JOHN THOMAS JACKSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that a defendant cannot be convicted of both principal and accessory to the same crime, and the lesser conviction should fail when multiple convictions for the same offense arise.
Appellant was convicted of second degree murder, manslaughter by culpable negligence, and accessory after the fact to murder or manslaughter, all stem…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Hearsay Rule cases and more on FLexlaw
COBB, Judge.
The appellant, John T. Jackson, was convicted of second degree murder, manslaughter by culpable negligence, and accessory after the fact to murder or manslaughter. These convictions are based upon the killing of a man named Christopher Stamey by Jackson and one Scott McLeroy.
Initially, we observe that Jackson cannot be convicted of killing Stamey twice. See Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla.1985). When one conviction must fail, it should be the lesser. See State v. Barton, 523 So. 2d 152 (Fla.1988). Moreover, it is legally impossible to be both a principal and an accessory to the same crime. Staten v. State, 519 So. 2d 622 (Fla.1988). Therefore, the manslaughter and accessory convictions must be reversed.
We find the admission of hearsay statements accredited to a nontestifying code-fendant not to be reversible error under the facts of this case. See Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972).
Accordingly, we affirm Jackson’s conviction for second degree murder, reverse his convictions for manslaughter and accessory after the fact, and remand for resentencing.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.
DAUKSCH and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Bowen v. State, 791 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…. Thus, a person cannot be convicted as both a principal in a crime and as an accessory after the fact to the . same crime, and the crime of accessory after the fact cannot arise until the underlying crime is complete. Id. See also Jackson v. State, 543 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Newkirk v. State, 222 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Baker v. State, 184 Tenn. 503, 201 S.W. 2d 667 (1947). The fact that Carr committed suicide and was never prosecuted does not bar Ms. Bowen’s prosecution, but the State is ob…
-
Williams v. State, 601 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…ding and abetting oneself is a nonexistent crime. Morman, 458 So. 2d at 89.10 In such a situation the court would be required to set aside the conviction for accessory after the fact (the relief which was granted in this case). See Jackson v. State, 543 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). Appellant also contends that his counsel had no authority to move the trial court to vacate his initial plea to the offense of accessory after the fact. We need not reach this issue in light of the discussion above. We reject…
Authorities Cited
- Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (U.S. 1972)
- Staten v. State, 519 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Barton, 523 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1988)
- Ramsey v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985)
- Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985)