FLORIDA CARRY, INC.

v.

JOHN E. THRASHER, AN INDIVIDUAL, AND FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

PER CURIAM.

Florida Carry, Inc., sued Florida State University (FSU) and its president, asserting claims arising from administrative regulations and policies regarding the possession of firearms on campus. The trial court dismissed the action because Florida Carry had not exhausted the administrative remedies available pursuant to the process established by FSU under the authority of section 1001.706(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2020), which requires notice, public comment, and a “process for a substantially affected person to challenge a statement of general applicability that has not been properly adopted as a regulation” or “an unlawful regulation.”

Florida Carry asserts that it may file a lawsuit directly in circuit court rather than be forced into pursuing available administrative remedies before doing so. No one questions that the Board of Governors has the authority to place “restrictions on activities and on access to facilities, firearms, food, tobacco, alcoholic beverages, distribution of printed materials, commercial solicitation, animals, and sound.” Id. § 1001.706(7)(b) (emphasis added); see Florida Carry, Inc. v. Univ. of N. Fla., 133 So. 3d 966, 975–76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). And no one questions Florida Carry’s right to challenge the lawfulness of restrictions on firearms, particularly in light of section 790.33, Florida Statutes, which creates enforceable rights against state agencies that adopt unlawful enactments that conflict with state firearms laws. The question is whether the rights set forth in section 790.33 are rendered meaningless by the available administrative remedy authorized by section 1001.706(2)(c). The answer is that both can co-exist without depriving a party of its constitutional or statutory rights absent extraordinary circumstances. As a general rule, a litigant must exhaust available administrative remedies, but exceptions exist, such as when doing so would be futile or exigent circumstances exist that justify going directly into circuit court. See, e.g., S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Mobile Am. Corp., Inc., 291 So. 2d 199, 201 (Fla. 1974) (“One is not required to pursue administrative remedies where such remedies would be of no avail.”). No exception applies here, such that Florida Carry is required to exhaust an available administrative remedy— one specifically established in the context of the state university system—to potentially resolve the specific dispute at issue without first resorting to a judicial forum. See State, Dep’t of Env’t Regul. v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist., 424 So. 2d 787, 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (noting that enactment of “new administrative remedies” had “severely curtailed the need for extraordinary judicial relief” such that “[o]nly in exceptional cases may the courts assume jurisdiction to render declaratory and/or injunctive relief without requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies”). Given the legislative directive that state universities provide administrative remedies to substantially affected parties, such as Florida Carry, and the absence of circumstances justifying by-passing those remedies, the trial court did not err in its dismissal for failure to exhaust remedies under section 1001.706(2)(c). AFFIRMED. LEWIS and MAKAR, JJ., concur; LONG, J., concurs with opinion.