DAY

v.

EDENFIELD

In this case, Plaintiff Trevor Day and Plaintiff Kimberly Wood challenge a traffic stop resulting in their arrest as unconstitutional, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They also bring several state law claims arising from the incident. These cases are among nearly 40 individual cases filed against the Sheriff of Jackson County, Florida, and former Deputy Zachary Wester, alleging that Wester, assisted in some cases by Deputy Trevor Lee, made pretextual traffic stops during which Wester planted controlled substances in vehicles and then falsely arrested the drivers or passengers.¹ It is also claimed that the Sheriff condoned the alleged unconstitutional

practices, was negligent in hiring, supervising, and retaining the deputies, and is liable for their misconduct under state law. The cases were consolidated for discovery purposes, and the above-named cases were selected as members of the first discovery pool.² Before the Court are Wester’s and the Sheriff’s motions to exclude the expert opinions and testimony of the Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Roy Bedard, under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403, and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Having fully reviewed the arguments and the record, the Court grants the motions, as follows.

I. Background

On May⁴, 2018, Trevor Day was driving a vehicle with passengers Kimberly Wood and Ashton Johnson. Day was waiting to pull out of a McDonalds and forgot to turn on his headlights immediately. Wester initiated a traffic stop based on the

ECF No. 33–1 at 38–39 (depo. at 37–38). Wood told Wester that the methamphetamine did not belong to anyone in the car, that none of them used methamphetamine, and that they had just cleaned out the car. Wester told Wood

Prosequi and dismissed all charges in both cases. The Sheriff’s Office began an internal investigation into Wester’s practices in July 2018, when alerted by State Attorney Christina Pumphrey that Wester may have planted drugs in Teresa Odom’s purse (a different plaintiff) based on the video camera footage. She also found that Wester’s arrest statistics were noticeably high and had observed inconsistencies between his sworn affidavits and the footage of his body camera. In August 2018, the Sheriff requested that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) conduct a criminal investigation into Wester’s conduct. In July 2019, following the investigation, Wester was arrested and charged with 67 criminal counts related to his official misconduct, including one count of racketeering and multiple counts of official misconduct, perjury, possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia, and false imprisonment related to specific arrests. A search after Wester’s arrest uncovered illegal narcotics and drug

CASE NOS. 5:19cv506-MCR/MJF,⁵:19cv505-MCR/MJF paraphernalia stored in his patrol vehicle. He was terminated from his employment, and in May 2021, a jury found him guilty on¹⁹ counts involving three individuals. In September 2018, as a result of the FDLE investigation and a loss of confidence in the cases due to Wester’s conduct, the State dropped 119 criminal charges that Wester had initiated, including Day and Wood’s cases.

Day and Wood each brought suit for the violation of constitutional and state law rights, maintaining that Wester planted the evidence for which they were falsely arrested and maliciously prosecuted and engaged in a conspiracy and repeated pattern of violating constitutional rights, which the Sheriff ignored or condoned amounting to deliberate indifference. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding a municipality may be liable for constitutional injury caused by the execution of a municipal custom or policy). They also brought state law claims against the Sheriff for false imprisonment/arrest and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Wester. In support of their claims, Day and Wood retained Roy R. Bedard, Ph.D., a police practices expert who opines, in part, that Wester’s conduct was not consistent with accepted police practices, that the Sheriff’s Office had a well-settled custom of condoning Wester’s misconduct by failing to supervise his work, and that the Sheriff

CASE NOS. 5:19cv506-MCR/MJF,⁵:19cv505-MCR/MJF was negligent in hiring, supervising, and retaining Wester. The Sheriff and Wester each moved to exclude or limit the expert testimony of Bedard, including his rebuttal report.

