlement. The appellate court reversed, holding that Southland met the requirements for intervention based on its direct subrogation interest in the litigation.
Southland met the requirements for intervention under Florida law. Southland had a direct and immediate interest in the litigation that satisfied the Morgareidge test, and its interests would not be fully protected by the insured's prosecution of the suit alone. The trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to intervene.
[1] A subrogee with a direct and immediate interest in pending litigation, who will gain or lose by the judgment, may be permitted to intervene.
[2] Intervention is permissible when the intervenor's interests will not be fully protected by the original plaintiff's suit.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the interest which will entitle a person to intervene under this provision must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment”
Establishes the Morgareidge test for intervention, requiring direct and immediate interest in the litigation with a gain or loss based on the judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSouthland Life Insurance Company had paid $600,000 in medical expenses for its insured, Jennifer Abelove, and expected to incur over $1,000,000 total.…
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COBB, Judge.
This case concerns the right of a subro-gee, Southland Life Insurance Company, to intervene in its insured’s action against putative tortfeasors allegedly responsible for the insured’s injuries. Southland asserts it has paid out $600,000.00, and expects to ultimately incur over $1,000,000, in medical expenses. Southland’s insurance policy with its insured, Jennifer Abelove, specifically entitles it to subrogation rights against responsible third parties.
The trial court denied Southland’s motion to intervene, instead granting it “the right to fully monitor this case, and ... attend the trial and all discovery depositions.” In addition, the trial court ordered that the parties were prohibited from settling with out adequate notice to Southland, and that Southland was entitled to “full opportunity to assert its rights before the Court, prior to any settlement being presented to the Court.”
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230 governs interventions:
Anyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion.
To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a motion for intervention, the Florida Supreme Court’s general test established in Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234, 78 So. 14, 15 (1918), continues to be applied. The rule sets out the following requirements:
[T]he interest which will entitle a person to intervene under this provision must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. In other words, the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof, or a claim to, or lien upon, the property or some part thereof, which is the subject of litigation.
Southland asserts that it meets the Mor-gareidge requirements for intervention.
Clearly, Southland has a direct and immediate interest in the Abelove litigation. Its chances for recovering paid-out medical expenses stand or fall according to the success and character of Jennifer’s suit. Accordingly, Southland will “either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.” Morgareidge, supra.
A further condition to intervention is set out in Bay Park Towers Condominium Association, Inc. v. H.J. Ross & Associates, 503 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), namely, that the intervenor’s interests will not be fully protected by the original plaintiff’s suit in his own interest. In this instance Southland fears that Jennifer may concentrate her efforts on an award for future damages rather than dilute them by including past, insurance-paid, medical costs. As Southland notes, intervention was allowed for a party in Brickell Bay Condominium, Inc. v. Forte, 410 So. 2d 522, 524 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), so that it could assist in bringing about the full recovery which alone would adequately protect its interest.
As further support for its motion to intervene, Southland cites to Blue Cross of Florida, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 230 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). Blue Cross sought to intervene in an action for damages because it had paid plaintiff’s medical expenses. As in the present appeal, a subrogation clause in the insurance policy gave Blue Cross the right to collect against the defendant. When the trial court denied the Blue Cross motion to intervene, the district court reversed, concluding that “equitable disposition of the parties’ rights” required intervention.” Id. at 709.
We agree with Southland. Despité the various measures taken by the trial court to protect Southland’s subrogation rights, none of these measures equates with intervention, to which Southland was entitled based upon Morgareidge and the other cases cited herein.
REVERSED.
DANIEL, C.J., and W. SHARP, J., concur.
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Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1992)…istrict court affirmed, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The court noted that the Fifth District had allowed an insurer to intervene in a factually similar case, see Southland Life Insurance Co. v. Abelove, 556 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), but concluded that in this case Union Central’s financial interest alone was insufficient to mandate intervention. The court then certified the following as a question of great public importance: [*507] DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSE…1 / 2
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Humana Health Plans v. Lawton, 675 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…it should have had an opportunity to be heard. Humana does have an interest in the litigation in order to present its argument and the denial of its petition to intervene deprived it of this opportunity. In Southland, Insurance Company v. Abe-love, 556 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), an insurer sought, and was found to have a right, to intervene in order to assert subro-gation rights set forth in its insurance contract with the insured. In the instant case, Humana seeks to intervene to assert it’s entitlemen…1 / 2
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Fla. Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. v. Bd. OF Trs. OF the Internal Improvement, 707 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…determined that the appellants showed a direct and immediate interest in the case, the trial court also found that the Trustees, a responsible governmental entity, will fully protect the appellants’ interest. See South-land Life Ins. Co. v. Abelove, 556 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Charlotte County Development Commission v. Lord, 180 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). Moreover, intervention is a matter of a court’s discretion; though the trial court may liberally grant the motion, there is no absolute right to…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234 (Fla. 1918)
- Med Rehab Therapy Ctr. Inc. v. Direct Gen. Ins. Co., 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1700 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)
- BAY Park Towers Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. H.J. Ross & Assocs., 503 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Morrison Assurance Co., Inc. v. Polak, 230 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- Blue Cross OF Fla., Inc. v. O'Donnell, 230 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- Brickell BAY Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Forte, 410 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)