JANNELL MCBRIDE, APPELLANT,
v.
GEORGE H. MCBRIDE, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1989-10-04
No. 89-00474
RYDER, A.C.J., and BOARDMAN, EDWARD F., (Ret.) J., concur.
549 So. 2d 787 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1989) Positive Treatment
Cited by 1 case

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Synopsis

In this dissolution of marriage case, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's dismissal of the wife's motion for attorneys' fees. The court held that when a marital settlement agreement provides for attorneys' fees upon default and the conditions for such fees are met, the trial court retains continuing jurisdiction to award those fees even if the motion is filed beyond the time for filing a motion for rehearing.


Holding

The court held that the trial court retained continuing jurisdiction to consider the wife's claim for attorneys' fees because the wife's right to such fees was a matter of right under the marital settlement agreement and constituted an independent claim, and the general reservation of jurisdiction in the final judgment was sufficient to support this continuing jurisdiction.


Headnotes

[1] A court retains jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees when the right to such fees is contractually established and becomes fixed upon the occurrence of specific events.

[2] A contractual provision obligating one party to pay attorneys' fees upon default creates an independent claim over which the court has continuing jurisdiction.

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Key Quotes

“the husband agrees to be responsible for any future attorneys' fees should the husband become in default and legal action become necessary”

The contractual language from the marital settlement agreement that created the husband's obligation to pay the wife's attorneys' fees upon default

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Facts & Procedural History

A final judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered on January 14, 1986, incorporating a marital settlement agreement requiring the husband to pay…

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Opinion of the Court
PATTERSON, Judge.

PATTERSON, Judge.

A final judgment of dissolution of marriage between the parties was entered on January 14, 1986. The judgment incorporates their marital settlement agreement, which provides:

[T]he husband agrees to be responsible for any future attorneys’ fees should the husband become in default and legal action become necessary.

The husband defaulted in the payment of alimony and on July 10, 1987, the wife instituted a contempt proceeding.

After an evidentiary hearing the trial judge entered an order which, among other things, awarded the wife a judgment for alimony arrearages in the amount of $20,-966.57. The order is silent on the issue of attorneys’ fees and contains no reservation of jurisdiction.

Thirteen days later the wife filed a motion to assess fees and costs. The husband responded with a motion to strike, asserting that the court lost jurisdiction to consider the issue when the time expired for filing a motion for rehearing under Rule 1.530(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.

In granting the husband’s motion, the trial court relied on Maney v. Maney, 413 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). In Maney the wife’s motion to assess attorneys’ fees was also filed beyond the time for the filing of a motion for rehearing. The final judgment, which gave full faith and credit to a Kentucky divorce decree, did not reserve jurisdiction for the consideration of fees. Maney, therefore, is facially similar to this case.

However, the difference between Maney and this case is that here, the husband contracted to pay fees on the happening of events which in fact occurred. • We find this circumstance analogous to the facts of Finkelstein v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 484 So. 2d 1241 (Fla.1986), in which our supreme court held that when the award of attorneys’ fees is a matter of right, a collateral and independent claim arises over which the court has continuing jurisdiction.

Here, the wife’s right to an award of fees became fixed upon the happening of the conditions to which the husband had agreed. The general reservation of jurisdiction in the final judgment is sufficient to give the court continuing jurisdiction to consider this independent claim.

We therefore vacate the January 19, 1989, order and direct the trial court to hear and determine the wife’s motion for the assessment of fees and costs.

RYDER, A.C.J., and BOARDMAN, EDWARD F., (Ret.) J., concur.


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