II. Legal Standards

Rule 702, as explained by Daubert and its progeny, governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F. 3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2005). Under Rule 702 and Daubert, district courts must act as “gatekeepers” to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589). Expert testimony is reliable and relevant—and, therefore, admissible—when the following criteria are met: (1) the expert is sufficiently qualified to testify about the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology used is “sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit refers to these criteria separately as “qualification, reliability, and helpfulness,” United States v. Frazier, 387 F. 3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004), and has emphasized that they are “distinct concepts that courts and litigants must take care not to conflate,” Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel–Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F. 3d

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1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003). These factors apply regardless of whether expert testimony is based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. See id. (citing Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)). The party offering the expert has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that each of these requirements is met. Rink, 400 F. 3d at 1292.

To meet the qualification requirement, a party must show that its expert has sufficient “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to form a reliable opinion about an issue that is before the court.” Hendrix ex. Rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 609 F. 3d 1183, 1193 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702).

To meet the reliability requirement for an expert witness whose opinion is based “solely or primarily on experience,” as opposed to scientific methodology, “the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” Frazier, 387 F. 3d at 1261 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). An expert may rely on “facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.”

Fed. R. Evid. 703. The court’s focus is on the expert’s principles and methodology, not the conclusions generated. Daubert. 509 U.S. at 595. Regardless of whether

CASE NOS. 5:19cv506-MCR/MJF,⁵:19cv505-MCR/MJF expert opinion is based on professional studies or personal experience, the expert must “employ[] in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F. 3d 1233, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152). Any flaws in generally reliable evidence are best “tested by the adversary process—competing expert testimony and active cross-examination.” Quiet Tech., 326 F. 3d at 1345 (internal quotations omitted). “But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” Gen. Elec. Co. v.

Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). Moreover, the court does not “evaluate the credibility of opposing experts” or the persuasiveness of their conclusions.⁴ Id. at 1341. Instead, the gatekeeping duty is limited to “ensur[ing] that the fact-finder weighs only sound and reliable evidence.” Frazier, 387 F. 3d at 1272. Because reliability is a “flexible” requirement, courts have “broad latitude” in determining both how and whether reliability has been satisfied. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141-

42.

To satisfy the helpfulness requirement, expert testimony must assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence, must be relevant to an issue in the case, and must offer insights “beyond the understanding and experience of the average citizen.” United States v. Rouco, 765 F. 2d 983, 995 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F. 3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting Daubert requires expert testimony that is “relevant to the task at hand” (internal marks omitted)). Experts may express an opinion on an ultimate issue of fact, Fed. R. Evid. 704, but may not tell the jury what result to reach or testify to a legal conclusion. Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F. 2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990). Also,

“expert testimony generally will not help the trier of fact when it offers nothing more than what lawyers for the parties can argue in closing arguments.” Knight through Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 856 F. 3d 795, 808–09 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Frazier,

387 F. 3d at 1262–63). In the context of police practices, an opinion may be based on experience, as long as the “expert’s role is ‘limited to describing sound professional standards and identifying departures from them.’” Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 732 F. 3d 710, 721 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting West v. Waymire, 114 F. 3d 336, 652 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also Samples v. City of Atlanta, 916 F. 2d 1548, 1551 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding most

CASE NOS. 5:19cv506-MCR/MJF,⁵:19cv505-MCR/MJF of a “use of force” expert’s testimony appropriate to the extent the jury was properly informed that “the expert was testifying regarding prevailing standards in the field of law enforcement”). A police practices expert may present factors that might inform an officer’s decision regarding standards such as probable cause or the use of force when making arrests because “such testimony speaks to prevailing standards in law enforcement and may be quite helpful to the jury in conducting its own analysis of a false arrest claim.” Washington v. City of Waldo, Fla., No. 1:15cv73- MW/GRJ, 2016 WL 3545909, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Mar.¹, 2016) (noting an expert may testify to relevant investigative practices and tactics but cannot state an opinion that the arresting officer in fact lacked probable cause). In all cases, the trial judge must find that the expert testimony “is properly grounded, well-reasoned, and not speculative.” Frazier, 387 F. 3d at 1262 (quoting Rule 702 advisory committee’s note). Even if all three Rule 702/Daubert admissibility criteria are met, expert opinion testimony is still subject to exclusion under Rule 403, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact, if it presents a danger of confusing or misleading the jury, or if the testimony is cumulative or needlessly time consuming. Frazier, 387 F. 3d at 1263. And when evaluating expert testimony, the

