BRYAN FRANCIS SWIFT

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

WINOKUR, J.

Bryan Francis Swift was charged with second-degree murder with a weapon for the fatal stabbing of Adam Parker. Swift sought immunity from prosecution under section 776.032, Florida Statutes. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Swift was not entitled to immunity because his use of deadly force was not necessary. Swift then pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of manslaughter without a weapon, expressly reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion for self-defense immunity.*

* These hearings are often called “Stand Your Ground immunity hearings.” See, e.g., Love v. State, 286 So. 3d 177 (Fla. “Generally, a defendant who pleads guilty cannot challenge his conviction on appeal.” Hicks v. State, 277 So. 3d 153, 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). A defendant who pleads guilty may, however, expressly reserve the right to appeal a prior dispositive order. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i). A trial court’s decision regarding entitlement to immunity is “plainly dispositive.” Hicks, 277 So. 3d at 169 (Winokur, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).

2019); Washington v. State, 296 So. 3d 567 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). “Stand your ground” is a phrase relating to the 2005 and 2014 amendments to sections 776.012, 776.013, and 776.031, Florida Statutes, indicating that a person in certain circumstances has no duty to retreat before resorting to force in self-defense and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force. See Ch. 2005-27, §§ 1–3, Laws of Fla.; Ch. 2014-195, §§ 3–5, Laws of Fla. In the same 2005 law, the Legislature enacted section 776.032, which immunizes a person acting in self-defense from criminal prosecution for the use of such force. See Ch. 2005-27, § 4, Laws of Fla. The Florida Supreme Court later ruled that a motion to dismiss an information pursuant to section 776.032 requires a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the applicability of the statutory immunity. Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2010). Thus, the hearing is on the defendant’s entitlement to immunity under section 776.032, which has almost nothing to do with the so-called “stand your ground” provisions of section 776.012, 776.013, and 776.031. For this reason, I agree with Judge Roberts’ observation in Mency v. State: Most of the case law refers to this immunity as “Stand-Your-Ground immunity,” but this is a misnomer because the immunity applies to all self-defense cases, not just ones in which standing one’s ground is an element. That is why a better label is “self-defense immunity.” 292 So. 3d 1, 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (Roberts, J., concurring). I agree that we should no longer refer to the provisions of section 776.032 as “Stand Your Ground immunity.”

Section 776.032 confers immunity from prosecution if a person’s use of deadly force is justified under section 776.012, Florida Statutes. Deadly force is justified if it “is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm” to oneself or another or “to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony.” § 776.012(2), Fla. Stat. When a defendant claims self-defense immunity, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and weigh the evidence presented. See Craven v. State, 285 So. 3d 992, 993 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). On appeal, the trial court’s findings of fact carry a presumption of correctness and may only be reversed if they are not supported by competent, substantial evidence. See id. The trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. See id.

Swift attacks how the trial court weighed the evidence presented at the immunity hearing. Swift’s self-defense theory was that he was protecting his sister, Bobbi Jo Smith, from imminent death or great bodily harm at the hands of Parker. Smith, the sole “eye-witness,” testified that she and Parker were involved in a physical altercation on the day of the murder and that Swift was simply trying to break up the fight when Parker was stabbed. Notably, there was no sign of physical injuries, to either Swift or Smith, as a result of the altercation. Moreover, Smith claimed that she was in and out of consciousness and could not say how Parker was stabbed. She further admitted that she lied when she told the responding officers that Parker’s wounds were the result of an accidental fall.

Following the testimony of Smith, two other witnesses, and several law enforcement officers, the trial court found that Smith’s testimony was far from credible. The only consistent aspect was her claim that she did not see the altercation between Swift and Parker. The trial court noted the undisputed fact that Parker was unarmed and the lack of evidence to support Smith’s version of the story. As a result, the trial court did not err in discounting Smith’s testimony.

Tasked with weighing the evidence, the trial court did not act improperly when it gave more weight to the contradictory evidence presented by the neutral witnesses and responding officers. This Court will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. See Morris v. State,

325 So. 3d 1009, 1011–12 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). The record thus includes competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination that Swift was not entitled to immunity under section 776.032.

Accordingly, the order on appeal is AFFIRMED.

MAKAR and LONG, JJ., concur. _____________________________