DAVIS
v.
INCH
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The Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner, in state custody, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising six grounds primarily alleging ineffective assistance of counsel a…
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THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon pro se Petitioner Phillip Davis’s Second Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. (“Am. Pet.”) (ECF No. 22). The Court referred the matter to the Honorable Lisette M. Reid, United States Magistrate Judge, who issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the Petition be DENIED. (“R&R”) (ECF No. 50). Petitioner filed objections.1 (“Obj.”) (ECF No. 52). The matter is now ripe for review. As set forth below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R.2
Beach, 820 F. 3d 68, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)”; and on page forty-two, line fourteen, the citation should read, in relevant part, “See 5-H Corp. v. Padovano, . . . .” As set forth in the R&R, Magistrate Judge Reid finds that trial counsel’s decision not to move to disqualify Judge Butchko “falls squarely into the realm of considered strategic choices.” R&R at 13. Magistrate Judge Reid finds that the state court “properly considered under Strickland whether Petitioner had established prejudice finding that the sole fact that Judge Butchko had imposed a 20-year sentence and discussed Petitioner’s past offenses and lack of remorse while imposing that sentence did not establish prejudice.” Id. Thus, because “Petitioner cannot show deficiency or prejudice under Strickland,” Magistrate Judge Reid finds that the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s first claim is entitled to deference. Id. at 14; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–94 (1984).
As to Petitioner’s second and third claims alleging that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge Count2 of the Information as fatally defective, Magistrate Judge Reid finds that Petitioner “failed to demonstrate that the state court’s denial of these claims was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.” R&R at 15. Specifically, Magistrate Judge Reid finds that “the Information named the Petitioner, and sufficiently set forth the charge and circumstances of the alleged offense,” and thus “Petitioner’s argument that there was insufficient information provided to apprise him of the nature of the charged offense and the predicate violations to support the first-degree felony enhancement fails.” Id. at 18; see also Heath v. Jones, 863 F. 2d 815, 821 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“The sufficiency of a state indictment is an issue on federal habeas corpus only if the indictment was so deficient that the convicting court was deprived of jurisdiction.” (citing DeBenedictis v. Wainwright, 674 F. 2d 841 (11th Cir. 1982))).
Further, Magistrate Judge Reid finds that “[t]o the extent [Petitioner] means to argue here that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue the issue in terms of actual innocence, Petitioner is not entitled to relief because he cannot demonstrate deficiency or prejudice under Strickland.” Id. at 19; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–94. As to Petitioner’s fourth claim—that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert forensic accountant to testify at trial—Magistrate Judge Reid finds that “Petitioner cannot demonstrate Strickland prejudice because he fails to show that the uncalled witness would have been available to testify at trial,” and “[e]ven if [the forensic accountant] had been retained and available to testify at trial, Petitioner’s allegations fail to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland.” R&R at 21–22. Specifically, Magistrate Judge Reid discusses at length the evidence introduced at trial and finds that “[g]iven the more than sufficient evidence adduced at trial, Petitioner has not demonstrated that [the forensic accountant’s] testimony would have altered the outcome of the proceedings.” Id. at 34; see also Van Poyck v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 290 F. 3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“It is well-settled in this Circuit that a petitioner cannot establish an ineffective assistance claim simply by pointing to additional evidence that could have been presented.” (citation omitted)).
Notably, the testimony of the forensic accountant Petitioner now relies on “was predicated on an incomplete, limited review of the record so that that the accountant’s testimony is, as noted by the state trial court, as good as the information upon which the opinion is based.” R&R at 34–35. Magistrate Judge Reid finds that “the [state] court’s finding that Petitioner cannot establish Strickland prejudice is more than amply supported by the record.” Id. at 35.
Magistrate Judge Reid finds that Petitioner’s fifth claim—that counsel failed to request a good faith defense instruction—fails as Petitioner again has not demonstrated Strickland prejudice because “he has not shown that [a] special jury instruction would have been given by the court, much less that it would have had a reasonable probability of changing the outcome.” Id. at 36.
Specifically, Magistrate Judge Reid finds that “[r]eview of the record confirms that the only evidence adduced at trial to support the good faith defense was Petitioner’s own self-serving testimony.” Id. On the record before the state court and this federal habeas petition, Magistrate Judge Reid finds that “the state court’s denial of relief was not unreasonable or lacking in justification,” and thus, “Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.” Id. at 37.
As to Petitioner’s sixth claim—that the trial court erred in denying his motion to disqualify Judge Milton Hirsch from presiding over the Rule 3.850 Motion on the basis of bias and prejudice—Magistrate Judge Reid finds that the claim is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review, and even if it was, it would still fail on the merits. Id. at 38–39; see also Trice v. Sec’y v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 766 F. App’x 840, 848 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“[F]ederal habeas relief is not available for errors of state law.” (citing Jamerson v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 410 F. 3d 682, 688 (11th Cir. 2005))). On the merits, Magistrate Judge Reid finds that Petitioner’s “subjective fear” that Judge Hirsch would be biased, “without more, is insufficient to warrant judicial disqualification.” R&R at 42.
Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Reid finds that the state court’s “rejection of this claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and is not based on an unreasonable determination of fact.” Id. at 42–43.
Magistrate Judge Reid finds that Petitioner “has not met the statutory threshold for granting [an evidentiary] hearing.” Id. at 44.
Finally, Magistrate Judge Reid finds that no certificate of appealability should issue because “Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. at 45.
In his Objections, Petitioner begins by stating that he “objects to all adverse rulings” in the R&R, which is improper. See Macort, 208 F. App’x at 784 (“It is critical that [any] objection be sufficiently specific and not a general objection to the report.”).
In term of specific objections, Petitioner focuses on his fourth ineffective assistance of counsel claim—that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert forensic accountant to testify at trial. See generally id. Petitioner discusses at length the testimony and affidavit offered by his Rule 3.850 forensic accountant. See id. at 3-17.
Petitioner argues that the forensic accountant’s testimony would have exculpated him as the accountant’s testimony goes to the “ultimate issue” that resulted in Petitioner’s conviction. Jd. at 13-17. Further, Petitioner discusses what he believes was exculpatory state witness testimony and evidence at trial. See id. at 17-19. The Court finds that Magistrate Judge Reid’s R&R is well-reasoned and adequately discusses the points Petitioner now raises in the form of Objections. See generally R&R. Indeed, the Objections raise the same arguments Petitioner raised in the Second Amended Petition regarding the testimony the forensic accountant would have offered. See (ECF No. 22) at 13-16. The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Reid’s analysis and conclusion that “the [state] court’s finding that Petitioner cannot establish Strickland prejudice is more than amply supported by the record.” R&R at 33-35.
Accordingly, UPON CONSIDERATION of the Petition, the R&R, the Objections, the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Magistrate Judge Reid’s R&R (ECF No. 50) is ADOPTED and Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (ECF No. 22) is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is instructed to CLOSE this case. All pending motions, if any, are DENIED AS MOOT. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this _;>¢4 day of July, 2021.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE c: All counsel of record
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984)
- Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (U.S. 1972)
- Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815 (11th Cir. 1989)
- van Poyck v. Fla. Dep't OF Corr., 290 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2002)
- Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (U.S. 1997)
- Jamerson v. Sec'y FOR THE Dep't OF Corr., 410 F.3d 682 (11th Cir. 2005)
- DeBENEDICTIS v. Louie L. Wainwright & the Attorney Gen. of the State of Fla., 674 F.2d 841 (11th Cir. 1982)