CASE NOS. 5:19cv506-MCR/MJF,⁵:19cv505-MCR/MJF court remains mindful of the delicate balance between its role as a gatekeeper and the jury’s role as the ultimate factfinder. Id. at 1272. The gatekeeping role “is not intended to supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury.” Allison, 184 F. 3d at 1312; see also Frazier, 387 F. 3d at 1272 (cautioning that only the jury determines “where the truth in any case lies,” and the court “may not usurp this function”).

III. Discussion

A. Roy Bedard, Ph.D., Opinions

Dr. Bedard opines generally that the police practices and procedures used by Wester during the stop and the related customs, policies, and practices of the Jackson

County Sheriff’s Office were not consistent with accepted law enforcement standards. Bedard’s lengthy report, see ECF No. 33–4,5 includes the following sections: I. Introduction, II. Qualifications and Background,6 III. Materials Provided

VI. Analysis, which includes his Summary of Opinions.

In the Analysis Protocol section, Bedard briefly explained that he relied on documents and data available to him from discovery materials and that these are the type of materials typically relied on by consultants and experts in forming opinions and that he also relied on his “training, experience and advanced education in the field of use of force, defensive tactics and human performance.” ECF No. 33–4 at 7. He acknowledged that his terminology may overlap with legal terms or standards but explained that the use of such terms is common in his field. Bedard also stated that any assumptions of truth in the report were made solely for the purpose of analysis and not to assign credibility to any evidence or witness. See ECF No. 33– 4 at 7–8.

The bulk of Bedard’s report recounts the facts of the cases he reviewed, including that of Day and Wood, viewed in the plaintiffs’ favor, and his summary of the investigation into Wester’s misconduct and the Sheriff’s background investigation at the time of hiring him. Bedard determined that Wester stopped vehicles based on “shady probable cause,” ECF No. 33–4 at 70, and after reviewing the facts of Day and Wood’s stop, Bedard opined that “[t]here was no probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion for the stop or subsequent search” of their vehicle or person. ECF No. 33–4 at 40, 42. Bedard opined that Wester, sometimes aided by Lee, exhibited a certain pattern of conduct during the searches. The pattern included failing to turn on the camera to document the stop in full or turning the camera off before any contraband was found, using an “abstract violation” to stop the vehicle or justify a search (such as traveling without headlights, smelling marijuana, or saying a canine officer was en route to prompt a consent to search), and abruptly returning to the patrol car before completing the final search (to retrieve black tactical gloves and secrete illicit drugs, according to Bedard), and finding the drugs (which he allegedly planted) on his return to the search. ECF No. 33–4 at 69–71, 81–82; ECF No. 33–5 at 105–106 (depo. 104–105) (“I saw a patterned behavior” that “allowed me to look at these

CASE NOS. 5:19cv506-MCR/MJF,⁵:19cv505-MCR/MJF other cases in the same light . . . for example, the coincidences of the stop, the probable cause, the search, the behaviors that I documented ad nauseum in my reports aligned”). These similarities were first summarized in the FDLE report and probable cause affidavit by FDLE investigator Special Agent Dyana Chase. In Bedard’s opinion, the Sheriff’s conduct of “allowing Wester’s fabricated probable cause to go unchecked for an extraordinary number of criminal cases and allowing it to be presented to the State attorney” made the Sheriff “complicit in the malicious prosecution of the wrongfully accused defendants.” ECF No. 33–4 at 73. He also opined that if Wester’s supervisors had “paid attention to the pattern-of-conduct that

