POLANCO

v.

IGOR & COMPANY, INC.

On April 9, 2020, the undersigned granted in part Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions based on Defendant Igor & Company’s failure to attend Court-ordered mediation.2 See (ECF No. 54). On April 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed its Notice of Mediation Expenses, advising the Court of the fees and other costs incurred in connection with the failed mediation. (ECF

$350 in Mediation costs. See generally (ECF Nos. 57 at 2, and 57-1 at 7). Counsel’s fees are based on an attorney hourly rate of $375. (ECF No. 57-1 at 7).

DISCUSSION

In assessing the reasonableness of a request for attorney’s fees in the Eleventh Circuit, courts use the “lodestar” method to calculate an objective estimate of the value of an attorney’s services. Norman v. Hous. Auth., 836 F. 2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). The “‘fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and hourly rates.’” ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F. 3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Norman, 836 F. 2d at 1303). Importantly, courts are not authorized “to be generous with the money of others, and it is as much the duty of courts to see that excessive fees and expenses are not awarded as it is to see that an adequate amount is awarded.” Id. at 428. Courts need not become “greeneyeshade accountants.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 837 (2011). Instead, the essential goal for the court is to “do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Id. Further, “[a] reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman, 836 F. 2d at 1299. The relevant market is “the place where the case is filed.” ACLU, 168 F. 3d at 427 (quotations and citation omitted). In determining reasonable hourly rates in the relevant legal market, the undersigned may also consider certain factors,

including “the attorney’s customary fee, the skill required to perform the legal services, the attorney’s experience, reputation and ability, the time constraints involved, preclusion of other employment, contingency, the undesirability of the case, the attorney’s relationship to the client, and awards in similar cases.” Mallory v. Harkness, 923 F. Supp. 1546, 1555 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (citing factors articulated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F. 2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (the “Johnson factors”))3.

Here, counsel asserts that he is the managing member of his firm and is a 2014 law school graduate from Florida Coastal School of Law. (ECF No. 57-1 at 2, 3). Counsel seeks fees at $375 an hour. (ECF No. 57-1 at 7). This Court, however, has recently found $350 to be a reasonable rate for plaintiff’s counsel in a similar action as the instant case. See Giniewicz v. UR Bath, LLC, No. 19-61790-RS (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2020) (ECF No. 19) (recommending $350 an hour for plaintiff’s counsel with approximately nine years of experience in an FLSA case that resulted in default judgment). The record does not show an independent basis why counsel’s hourly rate in this action should be any higher. Thus, counsel’s hourly rate for purposes of sanctions against Defendant for failure to attend Court-ordered mediation is reduced to $350 an hour. Accordingly, counsel’s fees are reduced to $8,067.50, based on 23.05 hours x $350/hr. All other amounts, supportive billing records, and documentation in the Notice of Mediation Expenses are reasonable and should be awarded in full.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDEGD that Plaintiff is awarded the following as sanctions against Defendant Igor & Company for Defendant’s

b Voce

ALICIA O. VALLE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE cc: U.S. District Judge Rodney Smith All counsel of record