DAVID M. GRIGSBY, HUSBAND
v.
HOLLY GRIGSBY, WIFE
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In this family law appeal, the Florida First District Court of Appeal reversed an ex parte order requiring a father to return a child to Florida after he relocated with the child to Georgia before any dissolution proceeding was filed. The court held that the parental relocation statute did not apply because the relocation occurred before the lawsuit was instituted, and that any custody order required a hearing and best-interests findings.
The trial court erred in ordering the return of the child and entering a temporary custody order ex parte. Section 61.13001, the parental relocation statute, does not apply when a parent relocates with a child before the institution of any dissolution proceeding. Moreover, any temporary custody determination requires a hearing and findings regarding the child's best interests.
[1] The parental relocation statute applies only when a parent's principal place of residence changes at the time of the last order establishing or modifying time-sharing or…
[2] A trial court errs in ordering the return of a child under a parental relocation statute when the relocation occurred prior to the institution of any dissolution proceedi…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the plain language of the relocation statute applies only where a parent's principal place of residence changes 'at the time of the last order establishing or modifying time-sharing' . . . or 'at the time of filing the pending action'”
Establishes that the relocation statute does not apply when a parent relocates before any dissolution proceeding is filed
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant, David M. Grigsby, relocated to Georgia with the parties' child prior to the filing of any dissolution proceeding. The trial court issue…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant appeals an Ex Parte Order for Return of Child to Florida in which the trial court ordered him to immediately return the parties’ child to Florida after he relocated with the child to Georgia. As Appellant contends, section 61.13001, Florida Statutes, which addresses parental relocation with a child, does not apply to this case given that he relocated with the child prior to the institution of any dissolution proceeding. See Rolison v. Rolison, 144 So. 3d 610, 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“[T]he plain language of the relocation statute applies only where a parent’s principal place of residence changes ‘at the time of the last order establishing or modifying time-sharing’ . . . or ‘at the time of filing the pending action.’ § 61.13001(1)(e), Fla. Stat. The Mother’s location was already in Georgia when the Father filed the pending
action; as such, in accordance with section 61.13001, she did not have to seek permission from the Father or the court to move there.”). As such, the trial court erred in ordering the return of the child and in entering a temporary custody order without holding a hearing and making any finding about the child’s best interests. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 331 So. 3d 832, 834 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (explaining that a trial court must conduct a hearing and make the requisite findings before making a temporary custody determination); Williams v. Williams, 845 So. 2d 246, 249 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“We recognize that a hearing on temporary custody may be more abbreviated than a hearing on permanent custody. Nevertheless, the trial court must receive evidence sufficient to assure the best interests of the child on a temporary basis.”). Accordingly, we REVERSE the ex parte order and REMAND for further proceedings. LEWIS, ROBERTS, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. _____________________________
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Kerstin Williams v. Williams, 845 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Rolison v. Rolison, 144 So. 3d 610 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)