ALEXANDRE

v.

RENAUD

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff Junia Alexandre’s (“Plaintiff”) Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs, ECF No. (“Motion”), filed on March 7, 2022. The Court has carefully reviewed the Motion, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed, and the Motion is denied as moot.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 7, 2022, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants.¹ ECF No. (“Complaint”). According to the Complaint, Plaintiff submitted a I-130 Petition for Alien Relative (“Petition”) on her spouse’s behalf on February 27, 2020. Id. at 5. Plaintiff received a Notice of Action from the USCIS on March 3, 2020. Id.; see also ECF No. [2-2]. Despite contacting the USCIS Contact Center on multiple occasions, Plaintiff has not received a response or approval

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiff has not paid the required filing fee and, thus, the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) are applicable. Fundamental to our system of justice is that the courthouse doors will not be closed to persons based on their inability to pay a filing fee. Congress has provided that a court “may authorize the commencement . . . or prosecution of any suit, action or proceeding . . . or appeal therein, without the prepayment of fees . . . therefore, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); see Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F. 3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004) (interpreting statute to apply to all persons seeking to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)).

Permission to proceed in forma pauperis is committed to the sound discretion of the court. Camp v. Oliver, 798 F. 2d 434, 437 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Thomas v. Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit, 574 F. App’x 916, 916 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A district court has wide discretion in ruling on an application for leave to proceed IFP.”).

However, “proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right.” Camp, 798 F. 2d at 437. In addition to the required showing that the litigant, because of poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, Martinez, 364 F. 3d at 1307, upon a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is required to examine whether “the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

If the Court determines that the complaint satisfies any of the three enumerated circumstances under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss the complaint. A pleading in a civil action must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).

Nor can a complaint rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Importantly, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and [are] liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F. 3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). “But the leniency accorded pro se litigants does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an action.” Matthews, Wilson & Matthews, Inc. v. Capital City Bank, 614 F. App’x 969, 969 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F. 3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F. 3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010)).

III. DISCUSSION

Even under the relaxed pleading standard afforded to pro se litigants, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not set forth cognizable claims. As an initial matter, it is not fully clear what causes of action Plaintiff alleges or even the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. Indeed, while Plaintiff has designated Case No. 22-cv-60500-BLOOM/Valle the nature of this action as “Other Immigration Actions” and “immigration delay,” ECF No. [2-1], Plaintiff has failed to set forth a single cause of action in the Complaint. See generally ECF No. . Thus, because the Complaint fails to set forth any specific cause of action, invoke the elements of any claim, or otherwise plausibly state a claim for relief, dismissal is warranted.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Complaint, ECF No. , is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Motion, ECF No. , is DENIED as moot.

3. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, March 8, 2022.

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to: Junia Alexandre 2061 W. Atlantic Blvd. Apt. 112 Pompano Beach, FL 33069