CHEYENNE MARRON
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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The appellate court reversed a lower court's denial of a postconviction motion. The defendant argued her sentence was illegal because it imposed probation to run concurrently with a prison sentence, which is impermissible.
Yes, a sentence is illegal if it imposes probation to run concurrently with a prison sentence. The probationary period must commence only after the prison sentence is completed.
[1] A trial court commits reversible error by imposing a sentence that requires probation to commence while the defendant is still serving a concurrent prison sentence; all i…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well settled that a court cannot sentence a defendant to serve probation while that defendant would still be serving a separate sentence in prison.”
Establishes the core legal principle violated by the sentence.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCheyenne Marron pleaded guilty to several charges related to an armed robbery. She was sentenced to concurrent prison terms and probation. While her d…
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LUCAS, Judge. Cheyenne Marron and four others were involved in an armed robbery that left one victim dead and another injured. Pursuant to a plea agreement she reached with the State, Ms. Marron was adjudicated guilty and sentenced on the following counts: count I, second-degree murder with a firearm, 150 months of incarceration
- 2 - followed by 150 months of probation; count II, attempted second-degree murder with a firearm, 126 months of incarceration followed by two years of probation; count III, armed robbery, 150 months of incarceration followed by 150 months of probation; and count IV, conspiracy to commit robbery, 60 months of incarceration. All of the counts were set to run concurrently. While Ms. Marron's direct appeal was pending before this court, her attorney filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion with the circuit court.1
The circuit court never ruled on the motion, and so it was deemed denied by operation of rule 3.800(b)(2)(B). See Sirmons v. State, 264 So. 3d 958, 959 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) ("[I]f a trial court does not rule on a motion to correct a sentencing error filed while an appeal is pending within sixty days, the motion shall be deemed denied." (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B))). Ms. Marron now brings this separate appeal in which she argues that the circuit court erred when it denied her rule 3.800 postconviction motion. Her argument is well taken. It is well settled that a court cannot sentence a defendant to serve probation while that defendant would still be serving a separate sentence in prison. See Nobles v. State, 605 So. 2d 996, 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (observing it would be 1See Proctor v. State, 901 So. 2d 994, 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) ("Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) provides that 'If an appeal is pending, a defendant or the state may file in the trial court a motion to correct a sentencing error.' ").
- 3 - "reversible error to impose simultaneous terms of imprisonment and probation" (citing Barr v. State, 474 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Brudie v. State, 467 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985))); Robinson v. State, 198 So. 3d 1088, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("[T]he incarcerative portions of all counts must be completed before the probationary portion of any count begins." (quoting Hatton v. State, 689 So. 2d 1195, 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997))). The sentences the circuit court imposed run afoul of this limitation.2 KHOUZAM, C.J., and LABRIT, J., Concur. 2The State suggests that, notwithstanding the written sentence the circuit court entered, the presiding judge intended Ms. Marron’s probation to commence only upon completion of all of her prison sentences. That may be true, but it is not apparent from our review of the record that that intent was ever expressed. And we are not at liberty to go beyond what the presiding judge actually said on the record to glean what sentence the judge intended to impose. Cf. Nobles, 605 So. 2d at 996 ("Probably the trial court planned that the probationary terms [in one case number] . . . would run concurrently with the [other] probationary terms . . . and consecutive to the prison term . . . .
However, neither the written sentences nor the oral pronouncement of the sentences make that clear.").
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Barr v. State, 474 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Proctor v. State, 901 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)
- Brudie v. State, 467 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Hatton v. State, 689 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Nobles v. State, 605 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Sirmons v. State, 264 So. 3d 958 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)
- Robinson v. State, 198 So. 3d 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)