DONOVAN

v.

ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD.

[ECF No. 10, p. 2 (emphasis added)]. Despite this offer, however, RCCL never actually amended its answer or filed a motion to amend its answer. So the Undersigned is left with the original affirmative defense, as originally phrased (i.e., not making a distinction between money paid by collateral sources for medical treatment and money billed by healthcare providers but not paid by collateral sources). Had RCCL followed through and amended the answer to reflect this distinction, then this ruling would have been different. The discussion outlined below explains why.

The so-called collateral source doctrine is an affirmative defense. Hassan v. United States Postal Serv., 842 F. 2d 260 (11th Cir. 1988). The general maritime law applicable to this case bars a tortfeasor from mitigating damages by setting off compensation received by the plaintiff from an independent source. Borque v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 623 F. 2d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 1980);1 see also Hillenburg v. Carnival Corp., No. 16-22091-CIV, 2016 WL 5922756, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2016) (“In attempting to reduce the amount of damages by the amount of benefits paid or payable to the plaintiff by a collateral source, Carnival . . . runs squarely against the collateral-source rule.”); Baptista v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:17- CV-22115-KMM, 2018 WL 1226041, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2018) (“The collateral source rule prohibits evidence that a plaintiff was compensated by a third-party source, like a health insurance provider.”); Brown v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 15-21732-CIV, 2016 WL 8730145, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2016) (“Defendant is prohibited from introducing evidence or argument of past or future collateral source payments of Plaintiff’s medical bills.”). However, although there is no binding Eleventh Circuit case on point, many of the judges in this district, including the Undersigned, have also held that “(1) only the amounts of medical bills that represent the amounts actually paid by a third party for a plaintiff’s medical care are a collateral source; and (2) no collateral source benefit is conferred for an amount billed but not paid and, therefore, a plaintiff would obtain an improper windfall if he or she were permitted to recover damages for the billed-but-notpaid amount or to recover for bills that were written off.” Gharfeh v. Carnival Corp., No. 17-20499, 2019 WL 186864, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2019).

24492, 2019 WL 1559026, at *3 (S.D. Fla. April 10, 2019) (citing Gharfeh, 2019 WL 186864, at *1). As explained in Underwood, “the collateral source rule does not and should not allow Plaintiff to introduce all her medical bills, including those she or a third party was never required to pay” because, “if it did, Plaintiff would be allowed to obtain an improper windfall” for the billed amount, instead of the value of her actual medical expenses. Id. at *6.

As phrased (as opposed to the never-formally-implemented offer), RCCL’s eighth affirmative defense runs afoul of the still-valid collateral source rule for amounts actually paid, and Morrison’s motion to strike is therefore granted. However, subject to evidentiary rulings made by Judge Cooke, who will preside at trial, Morrison will not be permitted to introduce medical bills which were discounted or written off or not paid --

and RCCL will likewise not be permitted to introduce evidence to show that Morrison has already been compensated for the medical costs she incurred, and which were, in fact, paid.? DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, in Miami, Florida, on October¹, 2019.

/ A fig i ee a Li Goodman

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies furnished to: The Honorable Marcia G. Cooke All counsel of record