BOBBIE LEE ROBINSON, PETITIONER,
v.
HONORABLE DAVID L. TOBIN, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A trial judge removed a defendant's specially appointed assistant public defender in a first-degree murder case because of past differences between the judge and the attorney, then appointed substitute counsel. The appellate court held that when a judge cannot preside impartially due to conflicts with the defendant's attorney, the judge must recuse himself rather than remove the defendant's counsel, and quashed the removal order.
The court held that when a successor judge determines he cannot preside impartially due to differences with the defendant's attorney, the judge must recuse himself from the case; removal of the defendant's attorney is not a permissible alternative. A successor judge must honor a predecessor judge's appointment of counsel unless good cause for removal of counsel—based on grounds applicable to the attorney's conduct or qualification—is demonstrated.
[1] A successor judge must honor another judge's appointment of counsel unless good cause for removal of counsel is demonstrated.
[2] A judge should recuse himself from a case when prejudice against the defendant's attorney is of such a degree that it adversely affects the client.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The focus in a case such as this should be on the defendant's rights. As soon as the assigned judge is aware of a defendant's right to court appointed counsel, the judge should appoint such counsel at the earliest practical time to best insure protection of the accused's rights.”
Establishes that the trial court's primary obligation is to protect the defendant's rights, particularly the right to counsel.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobinson was charged with first-degree murder along with three codefendants. The public defender certified a conflict of interest existed between Robi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, who is a defendant in a criminal proceeding below, has petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review an order removing defendant’s specially appointed assistant public defender. We grant the petition and quash the trial court’s order. Defendant is charged with first degree murder and other offenses. The public defender certified that a conflict of interest existed between defendant and his three codefendants. The trial judge to whom the matter was initially assigned appointed a special assistant public defender to represent defendant. See § 27.53(3), Fla.Stat. (1987). Soon thereafter the defendant’s case was transferred to the division of the respondent judge, to whom all four code-fendants are now assigned.
The special assistant public defender filed several motions on his client’s behalf. Approximately three weeks after being appointed, the special assistant public defender appeared before the transferee judge to argue the pending motions. At that time the transferee judge alluded to past differences between himself and the special assistant public defender in an unrelated case. The court indicated a reluctance to opt for recusal in a multi-defendant criminal case, which would cause a shifting of a substantial workload to another judge. Operating on the premise that it is the court’s prerogative to appoint the special assistant public defenders who appear in that division, the court expressed a preference to have someone else serve as counsel for the defendant. The court thereupon appointed substitute counsel and removed the special assistant public defender. The removed attorney, joined by the defendant individually, moved for reconsideration and asked that the original special assistant public defender be reinstated. The motion was denied and the defendant then petitioned for certiorari.
While the trial court acted with the best of intentions, the order of substitution was impermissible and departed from the essential requirements of law. The focus in a case such as this should be on the defendant’s rights. As soon as the assigned judge is aware of a defendant’s right to court appointed counsel, the judge should appoint such counsel at the earliest practical time to best insure protection of the accused’s rights. Should a successor judge later be assigned the case, the focus must remain on protecting the defendant’s right to counsel. Consequently, should that second judge decide, as here, that he can not preside impartially because of differences with the defendant’s attorney, it is the judge who should remove himself from the ease; removal of the defendant’s attorney is not an option in such a situation. See Fla.Bar Code Jud.Conduct, Canon 3C(l)(a); § 38.10, Fla.Stat. (1987); cf. Ginsberg v. Holt, 86 So. 2d 650, 651 (1956) (disqualification of judge “when the prejudice against the lawyer is of such degree that it adversely affects the client”). Accordingly, a successor judge must honor another judge’s appointment of counsel unless good cause for removal of counsel is demonstrated. See, e.g., Fla.Bar R.Prof.Conduct 4-1.7 to 4-1.12 (grounds for disqualification of counsel).
We therefore grant the petition, quash the order of substitution, and reinstate the original special assistant public defender.