Wester was exhibiting, they would have detected his crimes.” Id. In Bedard’s opinion, this was evidence of negligent training. Id. at 111. Bedard further opined that opined that Wester and Lee engaged in a conspiracy to “plant[] illegal drugs on unsuspecting citizens” and make false reports “for the express purpose of falsifying probable cause” and to “maliciously prosecute” the individuals. Id. at 109. Throughout the report, Bedard commented on Wester’s credibility. He noted that the State Attorney found Wester was a necessary and essential witness in the cases he charged but that he could not be relied on because his credibility had been called into question. ECF No. 33–4 at 65. In Bedard’s opinion, the cases rely on the

CASE NOS. 5:19cv506-MCR/MJF,⁵:19cv505-MCR/MJF veracity of the deputies, and he stated an opinion that Wester’s claims “lack integrity, trustworthiness, and credibility.” Id. at 110. Bedard stated an “opinion” that Wester did plant drugs in Plaintiffs’ vehicles—in this instance Day and Wood’s vehicle–– crediting their version of the events. Id. at 109. Regarding the Sheriff’s conduct, Bedard concluded that the actions of Wester and Lee “show a custom and practice of unwarranted pretextual stops, planting illegal drugs, planting drug paraphernalia and contraband, coercion and false reporting which by de facto is condoned” by the Sheriff, who “knew or should have known that such nefarious behaviors were underfoot.” ECF No. 33–4 at 110. He criticized the background investigation into Wester’s hiring, conducted by Lt. Mike Hodges, as deficient for failing to uncover or investigate “rumors” in Liberty County about Wester’s “moral character” issues.⁸ Bedard also thought Hodges was biased in favor of Wester and noted some deviations from standard policy and

Bedard also noted that in 2017, after Wester was hired by the Jackson County Sheriff’s Office, he became the subject of an internal affairs investigation of workplace sexual misconduct initiated by Hodges, which resulted in Wester being suspended for four days and received no remedial training. Bedard opined that this, together with the Liberty County rumors, showed that the Sheriff was aware of Wester’s “proclivity toward poor moral character.” ECF No. 33-4 at 101 Bedard opined that Wester’s moral character contributed to his conduct of planting evidence and that “allowing Wester to continue engaging in police activities based upon his questionable character was proximate to the Constitutional violations suffered by the

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Plaintiffs.” ECF No. 33-4 at 111; ECF No. 33–4 at 100 (reasoning, “Wester’s moral character violations were bleeding over into other areas of his work. A pattern of unlawful traffic stops was also emerging as Wester began to rack up an excessive amount of drug arrests . . . .”). Bedard also opined that “[f]ailing to fire Wester from the critical, high integrity position of law enforcement officer demonstrates negligent retention.” ECF No. 33–4 at 111. Bedard stated Wester’s conduct “reflected the unmistakable pattern of corruption,” citing Wester’s number of drug arrests that outpaced other officers and irregularities in his body camera use. ECF No. 33–4 at 100. Bedard stated that

Wester and Lee “created an overt pattern of suspicious conduct” that supervisors should have noticed. ECF No. 33–4 at 88. Somewhat contradictory, however, Bedard also surmised that Wester’s knowledge of police practices and the operation of body worn cameras “allowed him to effectively game the system.” ECF No. 33– 4 at 87. In the final opinions summarized in his report, Bedard concluded that Sheriff knew or should have known there was no probable cause for Plaintiffs’ arrests given the conduct of Wester and Lee “ routinely engaged in a systematic pattern and practice of making illegal traffic stops” and “planting illegal drugs” and that the

