PAUL BRIAN HELINSKI,
v.
HADASSA HELINSKI,

Fla. 3d DCA | 2021-03-31
No. 19-2270
Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2021)

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Synopsis

The appellate court held that a trial court retains jurisdiction to award fees to a guardian ad litem even after a voluntary dismissal, but reversed the award because the trial court failed to address outstanding discovery issues before the fee hearing, violating due process. The court also clarified that fees for collection efforts after dismissal are not authorized.


Holding

Yes, the trial court retained jurisdiction to award fees to the guardian ad litem despite the voluntary dismissal. However, the trial court erred by failing to address outstanding discovery issues before the fee hearing, thus violating the father's due process rights. The guardian ad litem is not authorized to seek fees for collection efforts after dismissal.


Headnotes

[1] A voluntary dismissal does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to conclude ancillary matters such as outstanding motions for attorney's fees and costs.

[2] A trial court violates due process by entering a final order before resolving unresolved discovery disputes and ruling on outstanding motions.

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Key Quotes

“a voluntary dismissal does not divest the court of jurisdiction to conclude ancillary matters involved in the case such as outstanding and unresolved motions for attorney’s fees and costs, and similar issues”

Establishes that the trial court retained jurisdiction despite the dismissal.

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Facts & Procedural History

Paul Helinski appealed a trial court's final judgment awarding fees to Kira E. Willig, the guardian ad litem for his children in post-decretal marital…

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Opinion of the Court

PER CURIAM. Paul Helinski appeals from the trial court’s final judgment of fees rendered in favor of attorney Kira E. Willig, who served as the guardian ad litem (“guardian”) for his children in the post-decretal marital dissolution proceedings below.

We conclude that notwithstanding a voluntary dismissal, the trial court retained jurisdiction to award the guardian her fees and allocate the same between the parents. See e.g., Tobkin v. State, 777 So. 2d 1160, 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (noting that “a voluntary dismissal does not divest the court of jurisdiction to conclude ancillary matters involved in the case such as outstanding and unresolved motions for attorney’s fees and costs, and similar issues”); Giuffre v. Edwards, 226 So. 3d 1034, 1037-38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (finding trial court had jurisdiction to consider non-party’s motions for sanctions based upon revelation of confidential settlement negotiations by attorney that were submitted before parties filed stipulation of dismissal).

However, we reverse because the trial court failed to address outstanding discovery issues before the fee hearing, thus depriving the father of due process. See Jackson v. Leon Cty. Elections Canvassing Bd., 204 So. 3d 571, 578-79 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (finding trial court abused discretion and thus violated petitioner’s due process rights by entering final order prior to resolving unresolved discovery disputes and ruling on outstanding motions). Upon remand, we note that the trial court is without authority to consider the attorney’s fees for collection efforts that the guardian sought after dismissal.1 Cf. O'Neill v. O'Neill, 812 So. 2d 448, 451-52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

Thus, we reverse the fee award and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Footnotes
1 There is no statute authorizing an award of attorney’s fees to collect fees for the guardian, and the guardian and the parties did not enter into a contract authorizing payment of such. Although section 61.403, Florida Statutes (2018), sets forth activities that a guardian may undertake, acting through counsel, it does not provide that a guardian ad litem may seek payment for the guardian’s “collection efforts.” Similarly, the agreed order appointing the guardian merely provides that “[t]he guardian . . . shall have all of the powers, privileges, and responsibilities authorized in section 61.403 . . . to the extent necessary to advance the best interests of the minor child(ren)” and that [she] “is entitled, through counsel, to be present at any depositions, hearings, or other proceedings concerning the minor child(ren).”

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