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Sheriff’s failure to act was a moving force in Plaintiffs’ injuries. ECF No. 33–4 at 113. Bedard also opined that the Sheriff acted with deliberate indifference to the possibility of his deputies making false arrests by his “ignoring the obvious patterns of corruption” by his deputies. Id. In his deposition (sitting for several cases at once), Bedard testified that he noted no deficiencies in the Sheriff’s camera policy other than the fact that “the policy was not being followed,” which he then explained as meaning the supervisors were not reviewing Wester’s footage. ECF No. 33–5 at 142–44 (depo. at 141–43) (stating, Wester’s supervisors “were kicking the can down the road on who was supposed to be doing that”). Bedard was asked about his review of the foundational materials used to create charts of body camera non-compliance that he had relied on to find that Wester failed to comply with the camera policy. ECF No. 33–7 at 23 (depo. at 414). Bedard acknowledged he had not reviewed the underlying data, such as the camera audit trail, and he did not know who had prepared the charts, but he said he had no reason to doubt the charts were accurate.⁹ ECF No. 33–7 at 33 (depo. at 424). Bedard conceded he did not do a statistical analysis of the camera usage or

B. Reliability and Helpfulness

Neither Wester nor the Sheriff challenges Bedard’s qualifications,¹⁰ but both challenge the reliability and helpfulness of his opinions. Wester seeks to exclude

Bedard’s testimony in total, contending his opinions lack specialized knowledge and are rife with improper speculation regarding subjective intent, baseless conjecture, inappropriate credibility determinations, and inadmissible legal conclusions that will not assist the jury. Similarly, the Sheriff challenges dozens of specific quoted

Bedard’s recitation of facts with gratuitously biased commentary akin to lawyer argument and labeled as “opinions” is improper. While Rule 702 allows an expert to testify to matters that will assist the jury in determining a fact in issue, and allows an expert to form opinions by assuming disputed facts in favor of one side, the expert cannot merely tell the jury what facts to find. See Montgomery, 898 F. 2d at 1541 (expert may “testify as to his opinion on an ultimate issue of fact” provided the expert “does not merely tell the jury what result to reach”). As other courts reviewing

Bedard’s work have commented, much of his report “do[es] not state expert opinions at all, but simply provide[s] [his] slant on facts that are in the record.” Daugherty v.

Graves, No. 3:11-CV-458, 2013 WL 501670, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Feb.⁸, 2013) (internal marks omitted) (criticizing an “advocacy based interpretation of the record”); see also Dougherty v. Hurst, Case No. 1:17cv72-TFM-C, ECF No. 203 (S.D. Ala. Sept.¹⁵, 2020) (finding Bedard’s report “replete with inadmissible ‘expert’ opinions”). Here, as in those cases, such comments are improper and too numerous to be parsed out line-by-line. In addition, all credibility determinations and legal conclusions that appear throughout Bedard’s report are unhelpful and improper. It is settled law in the Eleventh Circuit that expert testimony “concerning the truthfulness or credibility of a witness is inadmissible because it invades the jury's province in determining credibility.” United States v. Falcon, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1245 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (citing United States v. Beasley, 72 F. 3d 1518, 1528 (11th Cir. 1996)). Bedard states early in his report that he does not make credibility calls, but the bulk of the report shows otherwise. He improperly states that Day and Wood and other plaintiffs are the only credible witnesses, that Wester’s claims are untrustworthy, that Wester committed “crimes” in other cases where there has been no such determination, and

CASE NOS. 5:19cv506-MCR/MJF,⁵:19cv505-MCR/MJF he unduly emphasizes the State Attorney’s assessment of Wester’s credibility.¹² Similarly, Bedard’s legal conclusions on the existence of constitutional violations, probable cause, reasonable suspicion, false arrest, and negligence in the supervision or retention of Wester masquerading as “opinions” will be excluded as unhelpful and improper. See Montgomery, 898 F. 2d at 1541 (stating a “witness also may not testify to the legal implications of conduct; the court must be the jury’s only source of law”); see also See Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402 F. 3d 1092, 1112 n.8 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[C]ourts must remain vigilant against the admission of legal conclusions”).

Turning to the substance of his opinions, the Court concludes that Bedard’s opinions will not assist the jury on Day and Wood’s claims against Wester. The only fact at issue on the claims against Wester in this case is whether Wester planted drugs–either he planted the evidence or he did not. While testimony identifying proper procedures for vehicle stops and searches and deviations from them is the

The municipality’s custom or practice must be the “moving force” behind the injury. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). CASE NOS. 5:19cv506-MCR/MJF,⁵:19cv505-MCR/MJF with deliberate indifference to the possibility of false arrests by “ignoring obvious patterns of corruption” and failing to implement adequate hiring and supervisory procedures. These opinions are not supported by a reliable methodology or analysis. Bedard identified a custom of pretextual stops and planting evidence to falsely arrest Day and Wood and others without any supporting office-wide analysis of data showing that these violations in fact existed and were widespread throughout the department. Instead, Bedard’s opinions singularly focused on the conduct of Wester as creating the custom, and he assumed that that the stops were improper and that evidence was planted on other occasions.¹⁷ But Wester’s conduct alone cannot establish a widespread custom on the part of the Sheriff. Also, Bedard does not reference any record of actual complaints to the Sheriff about improper stops or the planting evidence, and none of the allegations now raised in suits against Wester were known at the time.18 Bedard’s unsupported opinion that the supervisors should

As to a custom of failure to supervise, Bedard again conducted no analysis. Bedard did not identify Wester’s supervisors or explain what each did or how their review was deficient as compared to any established professional standard or as contrasted with the accepted practices of other police departments. Bedard provided no analysis, literature or special experience to suggest or explain how Wester’s unchecked policy violations were of a type that could be considered “particularly dangerous” and thus presented an unusually high risk that constitutional rights would be violated if not reviewed. Bedard’s report is devoid of any data from other sheriff’s offices, independent testing or analysis, or studies that could suggest this

Absent a reasoned analysis supported by data, identified standards, or comparison with practices in other sheriff’s offices, Bedard’s opinions are conclusory and unreliable, based on mere conjecture, assumption, credibility calls, and amounting to no more than ipse dixit, which is neither reliable nor helpful.²⁰

On the state law negligence claims, Bedard’s expert opinions fare no better. Importantly, Bedard explained nothing about the camera policy itself that requires expert opinion to identify incidents of non-compliance. He performed no statistical analysis related to the camera non-compliance or Wester’s high rate of drug arrests as compared to other deputies and conceded this was within the jurors’ capability to

U.S. at 146. In addition, Bedard’s opinions criticizing the hiring process and background investigation of Wester are based on conjecture about moral character and are not helpful. Bedard actually cites “rumor” as well as an after-the-fact newspaper report and a personal conversation as sources.²² See e.g., ECF No. 33–4 at 37-38 (citing an October 2018 Tallahassee Democrat article about “allegations of hanky-panky”); id. (Bedard commented that “information given to [Jackson County Sheriff] Roberts firsthand by [Liberty County Sheriff] Finch involved rumors of violations of moral character” and “[t]hese rumors were sexual in nature”); ECF No. 33–8 at 12–13 (“There was a lot of salacious information that had never been examined.”). This will not assist the jury with any issue and also would be excluded under the balancing

Therefore, the Sheriff’s motion to exclude Bedard will be granted. The Sheriff also moves to exclude Bedard’s rebuttal report, challenging the opinions of the Sheriff’s expert, Robert Pusins. Because Bedard’s rebuttal report suffers the same flaws as his initial report, it will also be excluded. Accordingly, Wester’s Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Opinions of Roy Bedard, PhD, Case No. 5:19cv506-MCR/MJF, ECF No. 33, and Case No. 5:19cv505-MCR/MJF, ECF No. 31, is GRANTED. The Sheriff’s Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Opinions of Plaintiff’s Expert Witness, Roy Bedard, Case No. 5:19cv506-MCR/MJF, ECF No. 34, and Case No. 5:19cv505-MCR/MJF, ECF

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No. 32, is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to file a copy of this Order in both cases. DONE AND ORDERED this 31st day of March 2022

M. Casey Rodgers

M. CASEY RODGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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